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24-9-30 Iranian Military: Israel Shouldn’t Underestimate It - Warographics > .24-8-30 [Potential Impacts of Iraq-Turkey 'Development Road'] - Caspian > .Chokepoints - Geopolitical - CCP's Narrow Passes ..
Chokepoints - South China Sea ..
Chokepoints - Strait of Hormuz ..
Chokepoints - Strait of Hormuz ..
listen (help·info) Arabic: مَضيق هُرمُز Maḍīq Hurmuz ) is a strait between the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. It provides the only sea passage from the Persian Gulf to the open ocean and is one of the world's most strategically important choke points. On the north coast lies Iran, and on the south coast the United Arab Emirates and Musandam, an exclave of Oman. The strait is about 90 nautical miles (167 km) long, with a width varying from about 52 nautical miles (96 km) to 21 nautical miles (39 km).The Islamic Republic of Iran is one of the largest security threats in the Strait of Hormuz and remain an essential factor in global energy security, due to the high volume of oil and natural gas passing through the narrow openings on a daily basis. The sovereignty of The Islamic Republic of Iran extends, beyond its land territory, internal waters and its islands in the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz and the Oman Sea. Iran has used its sovereignty to threaten to close down the Strait of Hormuz multiple times, due to sanctions imposed on the country. This poses serious threats to the global oil market, with the Strait of Hormuz as a key location. Iran's capabilities are found in the country's anti-access/area-denial capabilities including small attack craft equipped with machine guns, multiple-launch rockets, anti-ship missiles and torpedoes. Naval mining has also been used as a strategy to threaten the security of the Strait of Hormuz. Lastly, the many naval exercises and unconventional methods used by the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy, is a display of capability and shows readiness to take action in the choke point. The strategic value of maritime choke points such as the Strait of Hormuz means that the threats to the choke point influence sharp rises in oil prices. The several attacks which have occurred over the last decade against oil facilities and tankers in or near the Strait of Hormuz, has had a large impact on the oil industry. From the perspective of security studies, Iran is an important player in the international oil economy.
A third of the world's liquefied natural gas and almost 25% of total global oil consumption passes through the strait, making it a highly important strategic location for international trade.
To reduce the risk of collision, ships moving through the Strait follow a Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS): inbound ships use one lane, outbound ships another, each lane being two miles wide. The lanes are separated by a two-mile-wide "median".
To traverse the Strait, ships pass through the territorial waters of Iran and Oman under the transit passage provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Although not all countries have ratified the convention, most countries, including the U.S., accept these customary navigation rules as codified in the Convention.
In April 1959 Iran altered the legal status of the strait by expanding its territorial sea to 12 nautical miles (22 km) and declaring that it would recognize only transit by innocent passage through the newly expanded area. In July 1972, Oman also expanded its territorial sea to 12 nautical miles (22 km) by decree. Thus, by mid-1972, the Strait of Hormuz was completely "closed" by the combined territorial waters of Iran and Oman. During the 1970s, neither Iran or Oman attempted to impede the passage of warships through the strait, but in the 1980s, both countries asserted claims that were different from customary (old) law. Upon ratifying UNCLOS in August 1989, Oman submitted declarations confirming its 1981 royal decree that only innocent passage is permitted through its territorial sea. The declarations further asserted that prior permission was required before foreign warships could pass through Omani territorial waters. Upon signing the convention in December 1982, Iran entered a declaration stating "that only states parties to the Law of the Sea Convention shall be entitled to benefit from the contractual rights created therein", including "the right of transit passage through straits used for international navigation". In May 1993, Iran enacted a comprehensive law on maritime areas, several provisions of which conflict with UNCLOS provisions, including a requirement that warships, submarines, and nuclear-powered ships obtain permission before exercising innocent passage through Iran's territorial waters.The United States does not recognize any of the claims by Oman and Iran and has contested each of them.
Oman has a radar site Link Quality Indicator (LQI) to monitor the TSS in the Strait of Hormuz. This site is on a small island on the peak of Musandam Governorate.
A third of the world's liquefied natural gas and almost 25% of total global oil consumption passes through the strait, making it a highly important strategic location for international trade.
To traverse the Strait, ships pass through the territorial waters of Iran and Oman under the transit passage provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Although not all countries have ratified the convention, most countries, including the U.S., accept these customary navigation rules as codified in the Convention.
In April 1959 Iran altered the legal status of the strait by expanding its territorial sea to 12 nautical miles (22 km) and declaring that it would recognize only transit by innocent passage through the newly expanded area. In July 1972, Oman also expanded its territorial sea to 12 nautical miles (22 km) by decree. Thus, by mid-1972, the Strait of Hormuz was completely "closed" by the combined territorial waters of Iran and Oman. During the 1970s, neither Iran or Oman attempted to impede the passage of warships through the strait, but in the 1980s, both countries asserted claims that were different from customary (old) law. Upon ratifying UNCLOS in August 1989, Oman submitted declarations confirming its 1981 royal decree that only innocent passage is permitted through its territorial sea. The declarations further asserted that prior permission was required before foreign warships could pass through Omani territorial waters. Upon signing the convention in December 1982, Iran entered a declaration stating "that only states parties to the Law of the Sea Convention shall be entitled to benefit from the contractual rights created therein", including "the right of transit passage through straits used for international navigation". In May 1993, Iran enacted a comprehensive law on maritime areas, several provisions of which conflict with UNCLOS provisions, including a requirement that warships, submarines, and nuclear-powered ships obtain permission before exercising innocent passage through Iran's territorial waters.The United States does not recognize any of the claims by Oman and Iran and has contested each of them.
Oman has a radar site Link Quality Indicator (LQI) to monitor the TSS in the Strait of Hormuz. This site is on a small island on the peak of Musandam Governorate.
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