Showing posts with label č. Show all posts
Showing posts with label č. Show all posts

Monday, August 9, 2021

TTP - Thousand Talents Scam - Qiming

21-12-23 How China's Biggest Spies were CAUGHT in 2021 - serpentza > .
23-8-27 [Qiming is new name for TTP intellectual poaching plan] - Update > .
23-4-16 R-U Hybrid Warfare: P00paganda, cyber, hybrid methods - Perun > .
22-11-19 G20 '22 Biden-Xi meeting = "start of a new Cold War" - Times > .
22-9-21 Western scholars debate decoupling; Xi plots tech dominance - Digging > .
22-3-24 Chinese Influence Over Australian Universities | JoAnd > . full > .

TTP - Thousand Talents Scam ..

In response to widespread Western negative reaction and pushback, Xina has attempted to duck beneath the radar by relabeling its scheme to poach intellectuals and steal intellectual property. The current iteration of the program is called Qiming, administered by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology.

Qiming Venture Partners (啟明創投; Qǐmíng chuàngtóu) is a Xina based Venture capital firm. It primarily invests in Technology, Internet and Healthcare related companies across Xina. It is headquartered in Shanghai with offices in Beijing, Suzhou, Shenzhen and Hong Kong. It mainly focuses on investments in China. Investors include Princeton University, Duke University and the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. In 2017, it set up its American branch, Qiming Venture Partners (USA). The branch is headquartered in Seattle, Washington with offices in Cambridge, Massachusetts and San Francisco, California.

The Thousand Talents Plan or Thousand Talents Program (TTP), or Overseas High-Level Talent Recruitment Programs was established in 2008 by the central government of China to recognize and recruit leading international experts in scientific research, innovation, and entrepreneurship. Both the United States and Canada have warned that China intends to use scientists who are involved with this plan to gain access to new technology for economic and military advantage.


The success of the program in recruiting U.S.-trained scientists back to China has been viewed with concern from the U.S., with a June 2018 report from the National Intelligence Council declaring an underlying motivation of the program to be “to facilitate the legal and illicit transfer of US technology, intellectual property and know-how” to China

In January 2020, the Federal Bureau of Investigation arrested Charles M. Lieber, the chair of Harvard University's Department of Chemistry and Chemical Biology, for lying about his ties to the program

In May 2020, the FBI arrested a former researcher at the Cleveland Clinic for failing to disclose ties to the Thousand Talents Program. 

In June 2020, it was reported that the National Institutes of Health had investigations into the behavior of 189 scientists. In November 2020, Song Guo Zheng, a TTP participant, pled guilty to making false claims to the FBI about his ties to the Chinese government during his employment at Ohio State University.

In November 2019, the US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations and Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs held an open hearing on the China's Talent Recruitment Plans, including the TTP, and called the programs a threat to national security. The report from the hearing cited TTP contracts as violating research values, TTP members willfully failing to disclose their membership to their home institutions, and cited numerous cases against TTP members for theft of intellectual property and fraud. One TTP member stole proprietary defense information on U.S. military jet engines. The report indicated that "TTP targets U.S.-based researchers and scientists, regardless of ethnicity or citizenship, who focus on or have access to cutting-edge research and technology."

In August 2020Canadian Security Intelligence Service warned both Canadian universities and Canadian research institutions of the TTP, saying that it recruited researchers and scientists around the world to persuade them to share their research and technology — either willingly or by coercion.

The program grew out of the "Talent Superpower Strategy" of the 17th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 2007. The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and State Council of the People's Republic of China elevated the program in 2010 to become the top-level award given through China's National Talent Development Plan to strengthen innovation and international competitiveness within China. In 2019, the program was re-branded as the "National High-end Foreign Experts Recruitment Plan." The United Front Work Department's Western Returned Scholars Association is the official representative body for program participants.

1000 Talent Plan professorship is the highest academic honor awarded by the State Council, analogous to the top-level award given by the Ministry of Education. The program includes two mechanisms: resources for permanent recruitment into Chinese academia, and resources for short-term appointments that typically target international experts who have full-time employment at a leading international university or research laboratory.

The program has three categories:
  • Innovative 1000 Talents plan (Long term / Short term) – for Chinese scholars below 55 years of age
  • Foreign 1000 Talents plan (Long term / Short term) – for foreigners only below 55 years of age
  • Young scholar 1000 Talents plan or Overseas Young Talents Project of China — for those below 40 years of age
The program has been praised for recruiting top international talent to China, but also criticized for being ineffective at retaining the talent.

Conflict of interest and fraud concerns: Although the program has successfully attracted top international talent to China, its efficacy in retaining these talented individuals has been questioned, with many of the most talented scientists willing to spend short periods in China but unwilling to abandon their tenured positions at major Western universities. Additionally, some Thousand Talents Plan Professors have reported fraud in the program including misappropriated grant funding, poor accommodations, and violations of research ethicsDismissals due to undisclosed connections to the TTP have taken place. Individuals who receive either of China's two top academic awards, the Thousand Talents Professorship and the Changjiang (Yangtze River) Scholar award, have become targets for recruitment by China's wealthiest universities so frequently that the Ministry of Education issued notices in both 2013 and 2017 discouraging Chinese universities from recruiting away top talent from one another [poaching].

Friday, June 26, 2020

CCP's Naval Ambitions - PLAN

Xina's amphbious challenges 












The People's Liberation Army Navy, also known as the Chinese Navy, PLA Navy or PLAN, is the naval warfare branch of the People's Liberation Army, the armed wing of the Communist Party of China and, by default, the national armed forces of China. The PLAN traces its lineage to naval units fighting during the Chinese Civil War and was established on 23 April 1949. Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, the Soviet Union provided assistance to the PLAN in the form of naval advisers and export of equipment and technology. Until the late 1980s, the PLAN was largely a riverine and littoral force (brown-water navy). However, by the 1990s, following the fall of the Soviet Union and a shift towards a more forward-oriented foreign and security policy, the leaders of the Chinese military were freed from worrying over land border disputes. Having traditionally been subordinated to the PLA Ground Force, PLAN leaders were able to advocate for a renewed attention towards the seas.

In 2008, China confirmed plans to operate a small fleet of aircraft carriers in the near future, but for the purpose of regional defence as opposed to "global reach". By 2009, with the advancements in naval technology, the PLAN was recognized to have reached the status of a green-water navy. Chinese military officials have also outlined plans to operate in the first and second island chains, and are working towards blue water capability. Chinese strategists term the development of the PLAN from a green-water navy into "a regional blue-water defensive and offensive navy."

The PLAN continues its expansion into the 2020s, increasing its operational capacity, commissioning new ships, and constructing naval facilities. Observers note that the PLAN's ongoing modernization is intended to build up the Chinese surface fleet and fix existing issues that limit the capability of the PLAN. Observers have noted that the PLAN's expansion will allow it to project Chinese power in the South China Sea and allow for the navy to counter the USN's operations in Asia.

The People's Liberation Army Navy is composed of five branches; the Submarine Force, the Surface Force, the Coastal Defense Force, the Marine Corps and the Naval Air Force. With a personnel strength of 240,000 personnel, including 15,000 marines and 26,000 naval air force personnel, it is the second largest navy in the world in terms of tonnage, only behind the United States Navy, and has the largest number of major combatants of any navy.

The Republic of China Navy (ROCN), also retroactively known as the Chinese Navy and commonly known as the Taiwanese Navy is the maritime branch of the Republic of China Armed Forces on Taiwan.

The ROC Navy's primary mission is to defend ROC territories and the sea lanes that surround Taiwan against a blockade, attack, or possible invasion by the People's Liberation Army Navy of the People's Republic of China. Operations include maritime patrols in the Taiwan Strait and surrounding waters, as well as counter-strike and counter-invasion operations during wartime. The Republic of China Marine Corps functions as a branch of the Navy.

The ship prefix for ROCN combatants is ROCS (Republic of China Ship); an older usage is CNS (Chinese Navy Ship).

The defence ministry said the aircraft, including nuclear-capable bombers, entered its air defence identification zone (ADIZ) in two waves. Taiwan responded by scrambling its jets and deploying missile systems. China sees democratic Taiwan as a breakaway province, but Taiwan sees itself as a sovereign state. Taiwan has been complaining for more than a year about repeated missions by China's air force near the island.

Chokepoints - South China Sea

2019 China's Attempted Hegemony - Geopolitics of the South China Sea > .
24-2-2 Why America Would Defend The Philippines - Ec Talk > .
24-2-17 Taiwan Question & World Order | X Economy - Update > .
24-2-16 USN vs PLAN - T&P > .
24-2-10 KOREA | A Final Separation? - Prof J K-L > .
24-1-9 Ċold Ŵar 2: NATO-like alliance vs Xina in the Indo-Pacific? | DW > .
23-12-21 Xina’s 3 goals in creating South Xina Sea tensions - Lei > .
23-12-18 Xinese Agression in the South China Sea (SXS) - Warographics > . 
23-10-25 US & [I-P-CW] vs Xina: Preparations to Fight War - Real > .
23-10-23 Xina's Threats Pushing Philippines Closer to US - WSJ > .
23-8-2 Xi's Anti-Corruption Purge of PLA Rocket Force | PLA structure - Digging > .
23-7-29 Ream, Hambantota, Tonga Naval Bases; Australia - Focus > .
23-7-28 PLAN's Indo-Pacific Bases - Ream, Djibouti, Hambantota, Tonga - Focus > .
23-7-27 Unbelievable Growth of Indonesia - EcEx > .
23-7-24 Xina's Nine-Dash Line: [Illegal Claims in South China Sea] - Geoff > .
23-7-12 Xina prepares for war - Hudson > .
23-6-11 [Mil-Civ Crosr] X's RoFo [Amphibious Assault] Ferries - K > . skip > .
23-6-11 US expanding presence in the Philippines = 9 bases - Binkov > .
23-5-10 US Military - New Bases to Counter China in Pacific | WSJ > .
23-2-28 Xina & ROC war prep: martial law, nuclear emergency, wartime controls > .
23-2-22 US Bases & Philippine Fight Against Xina - T&P > .
23-1-13 US & Japan boost cooperation; Marines ready to counter Xina > .
22-12-20 US military in Pacific to prevent Xinese invasion of Taiwan - PBS > .
22-11-27 Dragon's Claw: Xina's Next 10 Years - Kamome > . skip > .
22-11-11 Fortress Xina - Xi's Plans for World Domination - laowhy86 > .
22-11-2 Photo evidence - Xina has militarized South China Sea islands - Rev > .
22-10-11 Condeleeza Rice - Xina and Taiwan - Hoover > .
22-8-4 Situation Zoom: Pelosi Visits Taiwan | Goodfellows - Hoover > .
22-8-4 Nancy Peolosi’s trip ⇝ XXP and Xina-Taiwan relations - Lei > .
22-7-10 Singapore: Hx: Richest, Most Militarized Country in Asia - Explore > .
Risks of Amphibious Invasions - Hypothetical modern D-Day invasion - Binkov > .
22-5-12 The Philippines - China's New Province - laowhy86 > .
22-3-26 China has “Fully Militarized” the South China Sea - Uncensored > .
22-2-25 South China Sea dispute explained - Paint > .
22-1-31 Will Taiwan Spark a US-China Conflict? - Whatifalthist > .
2021 How China is Secretly Illegally Expanding its Territory > .
2021 Economic & Military Implications of China's BRI (Kevin Rudd) - Asia Society > .
Taiwan Strait Crisis 1954-1958 - Cold War > .
What is the RCEP? | CNBC > .
> Malaysia >>    



Taiwan ..

The South China Sea is a marginal sea of the Western Pacific Ocean. It is bounded in the north by the shores of South China (hence the name), in the west by the Indochinese Peninsula, in the east by the islands of Taiwan and northwestern Philippines (mainly Luzon, Mindoro and Palawan), and in the south by Borneo, eastern Sumatra and the Bangka Belitung Islands, encompassing an area of around 3,500,000 km2 (1,400,000 sq mi). It communicates with the East China Sea via the Taiwan Strait, the Philippine Sea via the Luzon Strait, the Sulu Sea via the straits around Palawan (e.g. the Mindoro and Balabac Strait), the Strait of Malacca via the Strait of Singapore, and the Java Sea via the Karimata and Bangka Strait. The Gulf of Tonkin is also part of the South China Sea, and the shallow waters south of the Riau Islands are also known as the Natuna Sea.

The South China Sea is a region of tremendous economic and geostrategic importance. One-third of the world's maritime shipping passes through it, carrying over US$3 trillion in trade each year. Huge oil and natural gas reserves are believed to lie beneath its seabed. It also contain lucrative fisheries, which are crucial for the food security of millions in Southeast Asia.

The South China Sea Islands, collectively comprising several archipelago clusters of mostly small uninhabited islands, islets (cays and shoals), reefs/atolls and seamounts numbering in the hundreds, are subject to competing claims of sovereignty by several countries. These claims are also reflected in the variety of names used for the islands and the sea.
The Strait of Malacca (Malay: Selat Melaka, Indonesian: Selat Malaka, Thai: ช่องแคบมะละกา, Tamil: மலாக்கா நீரிணை, Malākkā nīriṇai, Chinese: 馬六甲海峽/马六甲海峡) or Straits of Malacca is a narrow stretch of water, 580 mi (930 km) in length, between the Malay Peninsula (Peninsular Malaysia) and the Indonesian island of Sumatra. As the main shipping channel between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, it is one of the most important shipping lanes in the world. It is named after the Malacca Sultanate that ruled over the archipelago between 1400 and 1511, the center of administration of which was located in the modern-day state of Malacca, Malaysia.

From an economic and strategic perspective, the Strait of Malacca is one of the most important shipping lanes in the world.

The strait is the main shipping channel between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, linking major Asian economies such as India, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, China, Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea. The Strait of Malacca is part of the Maritime Silk Road that runs from the Chinese coast towards the southern tip of India to Mombasa, from there through the Red Sea via the Suez Canal to the Mediterranean, there to the Upper Adriatic region to the northern Italian hub of Trieste with its rail connections to Central Europe and the North Sea. Over 94,000 vessels pass through the strait each year (2008) making it the busiest strait in the world, carrying about 25% of the world's traded goods, including oil, Chinese manufactured products, coal, palm oil and Indonesian coffee. About a quarter of all oil carried by sea passes through the Strait, mainly from Persian Gulf suppliers to Asian markets. In 2007, an estimated 13.7 million barrels per day were transported through the strait, increasing to an estimated 15.2 million barrels per day in 2011. In addition, it is also one of the world's most congested shipping choke points because it narrows to only 2.8 km (1.5 nautical miles) wide at the Phillip Channel (close to the south of Singapore).

The maximum size (specifically draught) of a vessel that can pass through the Strait is referred to as Malaccamax, that is, for some of the world's largest ships (mostly oil tankers), the Strait's minimum depth (25 metres or 82 feet) is not deep enough. This is determined by the relatively shallow Singapore Strait, which provides passage to the Karimata Strait in the east. The next closest passageway (the Sunda Strait between Sumatra and Java) is even more shallow and narrow. Therefore, ships exceeding the Malaccamax must detour a few thousand nautical miles and use the Lombok Strait, Makassar Strait, Sibutu Passage, and Mindoro Strait instead.

Piracy has been a problem in the strait. Piracy had been high in the 2000s, with additional increase after the events of September 11, 2001. After attacks rose again in the first half of 2004, regional navies stepped up their patrols of the area in July 2004. Subsequently, attacks on ships in the Strait of Malacca dropped, to 79 in 2005 and 50 in 2006. Reports indicate that attacks have dropped to near-zero levels in recent years.

There are 34 shipwrecks, some dating to the 1880s, in the local TSS channel (the channel for commercial ships under the global Traffic Separation Scheme). These pose a collision hazard in the narrow and shallow strait.

On 20 August 2017, the United States Navy destroyer USS John S. McCain lost ten of its crew's lives in a collision with the merchant ship Alnic MC a short distance east of the strait whilst full steering capabilities had been lost and making a series of errors in attempted mitigation, its external lights being changed to "red over red" ("vessel not under command").

Another risk is the annual haze due to bush fires in Sumatra, Indonesia. It may reduce visibility to 200 metres (660 ft), forcing ships to slow down in the busy strait. The strait is frequently used by ships longer than 350 metres (1,150 ft).

Thai CanalThailand has developed plans to divert much of the strait's traffic and hence some of its economic significance to a shorter route: the Thai government has several times proposed cutting a canal through the Isthmus of Kra, saving around 960 kilometres (600 mi) from the journey between the two oceans. China has offered to cover the costs, according to a report leaked to The Washington Times in 2004. Nevertheless, and despite the support of several Thai politicians, the prohibitive financial and ecological costs suggest that such a canal will not be built.

An alternative is to install a pipeline across the Isthmus of Kra to carry oil to ships waiting on the other side. Proponents calculate it would cut the cost of oil delivery to Asia by about $0.50/barrel ($3/m3). Myanmar has also made a similar pipeline proposal.

The South China Sea disputes involve both island and maritime claims by several sovereign states within the region, namely Brunei, the People's Republic of China (PRC), Taiwan (Republic of China/ROC), Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. An estimated US$3.37 trillion worth of global trade passes through the South China Sea annually, which accounts for a third of the global maritime trade. 80 percent of China's energy imports and 39.5 percent of China's total trade passes through the South China Sea.

The disputes involve the islands, reefs, banks, and other features of the South China Sea, including the Spratly Islands, Paracel Islands, Scarborough Shoal, and various boundaries in the Gulf of Tonkin. There are further disputes, such as the waters near the Indonesian Natuna Islands, which many do not regard as part of the South China Sea. Claimant states are interested in retaining or acquiring the rights to fishing stocks, the exploration and potential exploitation of crude oil and natural gas in the seabed of various parts of the South China Sea, and the strategic control of important shipping lanes.

Since 2013, the PRC has resorted to island building in the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands region. According to Reuters, island building in the South China Sea primarily by Vietnam and the Philippines has been going on for decades; while China has come late to the island building game, its efforts have been on an unprecedented scale as it had from 2014 to 2016 constructed more new island surface than all other nations have constructed throughout history and as of 2016 placed military equipment on one of its artificial islands unlike the other claimants. A 2019 article in Voice of America that compared China and Vietnam's island building campaign in the South China Sea similarly noted that the reason why Vietnam in contradistinction to China has been subject to little international criticism and even support was because of the slower speed and widely perceived defensive nature of its island-building project.

China's actions in the South China Sea have been described as part of its "salami slicing" strategy, and since 2015 the United States and other states such as France and the United Kingdom have conducted freedom of navigation operations (FONOP) in the region. In July 2016, an arbitration tribunal constituted under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) ruled against the PRC's maritime claims in Philippines v. China. The tribunal did not rule on the ownership of the islands or delimit maritime boundaries. Both the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China (Taiwan) stated that they did not recognize the tribunal and insisted that the matter should be resolved through bilateral negotiations with other claimants. On September 17, 2020, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom issued a joint note verbale recognizing the PCA ruling and challenging China's claims.


China's quest to catch up with the West > .
China economy: Why it matters > .
Beware Dragons - atl >> .


sī vīs pācem, parā bellum

igitur quī dēsīderat pācem praeparet bellum    therefore, he who desires peace, let him prepare for war sī vīs pācem, parā bellum if you wan...