Showing posts with label Turkey-21. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Turkey-21. Show all posts

Wednesday, July 12, 2023

NATO 2023

.
23-9-23 Erdoğan's Turkey is NATO's Biggest Internal Problem - Real > .
23-9-18 South Korean Factory Churning Out Armaments for NATO | WSJ > .
23-8-20 NATO's Rearmament & Spending - NATO's R-U Response - Perun > .
23-8-11 NATO's new battle plan - Ruscia not only threat | Defence in Depth > .
23-8-6 Turkish Strategy & R-U War - Arms, Drones, Economics - Perun > . skip > .
23-7-6 NATO to Seek Concrete Actions on Xina | VOANews > .
23-7-10 Ukrainian NATO membership [could] end P00’s genocidal war | Sherriff > .
23-7-8 NATO summit in Vilnius - Lithuania & Ruscian neighbor | DW Doc > .
NATO militaries 
NATO vs Xina 
XIR - NoXious - Axis of Evil >>

> Europe v X >>Alliances - Principles, Geostrategic Benefits ..NATO Members' Militaries ..

23-7-11 > NATO is undertaking the most significant overhaul of its force structure since the end of the Cold War. Following decisions made at the NATO summit in Vilnius, Allies will keep up to 300,000 troops in a state of high readiness. This is a significant increase from the forces kept on alert as part of the NATO Response Force, which has served as the Alliance’s high-readiness force since 2003. NATO has also changed the way it conceptualises the defence of Allied territory. New Regional Plans will outline in detail how NATO forces would defend different areas of the Alliance, from specific forces and capabilities to levels of readiness required. Allied forces will then train to be able to execute these plans. When Russia launched its illegal, full-fledged invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the security landscape on the continent dramatically altered. Ensuring the safety of NATO Allies requires a new framework that provides for rapid response on a larger scale, demonstrating Allied resolve to defend their territory against all aggression.

Monday, February 20, 2023

6.4!

~180 times weaker, but definitely not what these poor folk need ...
23-2-20 Turkey shaken by new earthquakes 2 weeks after devastating disaster > .


23-2-18 Twelve days after a devastating earthquake hit Turkey and Syria, more than 46,000 people have died and more than 84,000 buildings have either been severely damaged, need urgent demolition, or collapsed, according to officials. The death toll in Turkey stands at 40,642 from the quake while neighbouring Syria has reported more than 5,800 deaths, a figure that has not changed for several days.

23-2-6 Turkey Quakes ..

Sunday, February 5, 2023

23-2-6 Turkey Quakes □

Tragic! 😭
23-2-6 Turkey: deadly earthquake strikes near Syrian border - Guardian > .
23-5-11 Turkey Votes. Erdoğan’s Last Dance? - gtbt > . skip > .
23-3-6 Syria one month on from the earthquakes - BBC > .
23-2-10 Disaster Zone: The Turkey-Syria Earthquake - Sky > .
23-2-8 Turkey-Syria earthquake - time running out – BBC > .
23-2-8 Turkey-Syria earthquake aid - search and rescue dogs – BBC > .
23-2-7 Earthquakes Wreak Havoc on Turkey and Syria - PZ > .
searching
23-2-9 High-tech robots → safer search and rescue | DW > .

2023 Turkey–Syria "Kahramanmaras" earthquakes: On 6 February 2023, two powerful earthquakes struck southern and central Turkey. The first occurred 34 km (21 mi) west of the city of Gaziantep at 04:20 TRT (01:17 UTC), causing widespread damage in Turkey and Syria. With a maximum Mercalli intensity of IX (Violent) and a magnitude of at least Mww 7.8, the first earthquake is tied with the 1939 Erzincan earthquake as the strongest instrumentally recorded earthquake to hit Turkey in modern times, while possibly being surpassed by the 1668 North Anatolia earthquake. It is also the deadliest earthquake to strike the country since the 1999 İzmit earthquake.

The earthquake was followed by numerous aftershocks, the strongest of which had a magnitude of Mw 6.7. The second earthquake occurred 9 hours later, 4 km (2.5 mi) south–southeast of Ekinözü in Kahramanmaraş Province at 13:24 TRT (10:24 UTC), also having a maximum Mercalli intensity of IX and a magnitude of at least Mww  7.5. As a result of the earthquakes, more than 3,600 people were killed and more than 15,600 were injured.

23-2-20 6.3! ..

Sunday, January 1, 2023

Elections 2023

23-1-16 Elections to Watch in 2023 - TLDR > .

Political Resignations 2023 ..

Africa
2023 Nigerian general election, 25 February
Israel 
23-7-25 Israel's Protests Restart: Can Netanyahu Survive?- TLDR Global > .
Italy 
23-11-28 Dutch election: Geert Wilders win - fears of far-right shift in Europe > .
23-6-11 Dutch Government Collapses: What Happens Next? - TLDR EU > .
UK 
4 May: 2023 England local elections w






23-9-6 India's opposition unites to take on PM Modi | DW > .

Thursday, June 16, 2022

Middle East - Powermongering

23-11-10 Qatar Angling to Be World’s Lead Hostage Negotiator | WSJ > .23-8-6 Turkish Strategy & R-U War - Arms, Economics - Perun > . skip > .22-12-17 How Qatar uses the World Cup for nation building - Caspian > .22-12-14 Xi’s Saudi trip & Sino-Arab relations; X-¥ oil vs petrodollar - Lei > .22-11-25 Why Saudi Arabia is Gladly Helping Russia - T&P > .
22-6-30 Wonky Saudi-US relationship - VisPol > .

02:10 The New Generation / Saudi Arabia & UAE
10:44 Sultan in crisis / Turkey
16:35 Iranian Dilemmas / Iran
21:19 Israel and the Syrian Triangle / Israel
23:05 Arab Spring 2.0
26:05 Outro

Why Arabs Lose Wars :: Middle East Quarterly .

Why Arabs Lose Wars > . Why Arabs Can't Fight - The Arab Culture Theory:

The Theory asserts that the poor performance of Arab armies in battle is caused by culturally-regular behavior and patterns of thought among Arab military personnel, particularly junior officers. It focuses on a number of particular traits which sociologists, anthropologists, and political psychologists of the Middle East agree are salient elements of the dominant Arab culture.

  • Promotion of conformity with group norms over innovation and independent thinking.
  • Promotion of a rather extreme deference to authority which discourages initiative among subordinates.
  • Promotion of avoidance at all costs, of shame -- discouraging an individual from accepting responsibility and encouraging the manipulation of information to conceal shameful acts.
  • Promotion of  fierce loyalty to the group which encourages individuals to shield friends and relatives from from shame and reinforces the emphasis on conformity.
  • Regarding manual labor as shameful, and considering technical and scientific work as a form of manual labor.

Arab Culture Theory predicts that these patterns of culturally-regular behavior will produce identical patterns of behavior on the battlefield which are crippling to Arab armies and air forces. These patterns of military ineffectiveness can be boiled down to four pervasive problems:

  • Militaries display severe problems with tactical leadership. Junior officers demonstrate little initiative, creativity, flexibility, or capacity for independent action in combat. Thus ground and air forces appear incapable of fighting maneuver battles or improvising ad hoc operations in the heat of battle.
  • Militaries suffer paralysis due to poor information flows. Junior officers and enlisted personnel regularly dissemble, exaggerate, obfuscate, and lie to conceal mistakes and unpleasant news, no matter how large or small.
  • Military personnel possess very limited technical skills. As a result, armed forces can rarely take full advantage of their weapons and equipment. 
  • Because Arab technicians do not understand how to properly care for sophisticated machinery, militaries have difficulty maintaining their equipment. Few military operators understand the need for constant preventive maintenance. [Rather than addressing the problem, militaries blame the suppliers.]

Saturday, July 24, 2021

Energy Geopolitics Eastern Mediterranean


Turkey’s Mediterranean policy has been framed in large measure by the ‘Blue Homeland’ doctrine, driven by its growing energy deficit and a desire for greater geopolitical influence in the region. Meanwhile, Egypt, Israel, Greece, Lebanon and Cyprus, led by their own economic and geopolitical drivers, have developed a common strategy to counter Turkey. Fiona Mullen discusses how increasing tensions over offshore resources and freedom of navigation, together with regional challenges such as migration and terrorism, impact on energy and geopolitics in the East Mediterranean. 

Full panel discussion > .

Friday, April 23, 2021

FR-AUKUS Fracas

EPo - Europolitics ..

Monday, February 8, 2021

UAVs

2021- 5 Demand For Armed-Drones (UAVs) Is Surging - CNBC > .
> DEWs - Directed Energy Weapons >
23-9-24 Combat Drones & Future Air Warfare - Humans + Wingman - Perun > .
23-8-6 Turkish Strategy & R-U War - Arms, Drones, Economics - Perun > . skip > .
23-7-26 Ukraine tech sector goes to war | FT Doc > .
23-6-30 Directed Energy Weapons - Lasers vs Drones, Missiles - T&P > .
23-6-13 NATO IAMD | NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence > .
23-6-13 Drones and the Dystopian Future of War - Journeyman > .
23-6-11 Rocket Roulette: Ruscia uses drones & missiles against Ukraine - U24 > .
23-6-7 Ukrainian Defense Tech Boom - War Startups - U24 > .
23-2-12 Small Drones & Loitering Munitions - Cheap Precision - Perun > .
22-11-16 Taiwan Pushes Drone Warfare to Counter Xina - Uncensored > .
22-11-11 Economics of Kamikaze Drones - nwyt > . skip > .
22-10-27 Pooti's [Desperate] Iranian Drones | Peter Zeihan, Ben Hodges > .
22-3-29 Military Drones; Decisive Factor in Russia-Ukraine war | DW > .
2013 Rise of the Drones (FULL doc) | NOVA | PBS > .
> Future Combat >>  >> Future >>>


UAVs include both autonomous (capable of operating without human input) drones and remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs). A UAV is capable of controlled, sustained level flight and is powered by a jet, reciprocating, or electric engine. In the twenty first century technology reached a point of sophistication that the UAV is now being given a greatly expanded role in many areas of aviation.

An unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) or uncrewed aerial vehicle, commonly known as a drone, is an aircraft without a human pilot on board. UAVs are a component of an unmanned aircraft system (UAS), which include additionally a ground-based controller and a system of communications with the UAV. The flight of UAVs may operate under remote control by a human operator ― remotely-piloted aircraft (RPA) ― or with various degrees of autonomy, such as autopilot assistance, up to fully autonomous aircraft that does not allow human intervention.

Compared to crewed aircraft, UAVs were originally used for missions too "dull, dirty or dangerous" for humans. While drones originated mostly in military applications, their use is rapidly finding many more applications including aerial photography, product deliveries, agriculture, policing and surveillance, infrastructure inspections, science, smuggling, and drone racing.

A UAV differs from a cruise missile in that a UAV is intended to be recovered after its mission, while a cruise missile impacts its target. A military UAV may carry and fire munitions on board, while a cruise missile is a munition.

The earliest recorded use of an unmanned aerial vehicle for warfighting occurred in July 1849, serving as a balloon carrier (the precursor to the aircraft carrier) is the first offensive use of air power in naval aviation. The first pilotless aircraft were built during WW1. From a suggestion that A. M. Low’s expertise in early television and radio technology be used to develop a remotely controlled pilotless aircraft to attack the Zeppelins a remarkable succession of British drone weapons in 1917 and 1918 evolved. After WW1, three Standard E-1s were converted to drones. The Larynx was an early cruise missile in the form of a small monoplane aircraft that could be launched from a warship and flown under autopilot; it was tested 1927-9 by the Royal Navy. The early successes of pilotless aircraft led to the development of radio controlled pilotless target aircraft in Britain and the US in the 1930s. In 1931, the British developed the Fairey Queen radio-controlled target from the Fairey IIIF floatplane, building a small batch of three, and in 1935 followed up this experiment by producing larger numbers of another RC target, the "DH.82B Queen Bee", derived from the de Havilland Tiger Moth biplane trainer.

The attitude towards UAVs, which were often seen as unreliable and expensive toys, changed dramatically with the Israeli Air Force’s victory over the Syrian Air Force in 1982. Israel’s coordinated use of UAVs alongside manned aircraft allowed the state to quickly destroy dozens of Syrian aircraft with minimal losses. Israeli drones were used as electronic decoys, electronic jammers as well as for real time video reconnaissance.

The US military is entering a new era in which UAVs will be critical to SIGINT payloads, or Electronic countermeasures systems should be in widespread use following 2010, with the UAVs controlled and relaying data back over high-bandwidth data links in real time, linked to ground, air, sea, and space platforms. The trend had been emerging before the American war in Afghanistan began in 2001, but was greatly accelerated by the use of UAVs in that conflict. The Predator RQ-1L UAV (General Atomics) was the first deployed UAV to the Balkans in 1995 Iraq in 1996 and was proved very effective in Operation Iraqi Freedom as well as Afghanistan.

Endurance UAVs for low-altitude and high-altitude operation, the latter sometimes referred to as "high-altitude long-endurance (HALE)" UAVs, are now in full service. On August 21, 1998, an AAI Aerosonde named Laima becomes the first UAV to cross the Atlantic Ocean, completing the flight in 26 hours. The idea of designing a UAV that could remain in the air for a long time has been around for decades, but only became an operational reality in the 21st century

The Government of Canada is considering the purchase of UAV's for arctic surveillance. The Canadian government wants to buy at least three high-altitude, unmanned aerial vehicles in what could be an attempt to salvage its Arctic sovereignty ambitions. The Canadian government wants to modify the existing Global Hawk drone, which can operate at 20,000 metres, to meet the rigours of flying in Canada's Far North.

Armed drones are growing in military importance as conflicts around the world have proven the utility of these effective tools of war. Demand is surging beyond the U.S. for the multibillion dollar armed-drone market. Companies in China, Turkey, and Russia, among others, have developed advanced remotely piloted aircraft that can use guided weapons on and off the battlefield. Over 100 states worldwide using military drones and that number is growing significantly. Over 20 states are using armed drones in conflicts or outside of armed conflicts.

The widespread use of drones in Iraq and Afghanistan by the United States to target and kill insurgents jump started a new chapter in the history of conflict. These high flying and remotely piloted aircraft could engage targets with impunity while the operators were safely working in a ground control station. Keeping the crews out of danger also made the drones politically cheap to use over dangerous skies. Now more and more countries are gaining this military capability for their own purposes.

Although larger and more complex drones, like the General Atomics MQ-9 Reaper are not cheap to develop or operate, smaller drones are becoming more ubiquitous in conflict zones. Limiting the proliferation of these smaller drones, and the ability to weaponize them, is a regulatory nightmare for government agencies around the world.

Drones are model airplanes with great sensors. All are dual use and have been used in the civilian realm. Drones have risen enormously in the civilian realm over the last five to 10 years. Controlling their export is very difficult.

Saturday, November 21, 2020

Europe vs Russia

23-9-5 Strategic Autonomy: Will Europe Ever Be Able to Defend Itself? | Waro > .

sī vīs pācem, parā bellum

igitur quī dēsīderat pācem praeparet bellum    therefore, he who desires peace, let him prepare for war sī vīs pācem, parā bellum if you wan...