Thursday, July 11, 2019

1854-3-20 Republican Party


U.S. Republican Party founded at a meeting in a schoolhouse in Wisconsin on March 20, 1854. The Missouri Compromise had been in place since 1820, when Missouri was admitted to the Union as a slave state in exchange for the prohibition of slavery north of the 36°30′ parallel. However, on 4 March 1854 the Senate passed the Kansas-Nebraska Act to create two new territories with the potential for them to be opened to slavery, effectively repealing the Missouri Compromise. In response, a coalition of opponents to the expansion of slavery began to discuss forming a new political party on an anti-slavery platform

New York attorney Alvan E. Bovay had moved to the small town of Ripon, Wisconsin, in 1850. He quickly became a respected member of the community, and was instrumental in the construction of the single-story wooden framed schoolhouse. On the evening of 20 March 1854 he organized a meeting there for fellow opponents of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, at which the town committees of the Free Soil and Whig parties voted to dissolve themselves in favor of creating a new party. It is generally accepted that Bovay himself proposed naming the new party ‘Republican’ in homage to the Republican Party of Thomas Jefferson. The party’s first convention was held on 6 July 1854 on the outskirts of Jackson, Michigan, barely six weeks after President Franklin Pierce signed the Kansas-Nebraska Act into law. By this time Bovay had persuaded Horace Greeley, the editor of the New York Tribune, to promote the ‘Republican’ party. The party quickly built support and by 1856 it proved to be the dominant political force in the North when John C. Fremont, the first Republican presidential candidate, won 11 of the 16 Northern states.

The Missouri Compromise was United States federal legislation that stopped northern attempts to forever prohibit slavery's expansion by admitting Missouri as a slave state in exchange for legislation which prohibited slavery north of the 36°30′ parallel except for Missouri. The 16th United States Congress passed the legislation on March 3, 1820, and President James Monroe signed it on March 6, 1820.

Earlier, in February 1819, Representative James Tallmadge Jr., a Jeffersonian Republican from New York, had submitted two amendments to Missouri's request for statehood that included restrictions on slavery. Southerners objected to any bill that imposed federal restrictions on slavery and believed that it was a state issue, as settled by the Constitution. However, with the Senate evenly split at the opening of the debates, both sections possessing 11 states, the admission of Missouri as a slave state would give the South an advantage. Northern critics including Federalists and Democratic-Republicans objected to the expansion of slavery into the Louisiana Purchase territory on the Constitutional inequalities of the three-fifths rule, which conferred Southern representation in the federal government derived from a state's slave population. Jeffersonian Republicans in the North ardently maintained that a strict interpretation of the Constitution required that Congress act to limit the spread of slavery on egalitarian grounds. "[Northern] Republicans rooted their antislavery arguments, not on expediency, but in egalitarian morality." "The Constitution [said northern Jeffersonians], strictly interpreted, gave the sons of the founding generation the legal tools to hasten [the] removal [of slavery], including the refusal to admit additional slave states."

When free-soil Maine offered its petition for statehood, the Senate quickly linked the Maine and Missouri bills, making Maine admission a condition for Missouri entering the Union as a slave state. Senator Jesse B. Thomas of Illinois added a compromise proviso that excluded slavery from all remaining lands of the Louisiana Purchase north of the 36° 30' parallel. The combined measures passed the Senate, only to be voted down in the House by Northern representatives who held out for a free Missouri. Speaker of the House Henry Clay of Kentucky, in a desperate bid to break the deadlock, divided the Senate bills. Clay and his pro-compromise allies succeeded in pressuring half of the anti-restrictionist House Southerners to submit to the passage of the Thomas proviso and maneuvered a number of restrictionist House northerners to acquiesce in supporting Missouri as a slave state. The Missouri question in the 15th Congress ended in stalemate on March 4, 1819, the House sustaining its northern antislavery position and the Senate blocking a slavery restricted statehood.

The Missouri Compromise was very controversial, and many worried that the country had become lawfully divided along sectional lines. The Kansas–Nebraska Act effectively repealed the bill in 1854, and the Supreme Court declared it unconstitutional in Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857), both of which increased tensions over slavery and contributed to the American Civil War.

The Kansas–Nebraska Act of 1854 (10 Stat. 277) was a territorial organic act that created the territories of Kansas and Nebraska. It was drafted by Democratic Senator Stephen A. Douglas, passed by the 33rd United States Congress, and signed into law by President Franklin Pierce. Douglas introduced the bill intending to open up new lands to development and facilitate the construction of a transcontinental railroad, but the Kansas–Nebraska Act is most notable for effectively repealing the Missouri Compromise, stoking national tensions over slavery, and contributing to a series of armed conflicts known as "Bleeding Kansas".

The United States had acquired vast amounts of sparsely settled land in the 1803 Louisiana Purchase, and since the 1840s Douglas had sought to establish a territorial government in a portion of the Louisiana Purchase that was still unorganized. Douglas's efforts were stymied by Senator David Rice Atchison and other Southern leaders who refused to allow the creation of territories that banned slavery; slavery would have been banned because the Missouri Compromise outlawed slavery in the territory north of latitude 36°30' north. To win the support of Southerners like Atchison, Pierce and Douglas agreed to back the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, with the status of slavery instead decided based on "popular sovereignty". Under popular sovereignty, the citizens of each territory, rather than Congress, would determine whether or not slavery would be allowed.

Douglas's bill to repeal the Missouri Compromise and organize Kansas Territory and Nebraska Territory won approval by a wide margin in the Senate, but faced stronger opposition in the House of Representatives. Though Northern Whigs strongly opposed the bill, the bill passed the House with the support of almost all Southerners and some Northern Democrats. After the passage of the act, pro-and anti-slavery elements flooded into Kansas to establish a population that would vote for or against slavery, resulting in a series of armed conflicts known as "Bleeding Kansas". Douglas and Pierce hoped that popular sovereignty would help bring an end to the national debate over slavery, but the Kansas–Nebraska Act outraged many Northerners, giving rise to the anti-slavery Republican Party. Ongoing tensions over slavery would eventually lead to the American Civil War.

Wednesday, July 10, 2019

Selectorate Theory

22-8-6 Selectorate Theory: The Basic Model > .
24-5-25 Why We Cannot [Easily] Stop Dictators - Versed > . 
23-8-13 Game Theory Of Military Spending | EcEx > .
23-2-19 Ruscia's Grand Strategy & Ukraine - P00's geostrategic disaster - P > .
22-9-22 Signs of a coming War in Europe | Garry Kasparov - geonow > .

● Securing Democracy 21st ..

The selectorate theory of government studies the interactive relationships between political survival strategies and economic realities. It is detailed in The Logic of Political Survival (2003). The theory is also applicable to all types of organizations with leadership, including (among others) private corporations and non-state actors.

The theory is known for its use of continuous variables to classify regimes by describing the ratios of coalitions within the total population. Regimes are classified on a spectrum of coalition size, as opposed to conventional, categorical labels (for example, the authors define conventional democracy as a large coalition regime and autocracy as a small coalition regime). The theory has been applied to a large range of topics including foreign aid, the choice of tax rates by incumbent political leaders, as well as medieval European history.

In selectorate theory, three groups of people constrain leaders. These groups are the nominal selectorate, the real selectorate, and the winning coalition. The nominal selectorate, also referred to as the interchangeables, includes every person who has some say in choosing the leader (for example, in an American presidential election, this is all registered voters). The real selectorate, also referred to as the influentials, are those who really choose the leaders (for example, in an American presidential election, the people who cast a vote for one of the candidates). The winning coalition, also referred to as the essentials, are those whose support translates into victory (for example, in an American presidential election, those voters that get a candidate to 270 Electoral College votes). In other countries, leaders may stay in power with the support of much smaller numbers of people, such as senior figures in the security forces, and business oligarchs, in contemporary Russia.

The fundamental premise in selectorate theory is that the primary goal of a leader - regardless of secondary policy concerns - is to remain in power. To remain in power, leaders must retain support from every member of their winning coalition. When the winning coalition is small, as in autocracies, the leader will tend to use private goods to satisfy the coalition. When the winning coalition is large, as in democracies, the leader will tend to use public goods to satisfy the coalition.

In The Dictator's Handbook, Bueno de Mesquita and Smith state five rules that leaders should use to stay in power:
  1. The smaller the winning coalition, the fewer people to satisfy to remain in control.
  2. Having a large nominal selectorate gives a pool of potential people to replace dissenters in coalition.
  3. Maintain control of revenue flows to redistribute to your friends.
  4. But only pay friends enough that they will not consider overthrowing you and at the same time little enough so that they depend on you.
  5. Don't take your friends' money and redistribute it to the masses.
  6. The winning coalition need not be the majority of the selectorate.
For example, Duh J tRUMP was elected [UN]president of the United States in 2016 without a majority of all votes cast. In this case, the winning coalition was less than 50% of the real selectorate, all the voters that actually cast a ballot in that election. Additionally, Duh J T's winning coalition represented only 24.5% of the nominal selectorate.

00:00 Intro Risk of Coups / Mass Uprising
2:55 Selectorate Governance: Is Democracy Fragile?
5:25 The Selectorate Theory
12:00 What Do Leaders Do?
37:30 What helps leaders survive?
39:22 Q&A

Comment: 5 Rules of Power Politics 
1. Depend on as few people as possible. 
2. Make the group of people that you can trust as large as possible (make officers expendable). 
3. Tax people as highly as you can (not too high that they quit working or revolt) 
4. Use minimal amount of that revenue to keep administration loyal. 
5.* Be kind of "civic-minded" with leftover revenue?

Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act 1919

The Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act 1919 > . 

Simulating Alternate Voting Systems

Sinn Fein

sī vīs pācem, parā bellum

igitur quī dēsīderat pācem praeparet bellum    therefore, he who desires peace, let him prepare for war sī vīs pācem, parā bellum if you wan...