Showing posts with label Atlantic. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Atlantic. Show all posts

Monday, June 28, 2021

Anglosphere - CANZUK

22-2-14 Australia's Liberal Party = appeasers of CCP - Kevin Rudd > .
22-2-14 The real (Australian) Liberal record on China - Kevin Rudd > .

Friday, March 26, 2021

Challenges - Geography of USA, Russia

.
22-1-23 US Geography Weaknesses - Kamome > .
24-12-3 Mississippi Floods & Droughts - America's Geographic Flaw - Map Pack > .
24-4-20 Canadian Defense Spending is a Joke | Solutions? - Waro > .
24-2-16 Why Russia is Invading the Arctic (why it matters) - Icarus > .
23-7-21 Canada’s Arctic Patrol Ships Will Secure the Northern Frontier - USNI > .
22-11-25 Race for the Arctic is ramping up - DW Planet A > .
22-11-22 Why [the Ruscian Federation] cannot become a democracy - Caspian > .
Mexico 
Canada & Arctic - Graydations >> .
Geography +/- ~ Chink in Armor >> .

"The United States benefits from ideal geographical conditions. However, the changing environment in the Arctic and the Caribbean offers two main threat to the US security. On one hand the melting ice in the Arctic is making Russia's port more accessible during winter months, whilst this is still a potential threat, Cuba is a far more direct menace. The Caribbean island is America's biggest strategic threat given its proximity to US mainland and as it creates two chokepoints into the Gulf of Mexico."

00:00 US Geopolitical Power
01:45 US Reliance on Sea Trade
03:42 US first Geography weakness: Melting of Arctic Ice
05:45 Russia's Warm Water Ports in the Pacific
07:07 US Power in the Arctic
08:34 US biggest Geography Weakness: Cuba
09:52 The importance of the Mississippi River to US economy
10:40 The trade through the Gulf of Mexico
13:21 Cuba Role in US Strategic Weakness

Alaska ..

Sunday, December 29, 2019

1930-4-22 London Naval Treaty Signed


NHT - Naval Hx - Treaties ..  

On April 22, 1930, the United States, Britain and Japan signed the London Naval Treaty, which regulated submarine warfare and limited shipbuilding.
--------
The Treaty for the Limitation and Reduction of Naval Armament, commonly known as the London Naval Treaty, was an agreement between the United Kingdom, the Empire of Japan, France, Italy and the United States, signed on 22 April 1930, which regulated submarine warfare and limited naval shipbuilding. Ratifications were exchanged in London on October 27, 1930, and the treaty went into effect on the same day. It was registered in League of Nations Treaty Series on February 6, 1931.

The terms of the treaty were seen as an extension of the conditions agreed in the Washington Naval Treaty. That treaty had been an effort to prevent a naval arms race after World War I.

The Conference was a revival of the efforts which had gone into the Geneva Naval Conference of 1927. At Geneva, the various negotiators had been unable to reach agreement because of bad feeling between the British Government and that of the United States. This problem may have initially arisen from discussions held between President Herbert Hoover and Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald at Rapidan Camp in 1929; but a range of factors affected tensions which were exacerbated between the other nations represented at the conference.

Under the Treaty, the standard displacements of submarines was restricted to 2,000 tons with each of the major powers being allowed to keep three submarines up to 2,800 tons, and France being allowed to keep one. Submarine gun caliber was also restricted for the first time to 6.1 inches (155 mm) with one exception, an already constructed French submarine was allowed to retain 8 inch (203 mm) guns. This put an end to the 'big-gun' submarine concept pioneered by the British M class and the French Surcouf.

The Treaty also established a distinction between cruisers armed with guns no greater than 6.1 inches (155mm) ("light cruisers" in unofficial parlance) from those with guns up to 8 inches (203 mm) ("heavy cruisers"). The number of heavy cruisers was limited – *Britain was permitted 15 with a total tonnage of 147,000, the U.S. 18 totalling 180,000, and the Japanese 12 totalling 108,000 tons. For light cruisers, no numbers were specified but tonnage limits were 143,500 tons for the U.S., 192,200 tons for the British, and 100,450 tons for the Japanese.

Destroyer tonnage was also limited, with destroyers being defined as ships of less than 1,850 tons and guns not exceeding 5.1 inches (130 mm). The Americans and British were permitted up to 150,000 tons and Japan 105,500 tons.

Article 22 relating to submarine warfare declared international law applied to them as to surface vessels. Also merchant vessels which demonstrated "persistent refusal to stop" or "active resistance" could be sunk without the ship's crew and passengers being first delivered to a "place of safety".

The next phase of attempted naval arms control was the Second Geneva Naval Conference in 1932; and in that year, Italy "retired" two battleships, twelve cruisers, 25 destroyers, and 12 submarines—in all, 130,000 tons of naval vessels (either scrapped or put in reserve). Active negotiations amongst the other treaty signatories continued during the following years.

This was followed by the Second London Naval Treaty of 1936.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/London_Naval_Treaty
-------
Prime Minister delivers final message to the press. Treaty document exhibited. Mr Stimson and Mr MacDonald in garden of No 10 Downing Street.

Sunday, December 15, 2019

NHT - Naval Hx - Treaties

Treaties and War, The Washington Naval Conference > .

The Washington Naval Treaty, also known as the Five-Power Treaty, was signed during 1922 among the major nations that had won World War I, which agreed to prevent an arms race by limiting naval construction. It was negotiated at the Washington Naval Conference, held in Washington, D.C., from November 1921 to February 1922, and it was signed by the governments of the United Kingdom, the United States, France, Italy, and Japan. It limited the construction of battleships, battlecruisers and aircraft carriers by the signatories. Numbers of other categories of warships, including cruisers, destroyers and submarines, were not limited by the treaty, but those ships were limited to 10,000 tons displacement each.

The treaty was concluded on February 6, 1922. Ratifications of that treaty were exchanged in Washington on August 17, 1923, and it was registered in the League of Nations Treaty Series on April 16, 1924.

Later naval arms limitation conferences sought additional limitations of warship building. The terms of the Washington treaty were modified by the London Naval Treaty of 1930 and the Second London Naval Treaty of 1936. By the mid-1930s, Japan and Italy renounced the treaties, while Germany renounced the Treaty of Versailles which had limited its navy. Naval arms limitation became increasingly difficult for the other signatories.


Naval Impact of American Isolationism | Interbellum | 1933 3/3 > .
1930 London Naval Treaty > .

30-4-22 London Naval Treaty Signed .. 
HMS Belfast; London Naval Treaty, 1930 .. 

The displacement or displacement tonnage of a ship is its weight based on the amount of water its hull displaces at varying loads. It is measured indirectly using Archimedes' principle by first calculating the volume of water displaced by the ship then converting that value into weight displaced. Traditionally, various measurement rules have been in use, giving various measures in long tons. Today, metric tonnes are more used.

Definitions: Ship displacement varies by a vessel's degree of load, from its empty weight as designed (known as "Lightweight tonnage") to its maximum load. Numerous specific terms are used to describe varying levels of load and trim. Ship displacement should not be confused with measurements of volume or capacity typically used for commercial vessels, such as net tonnage, gross tonnage, or deadweight tonnage.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Displacement_(ship) . 

Friday, December 6, 2019

Western treaties, post-WW2 timeline

57-3-25: Treaty of Rome; European Economic Community - HiPo > .
24-9-6 How the Atlantic Ocean made the modern world - Caspian > .
23-8-15 Oppenheimer's nuclear warnings more relevant than ever - Caspian > .
22-7-21 Why Every NATO Member Joined (Why Others Haven't) - Spaniel > .

On the 25th of march 1957 the Treaty of Rome which laid the foundations for the European Economic Community was signed by Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, The
Netherlands, and West Germany.

The EEC, sometimes referred to as the Common Market, was formally established on 1 January 1958. It survived, with some changes under the Maastricht Treaty, until 2009 when it was absorbed into the European Union.

The aim of the EEC was to establish economic integration between its members, such as a common market and customs union. However in reality the EEC operated beyond purely economic issues since it included organisations such as the European Atomic Energy Community that sought to generate and distribute nuclear energy to its member states.

The EEC was preceded by the European Coal and Steel Community, which came into force in 1952. The ECSC sought to amalgamate European coal and steel production in order to reconstruct Europe after the devastation of the Second World War. The hope was that this would reduce the threat of a future conflict by establishing mutual economic reliance. Within just three years the idea of a customs union was being discussed, and the 1956 Intergovernmental Conference on the Common Market and Euratom established the parameters for the Treaty of Rome.

Over time the EEC expanded its membership. Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom joined in 1973 while the 1980s saw the addition of Greece, Spain and Portugal. With the creation of the European Union in 1993 and its absorption of the EEC in 2009 the union expanded to contains 28 states.


47-3-4
Treaty of Dunkirk, between Britain and France ⇒ guard against German or Soviet aggression.

48-3-17 Treaty of BrusselsWestern Union (WU, to 1954).

48-4-16Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OECE).

49-4-4 North Atlantic Treaty (49-4-4) ⇒ military alliance to guard against German or Soviet aggression.

49-4-4 onward North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (implementation of North Atlantic Treaty ⇒ military alliance (Germany joined in May 1955) to guard against Soviet aggression.

49-5-5Council of Europe.

51-4-18 Treaty of Paris (1951) ⇒ establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).

52-5-26 General Treaty, Generalvertrag ⇒ ended Germany's status as an occupied territory

54-10-23 Modified Brussels Treaty (MTB) at 1954 Paris ConferenceWestern European Union (WEU, to 2010) = Germany and Italy admitted.

57-3-25 Treaty of Rome (1957–92) ⇒ European Economic Community (EEC) .

57-3-25 Euratom TreatyEuropean Atomic Energy Community .


1965 - 1967 Merger Treaty .
1975 - 1976 Council Agreement on TREVI .
1986 - 1987 Single European Act .
1985/90 - 1995 Schengen TreatyConvention .
1992 - 1993 Maastricht Treaty (Treaty on European Union) .
1997 - 1999 Amsterdam Treaty
2001 - 2003 Nice Treaty .
2007 - 2009 Lisbon Treaty .

Friday, November 1, 2019

39-11-30 Soviets invade Finland 40-3-13

Winter War begins > .
Talvisota - The Winter War > .
Winter War 1939-1940 - The Setup DOCUMENTARY > .
Finnish Ski Troops of the Winter War (1939) 1/2 - Invicta > .

39-9-1 The Polish German War 39-10-6

The Polish German War - WW2 - 001 September 1 1939 > .

Sunday, October 6, 2019

WVS - Women's Voluntary Service for Civil Defence

WVS > .

1938-5-16 Women's Voluntary Services (WVS) from 1938 to 1966 ⇒ Women's Royal Voluntary Service (WRVS) from 1966 to 2004 ⇒ WRVS from 2004 to 2013 ⇒ Royal Voluntary Service.

On 16 May 1938, the British government set out the objectives of the Women's Voluntary Service for Civil Defence or Women’s Voluntary Services for Air Raid Precautions:

It was seen “as the enrolment of women for Air Raid Precaution Services of Local Authorities, to help to bring home to every household what air attack may mean, and to make known to every household [in the country] what it can do to protect itself and the community.”

In the words of Home Secretary Sir Samuel Hoare, "as regards their civil defence functions, the Minister regards the Women's Voluntary Service as occupying ... much the same relationship as that of the women's auxiliary services for the armed forces of the Crown."

Hidden army - WVS .
Hidden army video - WVS .

The Women's Voluntary Services was founded in 1938 by Stella Isaacs, Marchioness of Reading, as a British women's organisation to recruit women into the Air Raid Precautions (ARP) services to help in the event of War.

The WVS/WRVS was a voluntary organisation, and it was Lady Reading's vision that there would be no ranks. It was perhaps the only organisation where you could find a Duchess and a char lady working side by side. While many members of the WVS mucked in on pretty much all tasks, the idea of an organisation without a hierarchy would not have worked and so while there were no ranks, there were titles. Women were recruited for specific tasks, whether that was to drive ambulances, to be a member of a knitting work party or collect National Savings. Inevitably those women who signed up for one thing often ended up being co-opted for other work, especially if they showed aptitude.

The WVS was split into 12 Regions (using the same boundaries as Civil Defence) which started with 1 in the NE of England and moved clockwise down the country and back up. London was Region 12 and Scotland Region 11. Each Region had a Regional Administrator who was paid for by the Home Office. Under this each County had a County Organiser and 'staff' and below that were the Centres. During and after the Second World War, there were almost 2,000 WVS centres around Great Britain (as well as Northern Ireland during the war) each at the sharp end of providing help to their communities. Each was prominently positioned within a town or village and was run by a Centre Organiser appointed by Headquarters in London. Each Centre Organiser had a team of members who were responsible for different aspect of WVS work e.g. evacuation, Training, Food or Clothing. Under their direction were the 'ordinary' members.

The WVS played a key part in the evacuation of civilians from urban areas. The WVS had been asked to pinpoint areas of safety and billeting for evacuated children. Moving children out of the cities proved reasonably easy. Getting them to a known area of safety proved a lot more difficult as trains did not always arrive at an expected destination or would turn up at a reception point unexpectedly. The WVS is credited with helping to move 1.5 million people (the majority were children) out of cities in the early days of September 1939.

The WVS also played a major role in the collection of clothing required for the needy. In October 1939, Lady Reading broadcast to the United States about the need for clothing in the UK. The broadcast led to large quantities of clothing (known as "Bundles for Britain") being sent over to the United Kingdom by the American Red Cross. These were distributed from WVS Emergency Clothing Stores.

When troops returned to ports after the evacuation at Dunkirk, members of the WVS were there to greet them and hand out food, drink and warm clothing. The WVS base at the railway station in Headcorn, Kent was an especially busy place for feeding returning soldiers before they dispersed—a spit was installed so that meat could be roasted there and then. The WVS also played a vital part during the Blitz of London and other cities.

By the time of the Blitz, women in the WVS were adept at providing food and drink around the clock. While ARP wardens and firemen fought the fires, women in the WVS set up mobile canteens to keep them refreshed, thus placing themselves in serious physical danger with collapsing buildings a constant threat. When the raids ended, the WVS also played a part in looking after those who were injured and had lost their homes. Records indicate that the WVS dealt with and helped over 10,000 people every night of the Blitz.

As the Blitz lasted for 57 nights, the WVS helped in total a vast number of people who went to their rest centres. Some people stayed just for a night—many stayed for much longer and stretched the resources of the WVS to the limit. In Barnes, one WVS member fed 1,200 bomb victims in just one day, cooking in her own kitchen.

It would be difficult to overstate the importance of the work done by the WVS during the Blitz: the rest centres provided shelter, food, and importantly, sanitation. But working so near to the centre of the bombing inevitably led to casualties. 241 members of the WVS were killed during the Blitz and many more were wounded. 25 WVS offices were destroyed.

The WVS began running IIPs (Incident Inquiry Points), places where people came to find out about their loved ones who were in an area that had been bombed in order to free the ARP to work with the fire brigade. The WVS also helped with the Queen's Messenger Food Convoys which took food to areas in need after a bombing raid. The people who survived the bombing of Coventry received help from one of the convoys with 14,000 meals being served.

By 1941, one million women belonged to the WVS. Their work did not slacken after the end of the Luftwaffe's bombing raids. The Battle of the Atlantic and the devastating toll of merchant ships sunk by U-boats led to shortages in Great Britain. The WVS did all that it could to assist in the collection of required material for the war effort and also to educate people not to waste what they had.

Each WVS centre had its own Salvage Officer and Food Leader. The Food Leader did whatever was required at a local level to assist the authorities in the complicated task of food rationing. Educational pamphlets were produced and lectures held. The WVS organised campaigns such as 'Salute the Soldier', 'Wings for Victory', 'Spitfire Funds' and Warship Week.

In the buildup to D-Day, the expertise the WVS had in catering was put to use again. The skills learned during the Blitz were again put to good use when the V1 and V2 rockets fell on London. Once again, the WVS played a key role in evacuation. With the success of D-Day, the WVS moved into Europe to support troops there. The first WVS abroad had landed in Italy with the success of the invasion there.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Royal_Voluntary_Service .

Women's Voluntary Service: 'The army Hitler forgot' .
https://www.royalvoluntaryservice.org.uk/about-us/our-history .
https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/1419318354/hidden-histories-of-a-million-wartime-women .
https://www.royalvoluntaryservice.org.uk/about-us/our-history/timeline-list .
https://www.mylearning.org/stories/women-at-war-the-role-of-women-during-ww2/480 .
https://www.bbc.co.uk/history/ww2peopleswar/categories/c54954/ .
http://www.caringonthehomefront.org.uk/search-the-library/volunteering/ .
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/ww2peopleswar/timeline/factfiles/nonflash/a6651894.shtml .
https://www.bbc.co.uk/history/ww2peopleswar/stories/71/a3384371.shtml .

44-12-3 Home Guard Stands Down ..
Voluntary Organisations ..
Women's Institute .. 
Women's Voluntary Service .. 

Tuesday, September 17, 2019

Lorenz Beam

The Lorenz beam was a blind-landing radio navigation system developed by C. Lorenz AG in Berlin. The first system had been installed in 1932 at Berlin-Tempelhof Central Airport, followed by Dübendorf in Switzerland (1934) and others all over the world. The Lorenz company referred to it simply as the Ultrakurzwellen-Landefunkfeuer, "ultra-short-wave landing radio beacon", or LFF. In the UK it was known as Standard Beam Approach (SBA).

Prior to the start of WW2, the Germans deployed the system at many Luftwaffe airfields in and outside Germany and equipped most of their bombers with the radio equipment needed to use it. It was also adapted into versions with much narrower and longer-range beams that was used to guide the bombers on missions over Britain, under the name Knickebein and X-Gerät.

Beam navigation works for a single point in space, making it useful for landing or bombing, but not as a general purpose navigation system. This led to a rotating version of the same system for air navigation known as Elektra. Further development produced a system that worked over very long distances, hundreds or thousands of kilometres, known as Sonne (or often, Elektra-Sonnen) that allowed aircraft and U-Boats to take fixes far into the Atlantic. The British captured Sonne receivers and maps and started to use it for their own navigation under the name Consol.
...
The Lorenz system worked by feeding a special three-element antenna system with a modulated radio signal. The signal was fed to the centre dipole, which had a slightly longer reflector element on either side set slightly back. A switch rapidly alternated the opened midpoint connection of each reflector in turn, sending the beam slightly to the left and then slightly to the right of the centreline of the runway. The beams widened as they spread from the antennas, so there was an area directly off the runway approach where the two signals overlapped. The switch was timed so it spent longer on the right side of the antenna than the left.

Lorenz used a single radio transmitter at 33.33 MHz (Anflugfunkfeuer) and three antennas placed in a line parallel to the end of the runway. The center antenna was always powered, while the other two were short-circuited by a mechanical rotary switch turned by a simple motor. This resulted in a "kidney" shaped broadcast pattern centered on one of the two "side" antennas depending on which antenna had been short-circuited. The contacts on the switch were set so that one antenna was shorted for the time to be considered a "Dot" by a morse operator and the other as a "Dash". The signal could be detected for some distance off the end of the runway, as much as 30 km. The Lorenz obtained a sharper beam than could be created by an aerial array by having two lobes of signal.

An aircraft approaching the airport would tune one of their radios to the Lorenz frequency. If the crew was on the left side of the centreline, they would hear a series of short tones followed by long pauses, meaning the aircraft was on the "dot" side of the antenna. Hearing the "dots", they would know that they had to turn to the right in order to fly down the centreline. If the crew was on the right side of the centerline, they would hear a series of long tones followed by short pauses, meaning the aircraft was on the "dash" side of the antenna. Hearing the "dashes", they would know that they had to turn to the left in order to fly down the centreline. In the centre, the radio would receive both signals, where the dots filled in the gaps in the dashes and produced a continual signal, the so-called "equisignal". Flying in the known direction of the runway and keeping the equisignal on the radio, the Lorenz could guide an aircraft down a straight line with a relatively high degree of accuracy, so much so that the aircraft could then find the runway visually except in the worst conditions.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lorenz_beam .
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Beams .

Friday, September 13, 2019

Polyethylene, radar, and submarine cables

.
Undersea Cables, Pipelines - Naval Gazing >> .

Polyethylene, radar, and submarine cables


Communication infrastructure ..

"They had heated a mixture of ethylene and benzaldehyde to 170°C (338°F), using apparatus that could submit materials to a pressure of 1,900 atmospheres (1,925 bars). But the reactions were explosive and safety concerns prompted the now defunct ICI, which merged into Dutch-based Akzo Nobel, to halt the research.

In December that year, Williams and colleagues Michael Perrin and John Paton reinvestigated the experiments of Gibson and Fawcett using ethylene alone. Under similar experimental conditions - but with better equipment - they observed a pressure drop, and when the reaction finished there were 8.5g of white PE powder.

Williams, Perrin and Paton had been lucky. The vessel had leaked and, it was later confirmed, a trace of oxygen was present in the fresh ethylene that had been added to the reaction vessel to replace the leaked gas. The fresh ethylene contained, by chance, the right amount of oxygen to act as an initiator.

"For once it didn't explode - usually it did - and we thought something must be wrong. So we left it to cool overnight. And when I looked inside the metal container the next day, I found what looked like a lump of sugar. In fact, that 'sugar' was polythene."

Uses for early PE were limited, as the material was soft and had a low melting point. This was because under the high pressure polymerization process the ethylene molecules did not always add in a regular chain.

A member of ICI's dyestuffs division, Bernard Habgood, recognized that PE could supersede gutta-percha, a natural material, for insulation of submarine cables. This provided the impetus to proceed to commercial scale production. The first full-scale PE plant, with a 100 tonne/year capacity, went into production on September 1, 1939, the day Germany invaded Poland and war became unavoidable for Britain.

ICI's work on PE changed during the Second World War, when the material was used to insulate airborne radar equipment. During the development of radar in the early war years it had proved difficult to insulate the equipment to prevent power loss and thus preserve the strength of the signal. PE's electrical insulation properties enabled the British forces to reduce the weight of radar equipment and allowed them to place radars inside fighter planes. This provided an enormous technical advantage in long-distance warfare, most significantly in the Battle of the Atlantic against German submarines. The Germans were obliged to use a bulkier insulating material for their radar, which was less effective."
http://www.icis.com/resources/news/2008/05/12/9122447/polyethylene-discovered-by-accident-75-years-ago/

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polyethylene
http://www.polymer-search.com/inventionplastic.html
http://www.acs.org/content/acs/en/education/whatischemistry/landmarks/polypropylene.html

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/polythenes-story-the-accidental-birth-of-plastic-bags-800602.html .

Thursday, August 22, 2019

Game Theory - Military, Economics

.
24-2-26 PLARF Corruption Scandal: X-T? (Robinson Crusoe Fallacy) - Spaniel > .
23-8-13 Anders & Perun - Theories of Victory & Ruscian Political [In] Stability > .

Wargaming & Battle of the Atlantic ..

https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=sun+tzu ?
Mistaking the actions of a rational opponent as a given fact or as “nature” is termed as a Robinson Crusoe Fallacy by George Tsebelis. ... Using simple decision theory to understand the outcomes of a given situation, therefore, amounts to a fallacy. Rational actors don’t operate on absolute probabilities but rather form responses based on the actions of other players. The Robinson Crusoe fallacy provides an important frame of analysis of decisions and helps us understand the outcomes arising from the interaction of two rational players. It goes against our intuitive understanding of incentives and presents a new understanding of the role of policy in increasing compliance.

Thursday, August 15, 2019

Naval Tactics

.
How to Build a Navy - Planning, Procurement, Production, Logistics -Drac > .
Coastal Defences - Brief History cMHV - Drac> .
Battle Of The Atlantic | Secrets Of War Doc > .
24-3-21 USN's 30-Year Plan on Shipbuilding - 2024 - Shipping > .
24-4-16 War Plan Red: USA's & Canada's Plans To Invade Each Other - Shadows > .

Historical Naval Wargaming kit (USN, late 20th) including map, USN ship miniatures, dice, rules, and reference charts for officers to practice their command, control, and decision making skills whilst off campus out on the fleet:

1960s Historical Naval Wargaming Kit Demo (US Naval War College Museum) > .
Analysing Logistics - RaWa >> .

Building a Navy - Planning, Procurement, Production, Logistics ..
Wargamers ..
Wargaming & Battle of the Atlantic ..

Wednesday, August 14, 2019

Operations Research

..
Operational Research 'ORigin Story' - OR Society > .



Operations research, or operational research (OR) in British usage, is a discipline that deals with the application of advanced analytical methods to help make better decisions. Further, the term operational analysis is used in the British (and some British Commonwealth) military as an intrinsic part of capability development, management and assurance. In particular, operational analysis forms part of the Combined Operational Effectiveness and Investment Appraisals, which support British defense capability acquisition decision-making.

It is often considered to be a sub-field of applied mathematics.The terms management science and decision science are sometimes used as synonyms.

Employing techniques from other mathematical sciences, such as mathematical modeling, statistical analysis, and mathematical optimization, operations research arrives at optimal or near-optimal solutions to complex decision-making problems. Because of its emphasis on human-technology interaction and because of its focus on practical applications, operations research has overlap with other disciplines, notably industrial engineering and operations management, and draws on psychology and organization science. Operations research is often concerned with determining the extreme values of some real-world objective: the maximum (of profit, performance, or yield) or minimum (of loss, risk, or cost). Originating in military efforts before World War II, its techniques have grown to concern problems in a variety of industries.
....
Beginning in the 20th century, study of inventory management could be considered the origin of modern operations research with economic order quantity developed by Ford W. Harris in 1913. Operational research may have originated in the efforts of military planners during World War I (convoy theory and Lanchester's laws). Percy Bridgman brought operational research to bear on problems in physics in the 1920s and would later attempt to extend these to the social sciences.

Modern operational research originated at the Bawdsey Research Station in the UK in 1937 and was the result of an initiative of the station's superintendent, A. P. Rowe. Rowe conceived the idea as a means to analyse and improve the working of the UK's early warning radar system, Chain Home (CH). Initially, he analysed the operating of the radar equipment and its communication networks, expanding later to include the operating personnel's behaviour. This revealed unappreciated limitations of the CH network and allowed remedial action to be taken.
.....
In the World War II era, operational research was defined as "a scientific method of providing executive departments with a quantitative basis for decisions regarding the operations under their control". Other names for it included operational analysis (UK Ministry of Defence from 1962) and quantitative management.

During the Second World War close to 1,000 men and women in Britain were engaged in operational research. About 200 operational research scientists worked for the British Army.

Patrick Blackett worked for several different organizations during the war. Early in the war while working for the Royal Aircraft Establishment (RAE) he set up a team known as the "Circus" which helped to reduce the number of anti-aircraft artillery rounds needed to shoot down an enemy aircraft from an average of over 20,000 at the start of the Battle of Britain to 4,000 in 1941.

In 1941, Blackett moved from the RAE to the Navy, after first working with RAF Coastal Command, in 1941 and then early in 1942 to the Admiralty

Blackett's team at Coastal Command's Operational Research Section (CC-ORS) included two future Nobel prize winners and many other people who went on to be pre-eminent in their fields. They undertook a number of crucial analyses that aided the war effort. Britain introduced the convoy system to reduce shipping losses, but while the principle of using warships to accompany merchant ships was generally accepted, it was unclear whether it was better for convoys to be small or large. Convoys travel at the speed of the slowest member, so small convoys can travel faster. It was also argued that small convoys would be harder for German U-boats to detect. On the other hand, large convoys could deploy more warships against an attacker. Blackett's staff showed that the losses suffered by convoys depended largely on the number of escort vessels present, rather than the size of the convoy. Their conclusion was that a few large convoys are more defensible than many small ones.

While performing an analysis of the methods used by RAF Coastal Command to hunt and destroy submarines, one of the analysts asked what colour the aircraft were. As most of them were from Bomber Command they were painted black for night-time operations. At the suggestion of CC-ORS a test was run to see if that was the best colour to camouflage the aircraft for daytime operations in the grey North Atlantic skies. Tests showed that aircraft painted white were on average not spotted until they were 20% closer than those painted black. This change indicated that 30% more submarines would be attacked and sunk for the same number of sightings. As a result of these findings Coastal Command changed their aircraft to using white undersurfaces.

Other work by the CC-ORS indicated that on average if the trigger depth of aerial-delivered depth charges (DCs) were changed from 100 feet to 25 feet, the kill ratios would go up. The reason was that if a U-boat saw an aircraft only shortly before it arrived over the target then at 100 feet the charges would do no damage (because the U-boat wouldn't have had time to descend as far as 100 feet), and if it saw the aircraft a long way from the target it had time to alter course under water so the chances of it being within the 20-foot kill zone of the charges was small. It was more efficient to attack those submarines close to the surface when the targets' locations were better known than to attempt their destruction at greater depths when their positions could only be guessed. Before the change of settings from 100 feet to 25 feet, 1% of submerged U-boats were sunk and 14% damaged. After the change, 7% were sunk and 11% damaged. (If submarines were caught on the surface, even if attacked shortly after submerging, the numbers rose to 11% sunk and 15% damaged). Blackett observed "there can be few cases where such a great operational gain had been obtained by such a small and simple change of tactics".


Bomber Command's Operational Research Section (BC-ORS), analyzed a report of a survey carried out by RAF Bomber Command. For the survey, Bomber Command inspected all bombers returning from bombing raids over Germany over a particular period. All damage inflicted by German air defences was noted and the recommendation was given that armour be added in the most heavily damaged areas. This recommendation was not adopted because the fact that the aircraft returned with these areas damaged indicated these areas were not vital, and adding armour to non-vital areas where damage is acceptable negatively affects aircraft performance. Their suggestion to remove some of the crew so that an aircraft loss would result in fewer personnel losses, was also rejected by RAF command. Blackett's team made the logical recommendation that the armour be placed in the areas which were completely untouched by damage in the bombers which returned. They reasoned that the survey was biased, since it only included aircraft that returned to Britain. The untouched areas of returning aircraft were probably vital areas, which, if hit, would result in the loss of the aircraft. This story has been disputed, with a similar damage assessment study completed in the US by the Statistical Research Group at Columbia University and was the result of work done by Abraham Wald.

When Germany organized its air defences into the Kammhuber Line, it was realized by the British that if the RAF bombers were to fly in a bomber stream they could overwhelm the night fighters who flew in individual cells directed to their targets by ground controllers. It was then a matter of calculating the statistical loss from collisions against the statistical loss from night fighters to calculate how close the bombers should fly to minimize RAF losses.

The "exchange rate" ratio of output to input was a characteristic feature of operational research. By comparing the number of flying hours put in by Allied aircraft to the number of U-boat sightings in a given area, it was possible to redistribute aircraft to more productive patrol areas. Comparison of exchange rates established "effectiveness ratios" useful in planning. The ratio of 60 mines laid per ship sunk was common to several campaigns: German mines in British ports, British mines on German routes, and United States mines in Japanese routes.

Operational research doubled the on-target bomb rate of B-29s bombing Japan from the Marianas Islands by increasing the training ratio from 4 to 10 percent of flying hours; revealed that wolf-packs of three United States submarines were the most effective number to enable all members of the pack to engage targets discovered on their individual patrol stations; revealed that glossy enamel paint was more effective camouflage for night fighters than traditional dull camouflage paint finish, and the smooth paint finish increased airspeed by reducing skin friction.

On land, the operational research sections of the Army Operational Research Group (AORG) of the Ministry of Supply (MoS) were landed in Normandy in 1944, and they followed British forces in the advance across Europe. They analyzed, among other topics, the effectiveness of artillery, aerial bombing and anti-tank shooting.

sī vīs pācem, parā bellum

igitur quī dēsīderat pācem praeparet bellum    therefore, he who desires peace, let him prepare for war sī vīs pācem, parā bellum if you wan...