42-11-16 End of the Beginning Speech

.1942-11-16 Churchill at Mansion House - End of the Beginning - BrMo > . 

Winston Churchill's War - BBC doc > .

(16 Nov 1942) Churchill attending the Lord Mayor's lunch at the Mansion House speaks of the victory at El Alamein.

42-10-24 El Alamein - day 3

42-10-24 El Alamein - Day Three - 1942, 24 Oct > .
The Battle of El Alamein [doc] > .

The First Battle of El Alamein (1–27 July 1942) was a stalemate, but it had halted the Axis advance on Alexandria (and then Cairo and ultimately the Suez Canal). The Eighth Army had suffered over 13,000 casualties in July, including 4,000 in the 2nd New Zealand Division, 3,000 in the 5th Indian Infantry Division and 2,552 battle casualties in the 9th Australian Division but had taken 7,000 prisoners and inflicted heavy damage on Axis men and machines. In his appreciation of 27 July, Auchinleck wrote that the Eighth Army would not be ready to attack again until mid-September at the earliest. He believed that because Rommel understood that with the passage of time the Allied situation would only improve, he was compelled to attack as soon as possible and before the end of August when he would have superiority in armour. Auchinleck therefore made plans for a defensive battle.[113]

In early August, Winston Churchill and General Sir Alan Brooke—the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS)—visited Cairo on their way to meet Joseph Stalin in Moscow. They decided to replace Auchinleck, appointing the XIII Corps commander, William Gott, to the Eighth Army command and General Sir Harold Alexander as C-in-C Middle East Command. Persia and Iraq were to be split from Middle East Command as a separate Persia and Iraq Command and Auchinleck was offered the post of C-in-C (which he refused). Gott was killed on the way to take up his command when his aircraft was shot down. Lieutenant-General Bernard Montgomery was appointed in his place and took command on 13 August.

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The Second Battle of El Alamein (23 October – 11 November 1942) was a battle of the Second World War that took place near the Egyptian railway halt of El Alamein. The First Battle of El Alamein and the Battle of Alam el Halfa had prevented the Axis from advancing further into Egypt.

In August 1942, General Claude Auchinleck had been sacked as Commander-in-Chief Middle East Command and his successor, Lieutenant-General William Gott was killed on his way to replace him as commander of the Eighth Army. Lieutenant-General Bernard Montgomery was appointed and led the Eighth Army offensive.

The Allied victory was the beginning of the end of the Western Desert Campaign, eliminating the Axis threat to Egypt, the Suez Canal and the Middle Eastern and Persian oil fields. The battle revived the morale of the Allies, being the first big success against the Axis since Operation Crusader in late 1941. The battle coincided with the Allied invasion of French North Africa in Operation Torch on 8 November, the Battle of Stalingrad and the Guadalcanal Campaign.
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El Alamein was an Allied victory, although Rommel did not lose hope until the end of the Tunisia Campaign. Churchill said,

It may almost be said, "Before Alamein we never had a victory. After Alamein we never had a defeat".

— Winston Churchill.

The Allies frequently had numerical superiority in the Western Desert but never had it been so complete in quantity and quality. With the arrival of Sherman tanks, 6-pounder anti-tank guns and Spitfires in the Western Desert, the Allies gained a comprehensive superiority. Montgomery envisioned the battle as an attrition operation, similar to those fought in the First World War and accurately predicted the length of the battle and the number of Allied casualties. Allied artillery was superbly handled and Allied air support was excellent, in contrast to the Luftwaffe and Regia Aeronautica, which offered little or no support to ground forces, preferring to engage in air-to-air combat. Air supremacy had a huge effect on the battle. Montgomery wrote,

The moral effect of air action [on the enemy] is very great and out of all proportion to the material damage inflicted. In the reverse direction, the sight and sound of our own air forces operating against the enemy have an equally satisfactory effect on our own troops. A combination of the two has a profound influence on the most important single factor in war—morale.

— Montgomery

Historians debate the reasons Rommel decided to advance into Egypt. In 1997, Martin van Creveld wrote that Rommel had been advised by the German and Italian staffs that his army could not properly be supplied so far from the ports of Tripoli and Benghazi. Rommel pressed ahead with his advance to Alamein and as predicted, supply difficulties limited the attacking potential of the axis forces. According to Maurice Remy (2002), Hitler and Mussolini put pressure on Rommel to advance. Rommel had been very pessimistic, especially after the First Battle of El Alamein, and knew that as US supplies were en route to Africa and Axis ships were being sunk in the Mediterranean, the Axis was losing a race against time. On 27 August, Kesselring promised Rommel that supplies would arrive in time but Westphal pointed out that such an expectation would be unrealistic and the offensive should not begin until they had arrived. After a conversation with Kesselring on 30 August, Rommel decided to attack, "the hardest [decision] in my life".

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Battle_of_El_Alamein

42-8-17 USAF bombs Rouen

B-17 Daytime raid - Rouen = USAF first bombing mission > .
44-12-31 B-17 Piggyback & Crash > .

17 August 1942: Mission No. 1. The United States VIII Bomber Command made its first heavy bomber attack on Nazi-occupied Europe when eighteen Boeing B-17E Flying Fortress four-engine bombers of the 97th Bombardment Group (Heavy), based at RAF Polebrook, Northamptonshire, England, headed for the railroad marshaling yards at Rouen-Sotteville, France. This was the largest and most active railroad yard in northern France.
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While six B-17s flew along the French coast as a diversion, twelve bombers flew to Rouen and were over the target from 1739 to 1746. From an altitude of 23,000 feet (7,010 meters), they dropped 39,000 pounds (17,690 kilograms) of general purpose bombs.

Accuracy was good. One of the aim points, the locomotive shops, was destroyed by a direct hit. The overall results were moderate.

https://www.thisdayinaviation.com/17-august-1942/ .

Lt Glenn Rojohn of the 8th Air Force’s 100th Bomb Group was flying his B-17 Flying Fortress on a raid over Germany. A second B-17 struck and stuck below Rojohn's B-17.

42-7-27 Japanese Bomb Port Darwin

.42-7-27 Port Darwin bombed by 27 Japanese bombers - BrMo > .

(27 Jul 1942) Twenty-seven Japanese bombers raid the North Australian port of Darwin.

42-7-2 Destruction of Convoy PQ17 42-7-25

Destruction of Convoy PQ17: Merchant Ships Left Defenceless - Hgraph > .

PQ 17 was the code name for an Allied Arctic convoy during WW2. On 27 June 1942, the ships sailed from Hvalfjord, Iceland, for the port of Arkhangelsk in the Soviet Union. The convoy was located by German forces on 1 July, after which it was shadowed continuously and attacked. The First Sea Lord Admiral Dudley Pound, acting on information that German surface units, including the German battleship Tirpitz, were moving to intercept, ordered the covering force built around the Allied battleships HMS Duke of York and the USS Washington away from the convoy and told the convoy to scatter. Due to vacillation by Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW, German armed forces high command), the Tirpitz raid never materialised. The convoy was the first large joint Anglo-American naval operation under British command; in Churchill's view this encouraged a more careful approach to fleet movements.

As the close escort and the covering cruiser forces withdrew westwards to intercept the German raiders, the merchant ships were left without escorts. The merchant ships were attacked by Luftwaffe aircraft and U-boats and of the 35 ships, only eleven reached their destination, delivering 70,000 short tons (64,000 metric tons) of cargo. The convoy disaster demonstrated the difficulty of passing adequate supplies through the Arctic, especially during the summer midnight sun. Convoy PQ 17 lost 24 of its 35 merchant ships during a week of daylight attacks by U-boats and aircraft. The German success was possible through German signals intelligence and cryptological analysis.