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Soviet Television and Radio - Cold War > .Ruscist Indoctrination
Societal Manipulation
Soviet Myths Debunked - Anna >> .
Tuesday, October 10, 2017
Speeches - Good, Bad, Ugly
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Life of Winston Churchill - Timeline > .
Words and delivery can combine to galvanize an audience, creating 'I remember where I was when' moments. JFK- Brandenburg Gate and Martin Luther King - Lincoln Memorial provide unforgettable examples. This collection of classic speech excerpts contains inspiring orations to the noblest endeavors and some of the most despicable speeches ever. Hitler, Churchill, Hirohito, Gandhi, Nixon, Obama...
Societal Manipulation
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And lest anyone forget the height of RepuGNican malevolence: cognitively-challenged DUHnocchio hypocritically and inaccurately vilifying Mexicans.
Spin Dictators
22-4-5 Sergei Guriev: Spin Dictators, Information Wars, Conflict in Ukraine > .
24-5-25 Why We Cannot [Easily] Stop Dictators - Versed > .
24-2-19 Book of Lord Shang: Ancient Path to Power; Ongoing Suffering - Digging > .
24-1-22 How [Viktator] Orbán Took Over Hungary - Context Matters > .
23-11-11 [Out Parasites! Nikolai Patrushev's NoXious World Order] (subs) - Katz > .
23-8-30 Fear is the new normal in Russian politics - Anders > .
23-8-29 Dictatorships: From Spin to Fear | Ruscist Regression (subs) - Katz > .
23-2-19 Ruscia's Grand Strategy & Ukraine - P00's geostrategic disaster - P > .
22-8-22 P00ti’s Secret Neo-Nazi Armies | Decade of Hate | VICE > .
Right-Wrong-wing authoritarians tend to accept what their leaders say is true and readily comply with their commands. They believe that respecting authority is an important moral virtue that everyone in the community must hold. They tend to place strict limits on how far the authorities can be criticized, and believe that the critics are troublemakers who don't know what they are talking about. RWAs are extremely submissive even to authority figures who are dishonest, corrupt, and inept. They will insist that their leaders are honest, caring, and competent, dismissing any evidence to the contrary as either false or inconsequential. They believe that the authorities have the right to make their own decisions, even if that includes breaking the rules that they impose on everyone else.
22-4-20 Spin Dictators: The Changing Face of Tyranny in the 21st Century > .
Guriev, Sergei, and Daniel Treisman. 2019. "Informational Autocrats." Journal of Economic Perspectives, 33 (4): 100-127.
Authoritarianism can be defined as the covariation of authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, and conventionalism (Altemeyer, 1981). All three of these tendencies involve adherence to specific standards of behavior: standards that could be exposed to threat and disruption.
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Ruscist Indoctrination
Societal Manipulation
State-Sanctioned Scapegoating ⇻
Spin Dictators: The Changing Face of Tyranny in the 21st Century is a political science book by Russian economist Sergei Guriev and American political scientist Daniel Treisman. It examines how modern dictators and autocrats – pioneered by Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore and Alberto Fujimori of Peru, and replicated by Vladimir Pootin of Russia, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of Turkey, and Diktator Orbán of Hungary – focus more on propaganda methods such as spin, disinformation, and psychologically keeping their populations in fear of the Other, instead of the more overtly brutal [pre-state-media] methods of political repression favoured by dictators of the past such as Joseph Stalin of the Soviet Union or Mao Zedong of China.
The authors contend that modern "spin dictators" pretend to be democrats (for example, allowing a select group of high-brow, but low-circulation, dissident newspapers to exist to show that they respect the freedom of the press), but still use their power to suppress dissent (for example, increasing tax demands on independent broadcasters, or such outlets being bought by the leader's cronies; or accusing independent broadcasters of publishing fake news and shutting them down). Thus, these authoritarian leaders manipulate the media, rather than totally censor or suppress it, and are thus more popular among the people. The book also discusses the sympathies between spin dictators and democratic populists such as American UNpresident DUHnocchio tRUMP.
Pootin's regime of the 2000s and early 2010s has been both a trigger and a key example for this theory. But the regime's sharp turn toward greater repressions in mid 2010–2020s culminating with the war in Ukraine raised the question of the prerequisites for that change. In an article written specifically for Re: Russia, Daniel Treisman argues that this reverse evolution was caused not by the conservatism and imperial ambitions of the Russian population, as is commonly believed, but rather by the ongoing process of social modernisation, which Pootin's spin dictatorship could no longer control.
The authors contend that modern "spin dictators" pretend to be democrats (for example, allowing a select group of high-brow, but low-circulation, dissident newspapers to exist to show that they respect the freedom of the press), but still use their power to suppress dissent (for example, increasing tax demands on independent broadcasters, or such outlets being bought by the leader's cronies; or accusing independent broadcasters of publishing fake news and shutting them down). Thus, these authoritarian leaders manipulate the media, rather than totally censor or suppress it, and are thus more popular among the people. The book also discusses the sympathies between spin dictators and democratic populists such as American UNpresident DUHnocchio tRUMP.
Pootin's regime of the 2000s and early 2010s has been both a trigger and a key example for this theory. But the regime's sharp turn toward greater repressions in mid 2010–2020s culminating with the war in Ukraine raised the question of the prerequisites for that change. In an article written specifically for Re: Russia, Daniel Treisman argues that this reverse evolution was caused not by the conservatism and imperial ambitions of the Russian population, as is commonly believed, but rather by the ongoing process of social modernisation, which Pootin's spin dictatorship could no longer control.
""In recent decades, dictatorships based on mass repression have largely given way to a new model based on the manipulation of information. Instead of terrorizing citizens into submission, "informational autocrats" artificially boost their popularity by convincing the public they are competent. To do so, they use propaganda and silence informed members of the elite by co-optation or censorship. Using several sources, including a newly created dataset on authoritarian control techniques, we document a range of trends in recent autocracies consistent with this new model: a decline in violence, efforts to conceal state repression, rejection of official ideologies, imitation of democracy, a perceptions gap between the masses and the elite, and the adoption by leaders of a rhetoric of performance rather than one aimed at inspiring fear.""
- Dictators survive not by means of force or ideology but by using propaganda, censorship and co-opting the elites.
- Informational autocracies prevail over old-style violent dictatorships when the informed elites are sufficiently large.
- Informational autocracies are replaced by democracies when the informed elites are too numerous to censor or co-opt.
Authoritarianism is a form of government characterized by the rejection of political plurality, the use of strong central power to preserve the political status quo, and reductions in the rule of law, separation of powers, and democratic voting. Political scientists have created many typologies describing variations of authoritarian forms of government. Authoritarian regimes may be either autocratic or oligarchic and may be based upon the rule of a party or the military. States that have a blurred boundary between democracy and authoritarianism have some times been characterized as "hybrid democracies", "hybrid regimes" or "competitive authoritarian" states.
The political scientist Juan Linz, in an influential 1964 work, An Authoritarian Regime: Spain, defined authoritarianism as possessing four qualities:
The political scientist Juan Linz, in an influential 1964 work, An Authoritarian Regime: Spain, defined authoritarianism as possessing four qualities:
- Limited political pluralism, is realized with constraints on the legislature, political parties and interest groups.
- Political legitimacy is based upon appeals to emotion and identification of the regime as a necessary evil to combat "easily recognizable societal problems, such as underdevelopment or insurgency."
- Minimal political mobilization, and suppression of anti-regime activities.
- Ill-defined executive powers, often vague and shifting extends the power of the executive.
Minimally defined, an authoritarian government lacks free and competitive direct elections to legislatures, free and competitive direct or indirect elections for executives, or both. Broadly defined, authoritarian states include countries that lack civil liberties such as freedom of religion, or countries in which the government and the opposition do not alternate in power at least once following free elections. Authoritarian states might contain nominally democratic institutions such as political parties, legislatures and elections which are managed to entrench authoritarian rule and can feature fraudulent, non-competitive elections.[15] Since 1946, the share of authoritarian states in the international political system increased until the mid-1970s but declined from then until the year 2000.
Bob Altemeyer, the Canadian-American social psychologist who first coined the term and its meaning in 1981, defined the right-wrong-wing authoritarian personality (RWA) as someone who exhibits:
- a high degree of submission to the authorities who are perceived to be established and legitimate in the society in which one lives.
- a general aggressiveness, directed against various persons, that is perceived to be sanctioned by established authorities.
- a high degree of adherence to the social conventions that are perceived to be endorsed by society and its established authorities.
In his writings, Altemeyer sometimes refers to right-wrong-wing authoritarians as "authoritarian followers". This is to emphasize that he is not speaking of authoritarian leaders [SDOs], which is the more commonly understood meaning of "authoritarian". Altemeyer refers to authoritarian leaders by the term "social dominator", and he has written extensively on the relationship between authoritarian followers and social dominators.
Submissiveness
Authoritarianism and fear responses to pictures: the role of social differences is an investigation of the self-reported fear of authoritarians in response to threats. A sample of 126 university students was exposed to a series of pictures of potentially threatening people and situations. In general, participants with high scores on authoritarianism were more fearful than participants with low scores. This result was found for both social threats (i.e., social differences, social disorder) and personal threats (i.e., animals, dangerous situations). The strongest association between authoritarianism and fear involved cases of social differences, defined as elements of a person's appearance or behavior that involve diversity or deviance from common social norms. Regression analyses also indicated that variation in authoritarianism could be best predicted by fear of social differences. Thus, these data suggest that authoritarians are relatively sensitive to threat, and particularly to threats involving the "outsider" who does not fit authoritarian standards of uniformity and order. The data are also consistent with recent research and theory that right-wrong-wing ideology is at least partly motivated by threat and fear.
The Psychology Of Dictators: Power, Fear, And Anxiety .
Fear: A Dictator's Tool - Institute for Security Policy and Law .
How Authoritarian Regimes Create a Climate of Fear .
tRUMP Is an Authoritarian. So Are Millions of Americans - Politico .Fear: A Dictator's Tool - Institute for Security Policy and Law .
How Authoritarian Regimes Create a Climate of Fear .
Prevalence of RWA among adults in Western countries:
Country / Low RWA / High RWA / total RWAs
Country / Low RWA / High RWA / total RWAs
US 13.4% 25.6% t 39% [GDP-disproportionate religiosity]
UK 13.6% 10.4% t 24%
Germany 17.4% 6.7% t 24.1%
France 10.2% 10.7% t 20.9%
Spain 17.9% 9.2% t 27.1%
Italy 17.9% 12.9% t 30.8%
Australia 17.1% 12.9% t 30%
Canada 21.3% 13.4% t 35.7%
Spies, Lies, and Algorithms (2022)
23-4-6 Technology Disrupting the Intelligence World | Amy Zegart - fa > .
23-3-14 Ruscist Scourge: West Targeted by HYBRID War - Starsky > .
22-7-31 Moles damaging a nation - top 5 methods (English subtitles) - Maxim Katz > .23-3-14 Ruscist Scourge: West Targeted by HYBRID War - Starsky > .
22-2-1 Hoover Book Club: Amy B. Zegart On "Spies, Lies, and Algorithms" - Hoover > .
Societal Manipulation
Theft vs Innovation - Talus >> .
0:54 - The impact of U.S. intelligence leading up to Russia invasion
4:31 - Why haven't these intelligence tactics been used before?
6:26 - How did U.S. intelligence know so much about the Russian invasion?
9:17 - How to interpret U.S. intelligence reports
13:20 - How does intelligence influence policy?
16:29 - The network of Federal intelligence agencies
18:54 - Why are there so many intelligence agencies?
21:30 - How has the intelligence community responded to this decrease in trust?
23:32 - Are autocratic countries better enabled to gather intelligence?
25:38 - Stories of betrayal in intelligence communities
28:06 - What causes intelligence failures?
31:29 - How accurate can intelligence agencies actually be?
33:31 - Putin’s KGB background & how it affects his policy
35:26 - What should be the consequence of bad intelligence/policy?
38:26 - What should be the intelligence community’s focus right now?
41:22 - What is the public’s view of the intelligence community right now?
43:22 - How do we reform intelligence agencies?
46:46 - Books Amy has written
Spies, Lies, and Algorithms (2022) ↠
Spies, Lies, and Algorithms: The History and Future of American Intelligence: Publication date: February 1, 2022
"Spying has never been more ubiquitous—or less understood. The world is drowning in spy movies, TV shows, and novels, but universities offer more courses on rock and roll than on the CIA and there are more congressional experts on powdered milk than espionage. This crisis in intelligence education is distorting public opinion, fueling conspiracy theories, and hurting intelligence policy. In Spies, Lies, and Algorithms, Amy Zegart separates fact from fiction as she offers an engaging and enlightening account of the past, present, and future of American espionage as it faces a revolution driven by digital technology.
Drawing on decades of research and hundreds of interviews with intelligence officials, Zegart provides a history of U.S. espionage, from George Washington’s Revolutionary War spies to today’s spy satellites; examines how fictional spies are influencing real officials; gives an overview of intelligence basics and life inside America’s intelligence agencies; explains the deadly cognitive biases that can mislead analysts; and explores the vexed issues of traitors, covert action, and congressional oversight. Most of all, Zegart describes how technology is empowering new enemies and opportunities, and creating powerful new players, such as private citizens who are successfully tracking nuclear threats using little more than Google Earth. And she shows why cyberspace is, in many ways, the ultimate cloak-and-dagger battleground, where nefarious actors employ deception, subterfuge, and advanced technology for theft, espionage, and information warfare."
"Spying has never been more ubiquitous—or less understood. The world is drowning in spy movies, TV shows, and novels, but universities offer more courses on rock and roll than on the CIA and there are more congressional experts on powdered milk than espionage. This crisis in intelligence education is distorting public opinion, fueling conspiracy theories, and hurting intelligence policy. In Spies, Lies, and Algorithms, Amy Zegart separates fact from fiction as she offers an engaging and enlightening account of the past, present, and future of American espionage as it faces a revolution driven by digital technology.
Drawing on decades of research and hundreds of interviews with intelligence officials, Zegart provides a history of U.S. espionage, from George Washington’s Revolutionary War spies to today’s spy satellites; examines how fictional spies are influencing real officials; gives an overview of intelligence basics and life inside America’s intelligence agencies; explains the deadly cognitive biases that can mislead analysts; and explores the vexed issues of traitors, covert action, and congressional oversight. Most of all, Zegart describes how technology is empowering new enemies and opportunities, and creating powerful new players, such as private citizens who are successfully tracking nuclear threats using little more than Google Earth. And she shows why cyberspace is, in many ways, the ultimate cloak-and-dagger battleground, where nefarious actors employ deception, subterfuge, and advanced technology for theft, espionage, and information warfare."
Suez Crisis (1956)
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Chokepoints - Suez Canal ..Suez Crisis - Propaganda Film (1956) ..
Canal of the Pharaohs - Ancient Suez Canal ➧
Operation Musketeer (Opération Mousquetaire) was the Anglo-French plan for the invasion of the Suez canal zone to capture the Suez Canal during the Suez Crisis in 1956. The operation had initially been given the codename Operation Hamilcar, but this name was quickly dropped when it was found that the British were painting an air recognition letter H on their vehicles, while the French, who spelled Hamilcar differently were painting an A. Musketeer was chosen as a replacement because it started with M in both languages. Israel, which invaded the Sinai peninsula, had the additional objectives of opening the Straits of Tiran and halting fedayeen incursions into Israel. The Anglo-French military operation was originally planned for early September, but the necessity of coordination with Israel delayed it until early November. However, on 10 September British and French politicians and Chiefs of the General Staff agreed to adopt General Charles Keightley's alterations to the military plans with the intention of reducing Egyptian civilian casualties. The new plan, renamed Musketeer Revise, provided the basis of the actual Suez operation.
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Operation Musketeer was a failure in strategic terms. By mischance it covered the Soviet Union's military intervention in Hungary on 4 November. On this issue and, more generally, on the principle of premature military action against Egypt, the operation divided public opinion in the UK. It demonstrated the limitations of the UK's military capacity, and exposed errors in several staff functions, notably intelligence and movement control. Tactically successful, both in the sea and airborne assaults and the subsequent brief occupation.
Operation Musketeer (Opération Mousquetaire) was the Anglo-French plan for the invasion of the Suez canal zone to capture the Suez Canal during the Suez Crisis in 1956. The operation had initially been given the codename Operation Hamilcar, but this name was quickly dropped when it was found that the British were painting an air recognition letter H on their vehicles, while the French, who spelled Hamilcar differently were painting an A. Musketeer was chosen as a replacement because it started with M in both languages. Israel, which invaded the Sinai peninsula, had the additional objectives of opening the Straits of Tiran and halting fedayeen incursions into Israel. The Anglo-French military operation was originally planned for early September, but the necessity of coordination with Israel delayed it until early November. However, on 10 September British and French politicians and Chiefs of the General Staff agreed to adopt General Charles Keightley's alterations to the military plans with the intention of reducing Egyptian civilian casualties. The new plan, renamed Musketeer Revise, provided the basis of the actual Suez operation.
...
Operation Musketeer was a failure in strategic terms. By mischance it covered the Soviet Union's military intervention in Hungary on 4 November. On this issue and, more generally, on the principle of premature military action against Egypt, the operation divided public opinion in the UK. It demonstrated the limitations of the UK's military capacity, and exposed errors in several staff functions, notably intelligence and movement control. Tactically successful, both in the sea and airborne assaults and the subsequent brief occupation.
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sī vīs pācem, parā bellum
igitur quī dēsīderat pācem praeparet bellum therefore, he who desires peace, let him prepare for war sī vīs pācem, parā bellum if you wan...
