Showing posts with label č. Show all posts
Showing posts with label č. Show all posts

Friday, June 26, 2020

CCP's Naval Ambitions - PLAN

Xina's amphbious challenges 












The People's Liberation Army Navy, also known as the Chinese Navy, PLA Navy or PLAN, is the naval warfare branch of the People's Liberation Army, the armed wing of the Communist Party of China and, by default, the national armed forces of China. The PLAN traces its lineage to naval units fighting during the Chinese Civil War and was established on 23 April 1949. Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, the Soviet Union provided assistance to the PLAN in the form of naval advisers and export of equipment and technology. Until the late 1980s, the PLAN was largely a riverine and littoral force (brown-water navy). However, by the 1990s, following the fall of the Soviet Union and a shift towards a more forward-oriented foreign and security policy, the leaders of the Chinese military were freed from worrying over land border disputes. Having traditionally been subordinated to the PLA Ground Force, PLAN leaders were able to advocate for a renewed attention towards the seas.

In 2008, China confirmed plans to operate a small fleet of aircraft carriers in the near future, but for the purpose of regional defence as opposed to "global reach". By 2009, with the advancements in naval technology, the PLAN was recognized to have reached the status of a green-water navy. Chinese military officials have also outlined plans to operate in the first and second island chains, and are working towards blue water capability. Chinese strategists term the development of the PLAN from a green-water navy into "a regional blue-water defensive and offensive navy."

The PLAN continues its expansion into the 2020s, increasing its operational capacity, commissioning new ships, and constructing naval facilities. Observers note that the PLAN's ongoing modernization is intended to build up the Chinese surface fleet and fix existing issues that limit the capability of the PLAN. Observers have noted that the PLAN's expansion will allow it to project Chinese power in the South China Sea and allow for the navy to counter the USN's operations in Asia.

The People's Liberation Army Navy is composed of five branches; the Submarine Force, the Surface Force, the Coastal Defense Force, the Marine Corps and the Naval Air Force. With a personnel strength of 240,000 personnel, including 15,000 marines and 26,000 naval air force personnel, it is the second largest navy in the world in terms of tonnage, only behind the United States Navy, and has the largest number of major combatants of any navy.

The Republic of China Navy (ROCN), also retroactively known as the Chinese Navy and commonly known as the Taiwanese Navy is the maritime branch of the Republic of China Armed Forces on Taiwan.

The ROC Navy's primary mission is to defend ROC territories and the sea lanes that surround Taiwan against a blockade, attack, or possible invasion by the People's Liberation Army Navy of the People's Republic of China. Operations include maritime patrols in the Taiwan Strait and surrounding waters, as well as counter-strike and counter-invasion operations during wartime. The Republic of China Marine Corps functions as a branch of the Navy.

The ship prefix for ROCN combatants is ROCS (Republic of China Ship); an older usage is CNS (Chinese Navy Ship).

The defence ministry said the aircraft, including nuclear-capable bombers, entered its air defence identification zone (ADIZ) in two waves. Taiwan responded by scrambling its jets and deploying missile systems. China sees democratic Taiwan as a breakaway province, but Taiwan sees itself as a sovereign state. Taiwan has been complaining for more than a year about repeated missions by China's air force near the island.

Chokepoints - South China Sea

2019 China's Attempted Hegemony - Geopolitics of the South China Sea > .
24-2-2 Why America Would Defend The Philippines - Ec Talk > .
24-2-17 Taiwan Question & World Order | X Economy - Update > .
24-2-16 USN vs PLAN - T&P > .
24-2-10 KOREA | A Final Separation? - Prof J K-L > .
24-1-9 Ċold Ŵar 2: NATO-like alliance vs Xina in the Indo-Pacific? | DW > .
23-12-21 Xina’s 3 goals in creating South Xina Sea tensions - Lei > .
23-12-18 Xinese Agression in the South China Sea (SXS) - Warographics > . 
23-10-25 US & [I-P-CW] vs Xina: Preparations to Fight War - Real > .
23-10-23 Xina's Threats Pushing Philippines Closer to US - WSJ > .
23-8-2 Xi's Anti-Corruption Purge of PLA Rocket Force | PLA structure - Digging > .
23-7-29 Ream, Hambantota, Tonga Naval Bases; Australia - Focus > .
23-7-28 PLAN's Indo-Pacific Bases - Ream, Djibouti, Hambantota, Tonga - Focus > .
23-7-27 Unbelievable Growth of Indonesia - EcEx > .
23-7-24 Xina's Nine-Dash Line: [Illegal Claims in South China Sea] - Geoff > .
23-7-12 Xina prepares for war - Hudson > .
23-6-11 [Mil-Civ Crosr] X's RoFo [Amphibious Assault] Ferries - K > . skip > .
23-6-11 US expanding presence in the Philippines = 9 bases - Binkov > .
23-5-10 US Military - New Bases to Counter China in Pacific | WSJ > .
23-2-28 Xina & ROC war prep: martial law, nuclear emergency, wartime controls > .
23-2-22 US Bases & Philippine Fight Against Xina - T&P > .
23-1-13 US & Japan boost cooperation; Marines ready to counter Xina > .
22-12-20 US military in Pacific to prevent Xinese invasion of Taiwan - PBS > .
22-11-27 Dragon's Claw: Xina's Next 10 Years - Kamome > . skip > .
22-11-11 Fortress Xina - Xi's Plans for World Domination - laowhy86 > .
22-11-2 Photo evidence - Xina has militarized South China Sea islands - Rev > .
22-10-11 Condeleeza Rice - Xina and Taiwan - Hoover > .
22-8-4 Situation Zoom: Pelosi Visits Taiwan | Goodfellows - Hoover > .
22-8-4 Nancy Peolosi’s trip ⇝ XXP and Xina-Taiwan relations - Lei > .
22-7-10 Singapore: Hx: Richest, Most Militarized Country in Asia - Explore > .
Risks of Amphibious Invasions - Hypothetical modern D-Day invasion - Binkov > .
22-5-12 The Philippines - China's New Province - laowhy86 > .
22-3-26 China has “Fully Militarized” the South China Sea - Uncensored > .
22-2-25 South China Sea dispute explained - Paint > .
22-1-31 Will Taiwan Spark a US-China Conflict? - Whatifalthist > .
2021 How China is Secretly Illegally Expanding its Territory > .
2021 Economic & Military Implications of China's BRI (Kevin Rudd) - Asia Society > .
Taiwan Strait Crisis 1954-1958 - Cold War > .
What is the RCEP? | CNBC > .
> Malaysia >>    



Taiwan ..

The South China Sea is a marginal sea of the Western Pacific Ocean. It is bounded in the north by the shores of South China (hence the name), in the west by the Indochinese Peninsula, in the east by the islands of Taiwan and northwestern Philippines (mainly Luzon, Mindoro and Palawan), and in the south by Borneo, eastern Sumatra and the Bangka Belitung Islands, encompassing an area of around 3,500,000 km2 (1,400,000 sq mi). It communicates with the East China Sea via the Taiwan Strait, the Philippine Sea via the Luzon Strait, the Sulu Sea via the straits around Palawan (e.g. the Mindoro and Balabac Strait), the Strait of Malacca via the Strait of Singapore, and the Java Sea via the Karimata and Bangka Strait. The Gulf of Tonkin is also part of the South China Sea, and the shallow waters south of the Riau Islands are also known as the Natuna Sea.

The South China Sea is a region of tremendous economic and geostrategic importance. One-third of the world's maritime shipping passes through it, carrying over US$3 trillion in trade each year. Huge oil and natural gas reserves are believed to lie beneath its seabed. It also contain lucrative fisheries, which are crucial for the food security of millions in Southeast Asia.

The South China Sea Islands, collectively comprising several archipelago clusters of mostly small uninhabited islands, islets (cays and shoals), reefs/atolls and seamounts numbering in the hundreds, are subject to competing claims of sovereignty by several countries. These claims are also reflected in the variety of names used for the islands and the sea.
The Strait of Malacca (Malay: Selat Melaka, Indonesian: Selat Malaka, Thai: ช่องแคบมะละกา, Tamil: மலாக்கா நீரிணை, Malākkā nīriṇai, Chinese: 馬六甲海峽/马六甲海峡) or Straits of Malacca is a narrow stretch of water, 580 mi (930 km) in length, between the Malay Peninsula (Peninsular Malaysia) and the Indonesian island of Sumatra. As the main shipping channel between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, it is one of the most important shipping lanes in the world. It is named after the Malacca Sultanate that ruled over the archipelago between 1400 and 1511, the center of administration of which was located in the modern-day state of Malacca, Malaysia.

From an economic and strategic perspective, the Strait of Malacca is one of the most important shipping lanes in the world.

The strait is the main shipping channel between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, linking major Asian economies such as India, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, China, Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea. The Strait of Malacca is part of the Maritime Silk Road that runs from the Chinese coast towards the southern tip of India to Mombasa, from there through the Red Sea via the Suez Canal to the Mediterranean, there to the Upper Adriatic region to the northern Italian hub of Trieste with its rail connections to Central Europe and the North Sea. Over 94,000 vessels pass through the strait each year (2008) making it the busiest strait in the world, carrying about 25% of the world's traded goods, including oil, Chinese manufactured products, coal, palm oil and Indonesian coffee. About a quarter of all oil carried by sea passes through the Strait, mainly from Persian Gulf suppliers to Asian markets. In 2007, an estimated 13.7 million barrels per day were transported through the strait, increasing to an estimated 15.2 million barrels per day in 2011. In addition, it is also one of the world's most congested shipping choke points because it narrows to only 2.8 km (1.5 nautical miles) wide at the Phillip Channel (close to the south of Singapore).

The maximum size (specifically draught) of a vessel that can pass through the Strait is referred to as Malaccamax, that is, for some of the world's largest ships (mostly oil tankers), the Strait's minimum depth (25 metres or 82 feet) is not deep enough. This is determined by the relatively shallow Singapore Strait, which provides passage to the Karimata Strait in the east. The next closest passageway (the Sunda Strait between Sumatra and Java) is even more shallow and narrow. Therefore, ships exceeding the Malaccamax must detour a few thousand nautical miles and use the Lombok Strait, Makassar Strait, Sibutu Passage, and Mindoro Strait instead.

Piracy has been a problem in the strait. Piracy had been high in the 2000s, with additional increase after the events of September 11, 2001. After attacks rose again in the first half of 2004, regional navies stepped up their patrols of the area in July 2004. Subsequently, attacks on ships in the Strait of Malacca dropped, to 79 in 2005 and 50 in 2006. Reports indicate that attacks have dropped to near-zero levels in recent years.

There are 34 shipwrecks, some dating to the 1880s, in the local TSS channel (the channel for commercial ships under the global Traffic Separation Scheme). These pose a collision hazard in the narrow and shallow strait.

On 20 August 2017, the United States Navy destroyer USS John S. McCain lost ten of its crew's lives in a collision with the merchant ship Alnic MC a short distance east of the strait whilst full steering capabilities had been lost and making a series of errors in attempted mitigation, its external lights being changed to "red over red" ("vessel not under command").

Another risk is the annual haze due to bush fires in Sumatra, Indonesia. It may reduce visibility to 200 metres (660 ft), forcing ships to slow down in the busy strait. The strait is frequently used by ships longer than 350 metres (1,150 ft).

Thai CanalThailand has developed plans to divert much of the strait's traffic and hence some of its economic significance to a shorter route: the Thai government has several times proposed cutting a canal through the Isthmus of Kra, saving around 960 kilometres (600 mi) from the journey between the two oceans. China has offered to cover the costs, according to a report leaked to The Washington Times in 2004. Nevertheless, and despite the support of several Thai politicians, the prohibitive financial and ecological costs suggest that such a canal will not be built.

An alternative is to install a pipeline across the Isthmus of Kra to carry oil to ships waiting on the other side. Proponents calculate it would cut the cost of oil delivery to Asia by about $0.50/barrel ($3/m3). Myanmar has also made a similar pipeline proposal.

The South China Sea disputes involve both island and maritime claims by several sovereign states within the region, namely Brunei, the People's Republic of China (PRC), Taiwan (Republic of China/ROC), Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. An estimated US$3.37 trillion worth of global trade passes through the South China Sea annually, which accounts for a third of the global maritime trade. 80 percent of China's energy imports and 39.5 percent of China's total trade passes through the South China Sea.

The disputes involve the islands, reefs, banks, and other features of the South China Sea, including the Spratly Islands, Paracel Islands, Scarborough Shoal, and various boundaries in the Gulf of Tonkin. There are further disputes, such as the waters near the Indonesian Natuna Islands, which many do not regard as part of the South China Sea. Claimant states are interested in retaining or acquiring the rights to fishing stocks, the exploration and potential exploitation of crude oil and natural gas in the seabed of various parts of the South China Sea, and the strategic control of important shipping lanes.

Since 2013, the PRC has resorted to island building in the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands region. According to Reuters, island building in the South China Sea primarily by Vietnam and the Philippines has been going on for decades; while China has come late to the island building game, its efforts have been on an unprecedented scale as it had from 2014 to 2016 constructed more new island surface than all other nations have constructed throughout history and as of 2016 placed military equipment on one of its artificial islands unlike the other claimants. A 2019 article in Voice of America that compared China and Vietnam's island building campaign in the South China Sea similarly noted that the reason why Vietnam in contradistinction to China has been subject to little international criticism and even support was because of the slower speed and widely perceived defensive nature of its island-building project.

China's actions in the South China Sea have been described as part of its "salami slicing" strategy, and since 2015 the United States and other states such as France and the United Kingdom have conducted freedom of navigation operations (FONOP) in the region. In July 2016, an arbitration tribunal constituted under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) ruled against the PRC's maritime claims in Philippines v. China. The tribunal did not rule on the ownership of the islands or delimit maritime boundaries. Both the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China (Taiwan) stated that they did not recognize the tribunal and insisted that the matter should be resolved through bilateral negotiations with other claimants. On September 17, 2020, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom issued a joint note verbale recognizing the PCA ruling and challenging China's claims.


China's quest to catch up with the West > .
China economy: Why it matters > .
Beware Dragons - atl >> .


Thursday, June 25, 2020

Djibouti Bases - Bab-al-Mandab Chokepoint

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24-2-23 Why the Closest US and Xinese Bases are in Djibiouti - T&P > .22-10-3 War in Yemen. Is Peace On The Horizon? [no] - gtbt > .
21-9-22 Countries with Djibouti Bases - ARgs > .
18-7-31 How Africa is Becoming China's China - Wend > .2021 Why Everyone is So Many Are Building Djibouti Military Bases  - KhAnubis > .
Gate of Lamentation: The Bab-El-Mandeb Strait - Galilei > .


Chokepoint: The Bab-el-Mandeb (Arabic: باب المندب, lit. 'Gate of Tears') is a strait between Yemen on the Arabian Peninsula, and Djibouti and Eritrea in the Horn of Africa. It connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden. The strait derives its name from the dangers attending its navigation or, according to an Arab legend, from the numbers who were drowned by an earthquake that separated the Arabian Peninsula from the Horn of Africa.

The Bab-el-Mandeb acts as a strategic link between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea via the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. In 2006, an estimated 3.3 million barrels (520,000 m3) of oil passed through the strait per day, out of a world total of about 43 million barrels per day (6,800,000 m3/d) moved by tankers.[2]

The distance across is about 20 miles (30 km) from Ras Menheli in Yemen to Ras Siyyan in Djibouti. The island of Perim divides the strait into two channels, of which the eastern, known as the Bab Iskender (Alexander's Strait), is 2 miles (3 km) wide and 16 fathoms (30 m) deep, while the western, or Dact-el-Mayun, has a width of about 16 miles (25 km) and a depth of 170 fathoms (310 m). Near the coast of Djibouti lies a group of smaller islands known as the "Seven Brothers". There is a surface current inwards in the eastern channel, but a strong undercurrent outwards in the western channel.

The British East India Company unilaterally seized the island of Perim in 1799 on behalf of its Indian empire. The government of Britain asserted its ownership in 1857 and erected a lighthouse there in 1861, using it to command the Red Sea and the trade routes through the Suez Canal. It was used as a coaling station to refuel steamships until 1935 when the reduced use of coal as fuel rendered the operation unprofitable.

The British presence continued until 1967 when the island became part of the People's Republic of South Yemen. Before the handover, the British government had put forward before the United Nations a proposal for the island to be internationalised as a way to ensure the continued security of passage and navigation in the Bab-el-Mandeb, but this was refused.

On February 22, 2008, a company owned by Tarek bin Laden unveiled plans to build a bridge named Bridge of the Horns across the strait, linking Yemen with Djibouti. Middle East Development LLC has issued a notice to construct a bridge passing across the Red Sea that would be the longest suspended passing in the world. The project has been assigned to engineering company COWI in collaboration with architect studio Dissing+Weitling, both from Denmark. It was announced in 2010 that Phase 1 had been delayed and as of mid-2016 nothing more has been heard about the project.

sī vīs pācem, parā bellum

igitur quī dēsīderat pācem praeparet bellum    therefore, he who desires peace, let him prepare for war sī vīs pācem, parā bellum if you wan...