Friday, June 26, 2020

Chokepoints - South China Sea

2019 China's Attempted Hegemony - Geopolitics of the South China Sea > .
24-2-2 Why America Would Defend The Philippines - Ec Talk > .
24-2-17 Taiwan Question & World Order | X Economy - Update > .
24-2-16 USN vs PLAN - T&P > .
24-2-10 KOREA | A Final Separation? - Prof J K-L > .
24-1-9 Ċold Ŵar 2: NATO-like alliance vs Xina in the Indo-Pacific? | DW > .
23-12-21 Xina’s 3 goals in creating South Xina Sea tensions - Lei > .
23-12-18 Xinese Agression in the South China Sea (SXS) - Warographics > . 
23-10-25 US & [I-P-CW] vs Xina: Preparations to Fight War - Real > .
23-10-23 Xina's Threats Pushing Philippines Closer to US - WSJ > .
23-8-2 Xi's Anti-Corruption Purge of PLA Rocket Force | PLA structure - Digging > .
23-7-29 Ream, Hambantota, Tonga Naval Bases; Australia - Focus > .
23-7-28 PLAN's Indo-Pacific Bases - Ream, Djibouti, Hambantota, Tonga - Focus > .
23-7-27 Unbelievable Growth of Indonesia - EcEx > .
23-7-24 Xina's Nine-Dash Line: [Illegal Claims in South China Sea] - Geoff > .
23-7-12 Xina prepares for war - Hudson > .
23-6-11 [Mil-Civ Crosr] X's RoFo [Amphibious Assault] Ferries - K > . skip > .
23-6-11 US expanding presence in the Philippines = 9 bases - Binkov > .
23-5-10 US Military - New Bases to Counter China in Pacific | WSJ > .
23-2-28 Xina & ROC war prep: martial law, nuclear emergency, wartime controls > .
23-2-22 US Bases & Philippine Fight Against Xina - T&P > .
23-1-13 US & Japan boost cooperation; Marines ready to counter Xina > .
22-12-20 US military in Pacific to prevent Xinese invasion of Taiwan - PBS > .
22-11-27 Dragon's Claw: Xina's Next 10 Years - Kamome > . skip > .
22-11-11 Fortress Xina - Xi's Plans for World Domination - laowhy86 > .
22-11-2 Photo evidence - Xina has militarized South China Sea islands - Rev > .
22-10-11 Condeleeza Rice - Xina and Taiwan - Hoover > .
22-8-4 Situation Zoom: Pelosi Visits Taiwan | Goodfellows - Hoover > .
22-8-4 Nancy Peolosi’s trip ⇝ XXP and Xina-Taiwan relations - Lei > .
22-7-10 Singapore: Hx: Richest, Most Militarized Country in Asia - Explore > .
Risks of Amphibious Invasions - Hypothetical modern D-Day invasion - Binkov > .
22-5-12 The Philippines - China's New Province - laowhy86 > .
22-3-26 China has “Fully Militarized” the South China Sea - Uncensored > .
22-2-25 South China Sea dispute explained - Paint > .
22-1-31 Will Taiwan Spark a US-China Conflict? - Whatifalthist > .
2021 How China is Secretly Illegally Expanding its Territory > .
2021 Economic & Military Implications of China's BRI (Kevin Rudd) - Asia Society > .
Taiwan Strait Crisis 1954-1958 - Cold War > .
What is the RCEP? | CNBC > .
> Malaysia >>    



Taiwan ..

The South China Sea is a marginal sea of the Western Pacific Ocean. It is bounded in the north by the shores of South China (hence the name), in the west by the Indochinese Peninsula, in the east by the islands of Taiwan and northwestern Philippines (mainly Luzon, Mindoro and Palawan), and in the south by Borneo, eastern Sumatra and the Bangka Belitung Islands, encompassing an area of around 3,500,000 km2 (1,400,000 sq mi). It communicates with the East China Sea via the Taiwan Strait, the Philippine Sea via the Luzon Strait, the Sulu Sea via the straits around Palawan (e.g. the Mindoro and Balabac Strait), the Strait of Malacca via the Strait of Singapore, and the Java Sea via the Karimata and Bangka Strait. The Gulf of Tonkin is also part of the South China Sea, and the shallow waters south of the Riau Islands are also known as the Natuna Sea.

The South China Sea is a region of tremendous economic and geostrategic importance. One-third of the world's maritime shipping passes through it, carrying over US$3 trillion in trade each year. Huge oil and natural gas reserves are believed to lie beneath its seabed. It also contain lucrative fisheries, which are crucial for the food security of millions in Southeast Asia.

The South China Sea Islands, collectively comprising several archipelago clusters of mostly small uninhabited islands, islets (cays and shoals), reefs/atolls and seamounts numbering in the hundreds, are subject to competing claims of sovereignty by several countries. These claims are also reflected in the variety of names used for the islands and the sea.
The Strait of Malacca (Malay: Selat Melaka, Indonesian: Selat Malaka, Thai: ช่องแคบมะละกา, Tamil: மலாக்கா நீரிணை, Malākkā nīriṇai, Chinese: 馬六甲海峽/马六甲海峡) or Straits of Malacca is a narrow stretch of water, 580 mi (930 km) in length, between the Malay Peninsula (Peninsular Malaysia) and the Indonesian island of Sumatra. As the main shipping channel between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, it is one of the most important shipping lanes in the world. It is named after the Malacca Sultanate that ruled over the archipelago between 1400 and 1511, the center of administration of which was located in the modern-day state of Malacca, Malaysia.

From an economic and strategic perspective, the Strait of Malacca is one of the most important shipping lanes in the world.

The strait is the main shipping channel between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, linking major Asian economies such as India, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, China, Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea. The Strait of Malacca is part of the Maritime Silk Road that runs from the Chinese coast towards the southern tip of India to Mombasa, from there through the Red Sea via the Suez Canal to the Mediterranean, there to the Upper Adriatic region to the northern Italian hub of Trieste with its rail connections to Central Europe and the North Sea. Over 94,000 vessels pass through the strait each year (2008) making it the busiest strait in the world, carrying about 25% of the world's traded goods, including oil, Chinese manufactured products, coal, palm oil and Indonesian coffee. About a quarter of all oil carried by sea passes through the Strait, mainly from Persian Gulf suppliers to Asian markets. In 2007, an estimated 13.7 million barrels per day were transported through the strait, increasing to an estimated 15.2 million barrels per day in 2011. In addition, it is also one of the world's most congested shipping choke points because it narrows to only 2.8 km (1.5 nautical miles) wide at the Phillip Channel (close to the south of Singapore).

The maximum size (specifically draught) of a vessel that can pass through the Strait is referred to as Malaccamax, that is, for some of the world's largest ships (mostly oil tankers), the Strait's minimum depth (25 metres or 82 feet) is not deep enough. This is determined by the relatively shallow Singapore Strait, which provides passage to the Karimata Strait in the east. The next closest passageway (the Sunda Strait between Sumatra and Java) is even more shallow and narrow. Therefore, ships exceeding the Malaccamax must detour a few thousand nautical miles and use the Lombok Strait, Makassar Strait, Sibutu Passage, and Mindoro Strait instead.

Piracy has been a problem in the strait. Piracy had been high in the 2000s, with additional increase after the events of September 11, 2001. After attacks rose again in the first half of 2004, regional navies stepped up their patrols of the area in July 2004. Subsequently, attacks on ships in the Strait of Malacca dropped, to 79 in 2005 and 50 in 2006. Reports indicate that attacks have dropped to near-zero levels in recent years.

There are 34 shipwrecks, some dating to the 1880s, in the local TSS channel (the channel for commercial ships under the global Traffic Separation Scheme). These pose a collision hazard in the narrow and shallow strait.

On 20 August 2017, the United States Navy destroyer USS John S. McCain lost ten of its crew's lives in a collision with the merchant ship Alnic MC a short distance east of the strait whilst full steering capabilities had been lost and making a series of errors in attempted mitigation, its external lights being changed to "red over red" ("vessel not under command").

Another risk is the annual haze due to bush fires in Sumatra, Indonesia. It may reduce visibility to 200 metres (660 ft), forcing ships to slow down in the busy strait. The strait is frequently used by ships longer than 350 metres (1,150 ft).

Thai CanalThailand has developed plans to divert much of the strait's traffic and hence some of its economic significance to a shorter route: the Thai government has several times proposed cutting a canal through the Isthmus of Kra, saving around 960 kilometres (600 mi) from the journey between the two oceans. China has offered to cover the costs, according to a report leaked to The Washington Times in 2004. Nevertheless, and despite the support of several Thai politicians, the prohibitive financial and ecological costs suggest that such a canal will not be built.

An alternative is to install a pipeline across the Isthmus of Kra to carry oil to ships waiting on the other side. Proponents calculate it would cut the cost of oil delivery to Asia by about $0.50/barrel ($3/m3). Myanmar has also made a similar pipeline proposal.

The South China Sea disputes involve both island and maritime claims by several sovereign states within the region, namely Brunei, the People's Republic of China (PRC), Taiwan (Republic of China/ROC), Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. An estimated US$3.37 trillion worth of global trade passes through the South China Sea annually, which accounts for a third of the global maritime trade. 80 percent of China's energy imports and 39.5 percent of China's total trade passes through the South China Sea.

The disputes involve the islands, reefs, banks, and other features of the South China Sea, including the Spratly Islands, Paracel Islands, Scarborough Shoal, and various boundaries in the Gulf of Tonkin. There are further disputes, such as the waters near the Indonesian Natuna Islands, which many do not regard as part of the South China Sea. Claimant states are interested in retaining or acquiring the rights to fishing stocks, the exploration and potential exploitation of crude oil and natural gas in the seabed of various parts of the South China Sea, and the strategic control of important shipping lanes.

Since 2013, the PRC has resorted to island building in the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands region. According to Reuters, island building in the South China Sea primarily by Vietnam and the Philippines has been going on for decades; while China has come late to the island building game, its efforts have been on an unprecedented scale as it had from 2014 to 2016 constructed more new island surface than all other nations have constructed throughout history and as of 2016 placed military equipment on one of its artificial islands unlike the other claimants. A 2019 article in Voice of America that compared China and Vietnam's island building campaign in the South China Sea similarly noted that the reason why Vietnam in contradistinction to China has been subject to little international criticism and even support was because of the slower speed and widely perceived defensive nature of its island-building project.

China's actions in the South China Sea have been described as part of its "salami slicing" strategy, and since 2015 the United States and other states such as France and the United Kingdom have conducted freedom of navigation operations (FONOP) in the region. In July 2016, an arbitration tribunal constituted under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) ruled against the PRC's maritime claims in Philippines v. China. The tribunal did not rule on the ownership of the islands or delimit maritime boundaries. Both the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China (Taiwan) stated that they did not recognize the tribunal and insisted that the matter should be resolved through bilateral negotiations with other claimants. On September 17, 2020, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom issued a joint note verbale recognizing the PCA ruling and challenging China's claims.


China's quest to catch up with the West > .
China economy: Why it matters > .
Beware Dragons - atl >> .


Counter Foreign Sanctions Law

23-9-25 Xi's Transforming Xina [for the worse] - Xina's Changing Trajectory - Dig > .

Stratfor Asia Pacific Analyst Chase Blazek explains China's New Anti-Sanctions Law:

 On June 10, 2021, the Standing Committee of China’s National People’s Congress (“NPC”) passed the Counter Foreign Sanctions Law (the “Law”), which is effective immediately. The Law has been described by Chinese officials as a significant step forward in upgrading China’s “legal toolbox” in response to sanctions, import prohibitions and export control restrictions imposed by foreign governments. The Law is drafted broadly and provides for retaliatory sanctions in response to what Chinese officials describe as “arbitrary” and “unilateral” foreign sanctions toward China, including import and other sanctions restrictions imposed recently on the basis of alleged human rights and forced labor violations in China, as well as a range of financial, export and technology transfer restrictions that have been imposed on various other foreign policy and national security grounds. The Law is the latest in a series of Chinese actions intended to establish a legal framework to counter foreign sanctions, import prohibitions and export controls targeting Chinese entities and sectors, and codifies a number of retaliatory sanctions already taken by China over the past several months

Although important questions remain regarding the scope, manner and extent to which China will implement these measures against non-Chinese parties (particularly private-sector entities), the Law has a number of important elements, including: (i) expanding on existing authorities to provide for the creation of a “counter-sanction list” of individuals subject to a range of restrictive measures (the “Countermeasures”) based on involvement in the formulation or implementation of covered foreign sanctions against China; and (ii) codifying a private right of action for aggrieved parties to sue for losses incurred as a result of covered foreign sanctions. The Law has significant implications for both Chinese and non-Chinese companies and individuals, located within or outside China, and poses challenging conflict-of-laws issues and potential private litigation risks for parties who may be subject to conflicting legal obligations.

CRA - China-Russia - untrustworthy bedmates

2021 Unpacking the China-Russia alliance - CaRe > .
24-12-19 North America is preparing for an Arctic battle | CBC > .
23-9-25 Xi's Transforming Xina [for the worse] - Xina's Changing Trajectory - Dig > .
23-8-16 How Corruption Destroyed the Ruscian Army - Icarus > . skip > .
23-8-2 Xi's Anti-Corruption Purge of PLA Rocket Force | PLA structure - Digging > .
23-5-31 Xina is Backstabbing Ruscia - Uncensored > .
23-1-22 Politics Can Destroy Armies: Factionalism & R-U War - Perun > .
22-11-19 Splinternet - Xina 1st of 35+ Countries Leaving Global Internet - Tech > .
22-11-17 Poopagandistic malice | [Demented] reactions to Kherson (subs) - Katz > .

Thursday, June 25, 2020

Djibouti Bases - Bab-al-Mandab Chokepoint

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24-2-23 Why the Closest US and Xinese Bases are in Djibiouti - T&P > .22-10-3 War in Yemen. Is Peace On The Horizon? [no] - gtbt > .
21-9-22 Countries with Djibouti Bases - ARgs > .
18-7-31 How Africa is Becoming China's China - Wend > .2021 Why Everyone is So Many Are Building Djibouti Military Bases  - KhAnubis > .
Gate of Lamentation: The Bab-El-Mandeb Strait - Galilei > .


Chokepoint: The Bab-el-Mandeb (Arabic: باب المندب, lit. 'Gate of Tears') is a strait between Yemen on the Arabian Peninsula, and Djibouti and Eritrea in the Horn of Africa. It connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden. The strait derives its name from the dangers attending its navigation or, according to an Arab legend, from the numbers who were drowned by an earthquake that separated the Arabian Peninsula from the Horn of Africa.

The Bab-el-Mandeb acts as a strategic link between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea via the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. In 2006, an estimated 3.3 million barrels (520,000 m3) of oil passed through the strait per day, out of a world total of about 43 million barrels per day (6,800,000 m3/d) moved by tankers.[2]

The distance across is about 20 miles (30 km) from Ras Menheli in Yemen to Ras Siyyan in Djibouti. The island of Perim divides the strait into two channels, of which the eastern, known as the Bab Iskender (Alexander's Strait), is 2 miles (3 km) wide and 16 fathoms (30 m) deep, while the western, or Dact-el-Mayun, has a width of about 16 miles (25 km) and a depth of 170 fathoms (310 m). Near the coast of Djibouti lies a group of smaller islands known as the "Seven Brothers". There is a surface current inwards in the eastern channel, but a strong undercurrent outwards in the western channel.

The British East India Company unilaterally seized the island of Perim in 1799 on behalf of its Indian empire. The government of Britain asserted its ownership in 1857 and erected a lighthouse there in 1861, using it to command the Red Sea and the trade routes through the Suez Canal. It was used as a coaling station to refuel steamships until 1935 when the reduced use of coal as fuel rendered the operation unprofitable.

The British presence continued until 1967 when the island became part of the People's Republic of South Yemen. Before the handover, the British government had put forward before the United Nations a proposal for the island to be internationalised as a way to ensure the continued security of passage and navigation in the Bab-el-Mandeb, but this was refused.

On February 22, 2008, a company owned by Tarek bin Laden unveiled plans to build a bridge named Bridge of the Horns across the strait, linking Yemen with Djibouti. Middle East Development LLC has issued a notice to construct a bridge passing across the Red Sea that would be the longest suspended passing in the world. The project has been assigned to engineering company COWI in collaboration with architect studio Dissing+Weitling, both from Denmark. It was announced in 2010 that Phase 1 had been delayed and as of mid-2016 nothing more has been heard about the project.

Tuesday, June 23, 2020

First Island Chain - Asia

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Amphibious Challenges ..   Amphibious 21st & RoRo Ferries
23-5-10 US Military - New Bases to Counter China in Pacific | WSJ > .23-2-28 America predicts war with China in 2025 - Caspian > .
23-2-28 Xina & ROC war prep: martial law, nuclear emergency, wartime controls > .
Communist Attempts to Take Over Japan in the 1950s - Cold War > .

The first island chain refers to the first chain of major archipelagos out from the East Asian continental mainland coast. Principally composed of the Kuril Islands, Japanese Archipelago, Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan (Formosa), the northern Philippines, and Borneo; from the Kamchatka Peninsula to the Malay Peninsula. Some definitions of the first island chain anchor the northern end on the Russian Far East coast north of Sakhalin Island, with Sakhalin Island being the first link in the chain. However, others consider the Aleutians as the farthest north-eastern first link in the chain. The first island chain forms one of three island chain doctrines within the Island Chain Strategy.

Much of the first island chain is roughly situated in waters claimed by the PRC. These include the South China Sea, within the Nine-Dash Line, the East China Sea within the Okinawa Trough. The boundary between Okinawa and China lies between Japan and Taiwan.

US General Douglas MacArthur pointed out that before WW2, the US protected its western shores with a line of defense from Hawaii, Guam, to the Philippines. However this line of defense was attacked by Japan with the Pearl Harbor bombing of 1941, thereby drawing the US into the war. The US subsequently launched the air Raid on Taipei (Taiwan at the time part of Japan's empire) and launched the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The WW2 victory allowed the US to expand its line of defense further west to the coast of Asia, and thus the US controlled the first island chain.

Between the end of WW2 and the Korean War, MacArthur praised Taiwan, located at the midpoint of the first island chain, as an 'unsinkable aircraft carrier'.

The Island Chain Strategy is a strategy first mentioned by American foreign policy commentator John Foster Dulles in 1951 during the Korean War. It suggests surrounding the Soviet Union and China by sea. The island chain concept did not become a major theme in American policy, but it has become a major fixation of both American and Chinese analysts to this day. For the U.S. the island chain strategy is a big part of the military of the United States's force projection in the Eastern part of Asia. For Chinese, the concept is used as part of their fears of encirclement by American forces. For both sides, the island chain strategy emphasizes the geographical and strategic importance of Taiwan. The primary target of the doctrine was the USSR; however, additional targets also included the People's Republic of China, Vietnam, and North Korea. After the USSR collapsed in 1991, China soon became the major target of the doctrine.

In 2014 April, the United States Naval Institute (USNI) assessed that the first island chain is the most effective point to counter any Chinese invasion. The US could not only cut off the People's Liberation Army Navy from entering the western Pacific, but also predict where they may move before trying to break through in the first place. The US and first chain countries are able to coordinate because of the US military's freedom of navigation in the first chain block. In June 2019, USNI called for a blockade of the first island chain if armed conflict broke out between China and the United States.

Andrew Krepinevich argued that an "archipelagic defense" of the countries that make up the first island chain would make up a big part of the implementation of the national defense strategy of 2018.

A 2019 report by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments "proposes a U.S. military strategy of Maritime Pressure and a supporting joint operational concept, “Inside-Out” Defense, to stabilize the military balance in the Western Pacific and deny China the prospect of a successful fait accompli." The first island chain plays a central role in the report.

In 2020, the United States Marine Corps started shifting its tactics in conjunction with the United States Navy to be deployed along or near the first island chain. In 2021, the United States Marine Corps announced a goal of three additional Pacific-based regiments.

In the first island chain, Taiwan is considered of critical strategic importance. It is located at the midpoint of the first chain and occupies a strategic position.


23-2-1 US secures deal on Philippines bases to complete arc around China: The US has secured access to four additional military bases in the Philippines - a key bit of real estate which would offer a front seat to monitor the Chinese in the South China Sea and around Taiwan. With this deal, Washington has stitched the gap in the arc of US alliances stretching from South Korea and Japan in the north to Australia in the south.

The missing link had been the Philippines, which borders two of the biggest potential flashpoints, Taiwan and the South China Sea, or the West Philippine Sea as Manila insists on calling it.

The US already had limited access to five sites under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) - the new additions and expanded access, according to a statement from Washington, will "allow more rapid support for humanitarian and climate-related disasters in the Philippines, and respond to other shared challenges", likely a veiled reference to countering China in the region.

sī vīs pācem, parā bellum

igitur quī dēsīderat pācem praeparet bellum    therefore, he who desires peace, let him prepare for war sī vīs pācem, parā bellum if you wan...