Just when we thought Australia's relationship with China couldn’t get any worse, Beijing has delivered Australia another punch. It’s in the form of a list of
14 grievances it has with us and is polished off with an almighty threat: if you make an enemy of China, China will be the enemy! [More like: China will drop the smiley mask.] When that belligerence is combined with the upheaval of a new administration in Washington, it’s clear we are facing a dangerous new world order, and the Pacific is likely to be an especially vulnerable region. For the best analysis of what the immediate future might hold,
60 Minutes Australia speaks with H. R. McMaster, a highly respected military man and former U.S. national security adviser. But his expert assessment includes a grim warning. Australia, he reckons, has a battle on its hands.
Paul Dibb AM (born 3 October 1939) is an English-born Australian
strategist, academic and former
defence intelligence official. He is currently
emeritus professor of strategic studies at the
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre which is part of the
Australian National University.
He was the head of the National Assessments Staff (the predecessor to the
Office of National Assessments) from 1974 to 1978, the director of the
Joint Intelligence Organisation (the predecessor to the
Defence Intelligence Organisation) from 1986 to 1988, and the head of the
Defence Strategy and Intelligence Group with the rank of Deputy Secretary in the
Department of Defence from 1988 to 1991. Dibb is also known for his contribution to Australian defence strategy through writing the 1986 Review of Australia’s defence capabilities, known as the
Dibb Report, and being the primary author of the 1987
Defence White Paper. From 1965 to 1984, Dibb worked for the
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, tasked with gaining intelligence and recruiting
KGB and
GRU agents in
Canberra. In 1991, Dibb retired from the
Australian Public Service and became the director of the
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, part of the
Australian National University until 2003–where he is currently the emeritus professor. During the Government of Prime Minister
John Howard, Dibb was a member of the
Foreign Minister's Foreign Policy Advisory Council.
Dibb's report was published in
March 1986 and recommended for Australia to
abandon the
remaining elements of the forward defence policy but
concentrate its military resources on the geographic areas relevant to defending the country and its economic interests from direct attack.
Dibb's recommendations were based around an assessment that "Australia is one of the most secure countries on earth" and that while there was the
potential for regional conflict, the longer-term intentions and capabilities of countries in Australia's region could not be predicted and so did not form a suitable basis for planning.
Dibb recommended for Australia's military posture to be based on a
strategy of denying aggressors the ability to attack the country. That was to be achieved through using a
layered defence of
Jindalee Operational Radar Network (over-the-horizon radar), patrol aircraft and maritime strike aircraft to protect Australia's approaches with the Army's
Operational Deployment Force being responsible for defeating any landings on the Australian mainland. That would require changes to the
Australian Defence Force's structure and equipment acquisition programs. The
policy of self-reliance proposed by Dibb also placed
less emphasis on ANZUS, its alliance with the United States, than previous policies.
The Dibb Report received a
mixed response. Some experts regarded it as being an important contribution to developing an
independent Australian defence posture. Other experts criticised the report for calling for an
essentially defensive military strategy, implying that existing Australian military capabilities be abandoned and making optimistic assumptions about the period of time available to detect and respond to new threats to Australia. Many of the Dibb Report's assumptions were used in developing the
1987 Defence White Paper, but the
Government did not adopt some of Dibb's key recommendations, such as those concerning Australia's relationship with the
United States and the
Australian military's role in the Pacific.
