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Lying About the Jews in Film - WW2 > .
Saturday, October 28, 2017
American Black Chamber (1931)
.Yardley - US Black Chamber (Military Intelligence Section 8) - UK-USA - Bletchley > .
Black Chamber - Cipher Bureau - MI-8 ..
The Codebreakers – The Story of Secret Writing is a book by David Kahn, published in 1967, comprehensively chronicling the history of cryptography from ancient Egypt to the time of its writing. The United States government attempted to have the book altered before publication, and it succeeded in part.
The The American Black Chamber is a 1931 book by Herbert O. Yardley. The book describes the inner workings of the interwar American governmental cryptography organization called the Black Chamber. The cryptography historian David Kahn called the book "the most famous book on cryptology ever published." By describing the inner workings of the organization, the book created large interest and heightened public awareness of the United States's cryptographic abilities. In particular, the Japanese government became aware of the extent of experience that the American government had with cryptography and increased the strength of their own knowledge in cryptography in response. Reviewers suggested the book may have cost the United States significantly in the Pacific theater against Japan in World War 2.
A-Tish-Oo! (1941-2)
Better quality (without irritating tabs) - Internet Archive > .
A [February] 1941 British film about how coughs and sneezes spread diseases. Some masks that can be worn to help stop the spread of diseases are shown. Produced by Verity Films for the Ministry of Information.
Why Londoners in the blitz accepted face masks to prevent infection – unlike today’s objectors ojectionables .
A [February] 1941 British film about how coughs and sneezes spread diseases. Some masks that can be worn to help stop the spread of diseases are shown. Produced by Verity Films for the Ministry of Information.
"For the countless Londoners driven into communal shelters by nightly German air raids, personal space had become a luxury. This was particularly so for those who sought shelter in the London underground. For its perceived subterranean safety, by the blitz’s peak, some 150,000 citizens were sleeping in tube stations.
Though the dangers of close personal contact were not the only thing on the minds of concerned public health officials, preventing epidemic disease in the overcrowded spaces of the tube stations was a major concern. The mask emerged as a common-sense solution to the problem of thousands of shelterers suddenly using the tube’s damp, poorly ventilated spaces as their nightly abodes.
Eager to prevent an epidemic before it started, the Ministry of Health set up an advisory committee to investigate conditions in air-raid shelters, with special reference to health and hygiene. The official call for masks came in December 1940, two months into the blitz and just as flu season was getting underway, in a white paper that recommended their use alongside a raft of other preventive health measures. British scientists conscripted to the Medical Research Council’s Air Hygiene Unit were convinced: the “principle of wearing masks for protection against droplet infection” was a sound practice.
The Ministry of Health endorsed three types of mask: the standard gauze type (similar to today’s homemade masks); a cellophane screen (like today’s visors, but only covering the mouth and nose); and the commercially available “yashmak” (in the style of the Muslim veil), for the “fashion conscious”. The ministry ordered 500,000 masks to be distributed as needed in the event of an epidemic and commissioned an instructional leaflet for shelterers.
British newspapers publicised the government’s new policy. On February 5 1941, the Times reported that Sir William Jameson, the chief medical officer, had endorsed the new masks, and, more colourfully, Ritchie Calder, a journalist for the Daily Herald tried one out in public. “After ten minutes yesterday my anti-flu ‘windscreen’ ceased to be a source of ribald remarks,” he reported. “People round me became used to seeing me working in what looked like a transparent eye-shade which had slipped down my nose.”
Predicting that masks would become “as commonplace as horn-rim glasses”, Calder wrote that he could even blow his nose with his mask on. The only thing he couldn’t do “in comfort”, he reported, was “have a cigarette”.
Sharp contrast
A short propaganda film commissioned by the Ministry of Information and released in February 1941 also saw the mask message as self-evidently good sense. “If the shelter doctor or nurse gives you a mask,” the narrator exhorted, “well, wear it!”
.....
Despite protests to the contrary, the source of the COVID-19 mask controversy is not rooted in longstanding concerns about individual rights or British character. We need to look elsewhere to find its source: to the general breakdown in communication and trust between experts, the government and [wrong-wing] members of the public, that became a mainstay of contemporary life well after the blitz had passed and has been exacerbated by the pandemic."
https://theconversation.com/why-londoners-in-the-blitz-accepted-face-masks-to-prevent-infection-unlike-todays-objectors-142021 .
Though the dangers of close personal contact were not the only thing on the minds of concerned public health officials, preventing epidemic disease in the overcrowded spaces of the tube stations was a major concern. The mask emerged as a common-sense solution to the problem of thousands of shelterers suddenly using the tube’s damp, poorly ventilated spaces as their nightly abodes.
Eager to prevent an epidemic before it started, the Ministry of Health set up an advisory committee to investigate conditions in air-raid shelters, with special reference to health and hygiene. The official call for masks came in December 1940, two months into the blitz and just as flu season was getting underway, in a white paper that recommended their use alongside a raft of other preventive health measures. British scientists conscripted to the Medical Research Council’s Air Hygiene Unit were convinced: the “principle of wearing masks for protection against droplet infection” was a sound practice.
The Ministry of Health endorsed three types of mask: the standard gauze type (similar to today’s homemade masks); a cellophane screen (like today’s visors, but only covering the mouth and nose); and the commercially available “yashmak” (in the style of the Muslim veil), for the “fashion conscious”. The ministry ordered 500,000 masks to be distributed as needed in the event of an epidemic and commissioned an instructional leaflet for shelterers.
British newspapers publicised the government’s new policy. On February 5 1941, the Times reported that Sir William Jameson, the chief medical officer, had endorsed the new masks, and, more colourfully, Ritchie Calder, a journalist for the Daily Herald tried one out in public. “After ten minutes yesterday my anti-flu ‘windscreen’ ceased to be a source of ribald remarks,” he reported. “People round me became used to seeing me working in what looked like a transparent eye-shade which had slipped down my nose.”
Predicting that masks would become “as commonplace as horn-rim glasses”, Calder wrote that he could even blow his nose with his mask on. The only thing he couldn’t do “in comfort”, he reported, was “have a cigarette”.
Sharp contrast
A short propaganda film commissioned by the Ministry of Information and released in February 1941 also saw the mask message as self-evidently good sense. “If the shelter doctor or nurse gives you a mask,” the narrator exhorted, “well, wear it!”
.....
Despite protests to the contrary, the source of the COVID-19 mask controversy is not rooted in longstanding concerns about individual rights or British character. We need to look elsewhere to find its source: to the general breakdown in communication and trust between experts, the government and [wrong-wing] members of the public, that became a mainstay of contemporary life well after the blitz had passed and has been exacerbated by the pandemic."
https://theconversation.com/why-londoners-in-the-blitz-accepted-face-masks-to-prevent-infection-unlike-todays-objectors-142021 .
Australian Recruitment Film
"100,000 Cobbers" is a 1942 dramatised documentary by director Ken G. Hall for the Australian Department of Information during World War II to boost recruitment into the armed forces.
Cinesound Productions were commissioned to make the film by the Department of Information. The original title was Democratic Army. Director Ken G. Hall said he wanted to make a featurette as opposed to a documentary film. The theme of it was to "show that a man may not have a friend in the world, but from the moment he joins the Army he has "cobbers" in plenty."
100,000 Cobbers was mostly filmed at Liverpool Military camp using national servicemen. There was also location shooting at Luna Park.
Cinesound Productions were commissioned to make the film by the Department of Information. The original title was Democratic Army. Director Ken G. Hall said he wanted to make a featurette as opposed to a documentary film. The theme of it was to "show that a man may not have a friend in the world, but from the moment he joins the Army he has "cobbers" in plenty."
100,000 Cobbers was mostly filmed at Liverpool Military camp using national servicemen. There was also location shooting at Luna Park.
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sī vīs pācem, parā bellum
igitur quī dēsīderat pācem praeparet bellum therefore, he who desires peace, let him prepare for war sī vīs pācem, parā bellum if you wan...
