23-10-20 Xina's PLAN Expansion vs USN's Hegemony - gtbt > . skip > .
22-10-1 India Will Not Be The Next Xina - EcEx > .
20-4-30 Why Pakistan's Geography Sucks - Real > .
21-9-30 Understanding China c Kevin Rudd - Bridgewater > .
CPEC - 2020 China-Pakistan Economic Corridor’s Return to the Shadows .
The troubles faced by the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)—the flagship of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—are perhaps the most conclusive demonstration that the BRI model that has been in place for the last few years is no longer sustainable. Even before the coronavirus pandemic, CPEC had stalled. ... The projects that are already underway or that have been completed are far from negligible, however. CPEC represents a marked expansion of China’s economic presence in Pakistan, with approximately $25 billion in investments to date—but this is already pushing close to the framework’s limits rather than the foundations of a more ambitious plan.
CPEC was supposed to act as a vehicle to upgrade the China-Pakistan partnership. Some Chinese analysts used to describe the relationship as a “stool with two legs”: While security and political ties have been strong for decades, economic ties had always been extremely weak — a relationship almost entirely confined to military and intelligence matters, and managed by a very small cast of individuals on the two sides. China was never a factor in day-to-day economic or political life in Pakistan. China's strong approval ratings in opinion polls reflected its unimpeachable reputation as the “all-weather friend” rather than any deeper affinity among the Pakistani public.
... China had to tread carefully to avoid eliciting alarmed reactions in New Delhi or further afield. CPEC was a way of changing that narrative. ... There was also a gamble involved: CPEC was dubbed the “flagship” of the BRI, which tied its fate closely to the reputation of the entire initiative, and even to Xi Jinping himself. ... If CPEC succeeded, other countries would look to replicate it.
For Pakistan, CPEC was an opportunity to draw China into a deeper level of political, security, commercial, and financial commitment to the country, in a highly visible way, at a juncture where U.S. support was being tapered back on all fronts, and international investors were very wary of the security situation. For both sides, the optics are therefore almost as important as the substance. China and Pakistan have a strong incentive to put a good face on CPEC whatever is actually happening in practice.
21-8-20 Protests in Pakistan erupt against China’s Belt and Road plan: Demonstrations shut down Gwadar, where Chinese are blamed for lack of water and electricity and threat to local fishing [Inevitable, it appears.]
Protests have erupted in Pakistan’s port city Gwadar against a severe shortage of water and electricity and threats to livelihoods, part of a growing backlash against China’s multibillion-dollar Belt and Road projects in the country.
This week, demonstrators including fishers and other local workers blocked the roads in Gwadar, a coastal town in Balochistan. They burned tyres, chanted slogans and largely shut down the city, to demand water and electricity and a stop to Chinese trawlers illegally fishing in the nearby waters and then taking the fish to China. Two people were injured when the authorities cracked down on the protesters.
The protests are part of a growing discontent with China’s presence in Gwadar, whose port is an integral part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor project (CPEC), in which China has invested billions in infrastructure projects in Pakistan.
Under the project, Pakistan surrendered Gwadar port to a Chinese-backed multinational corporation for a lease of 40 years. It is part of China’s mammoth Belt and Road initiative, which stretches across 70 countries to give China a clear trade route from east Asia to Europe.
The Pakistan government accepted China’s investment in the hope it would help boost the country’s ailing economy. [In all probability, it did fill the purses of corrupt local officials.] But Balochistan is home to a long-running violent insurgency, and China’s presence in Gwadar has been the cause of much social unrest and led to great anti-Chinese sentiment.
There are signs that resentment at Belt and Road is growing across the country. Nine Chinese workers were killed last month when a vehicle laden with explosives and driven by a suicide attacker rammed a convoy heading out to work on the Dasu dam, another flagship CPEC project.
China’s ambassador to Pakistan was also targeted in a terrorist attack on his hotel in April, though he was not hurt.
CPEC - China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (Afghanistan) ..
CPEC - 2020 China-Pakistan Economic Corridor’s Return to the Shadows .
(2020) CPEC Slowdown
The troubles faced by the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)—the flagship of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—are perhaps the most conclusive demonstration that the BRI model that has been in place for the last few years is no longer sustainable. Even before the coronavirus pandemic, CPEC had stalled. ... The projects that are already underway or that have been completed are far from negligible, however. CPEC represents a marked expansion of China’s economic presence in Pakistan, with approximately $25 billion in investments to date—but this is already pushing close to the framework’s limits rather than the foundations of a more ambitious plan.
... China had to tread carefully to avoid eliciting alarmed reactions in New Delhi or further afield. CPEC was a way of changing that narrative. ... There was also a gamble involved: CPEC was dubbed the “flagship” of the BRI, which tied its fate closely to the reputation of the entire initiative, and even to Xi Jinping himself. ... If CPEC succeeded, other countries would look to replicate it.
For Pakistan, CPEC was an opportunity to draw China into a deeper level of political, security, commercial, and financial commitment to the country, in a highly visible way, at a juncture where U.S. support was being tapered back on all fronts, and international investors were very wary of the security situation. For both sides, the optics are therefore almost as important as the substance. China and Pakistan have a strong incentive to put a good face on CPEC whatever is actually happening in practice.
21-8-20 Protests in Pakistan erupt against China’s Belt and Road plan: Demonstrations shut down Gwadar, where Chinese are blamed for lack of water and electricity and threat to local fishing [Inevitable, it appears.]
This week, demonstrators including fishers and other local workers blocked the roads in Gwadar, a coastal town in Balochistan. They burned tyres, chanted slogans and largely shut down the city, to demand water and electricity and a stop to Chinese trawlers illegally fishing in the nearby waters and then taking the fish to China. Two people were injured when the authorities cracked down on the protesters.
...
Responsibility for the attack was claimed by the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), which like other militant groups in the region accuses Chinese of exploiting Balochistan’s mineral resources, and has previously attacked Chinese nationals and the Chinese consulate in Karachi.Under the project, Pakistan surrendered Gwadar port to a Chinese-backed multinational corporation for a lease of 40 years. It is part of China’s mammoth Belt and Road initiative, which stretches across 70 countries to give China a clear trade route from east Asia to Europe.
The Pakistan government accepted China’s investment in the hope it would help boost the country’s ailing economy. [In all probability, it did fill the purses of corrupt local officials.] But Balochistan is home to a long-running violent insurgency, and China’s presence in Gwadar has been the cause of much social unrest and led to great anti-Chinese sentiment.
China’s ambassador to Pakistan was also targeted in a terrorist attack on his hotel in April, though he was not hurt.
