Sunday, December 29, 2019

1928-8-7 Kellogg–Briand (Paris) Pact


On the 27th of August 1928 Germany France and the United States signed the general
treaty for renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy otherwise known as the Kellogg-Briand pact. A total of 62 nations eventually went on to join them in signing the agreement, which promised to never use war as a way to settle conflicts.

Jointly created by the United States Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg and French foreign minister Aristide Briand, the Pact stemmed from France’s desire to protect itself against possible future German aggression. Unwilling to join what could be interpreted as a military alliance, Kellogg suggested that they invite all countries to sign a condemnation of war unless in self-defence. The United States’ involvement meant that the Pact was signed outside the League of Nations, of which America was not a member, and therefore means that it is still in force today.

At the time it was hoped that the signing of the Pact would stop any future wars, but the impact of the worldwide depression in the 1930s led nations such as Japan and Italy to launch invasions of Manchuria and Abyssinia respectively. Such invasions began without the aggressor ever declaring war but, despite this, the Pact was ineffective since it provided no way to enforce its terms anyway. However, it did act as the legal basis for the notion of a crime against peace, and in turn became the basis for many of the key prosecution arguments in the Nuremberg Trials and the Tokyo Trials that followed the Second World War.

The Kellogg–Briand Pact (or Pact of Paris, officially General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy) is a 1928 international agreement in which signatory states promised not to use war to resolve "disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them". There were no mechanisms for enforcement. Parties failing to abide by this promise "should be denied of the benefits furnished by [the] treaty". It was signed by Germany, France, and the United States on 27 August 1928, and by most other states soon after. Sponsored by France and the U.S., the Pact renounced the use of war and calls for the peaceful settlement of disputes. Similar provisions were incorporated into the Charter of the United Nations and other treaties, and it became a stepping-stone to a more activist American policy. It is named after its authors, United States Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg and French foreign minister Aristide Briand. The pact was concluded outside the League of Nations and remains in effect.

A total of 62 nations eventually went on to join them in signing the agreement, which promised to never use war as a way to settle conflicts.

Jointly created by the United States Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg and French foreign minister Aristide Briand, the Pact stemmed from France’s desire to protect itself against possible future German aggression. Unwilling to join what could be interpreted as a military alliance, Kellogg suggested that they invite all countries to sign a condemnation of war unless in self-defence. The United States’ involvement meant that the Pact was signed outside the League of Nations, of which America was not a member, and therefore means that it is still in force today.

At the time it was hoped that the signing of the Pact would stop any future wars, but the impact of the worldwide depression in the 1930s led nations such as Japan and Italy to launch invasions of Manchuria and Abyssinia respectively. Such invasions began without the aggressor ever declaring war but, despite this, the Pact was ineffective since it provided no way to enforce its terms anyway. However, it did act as the legal basis for the notion of a crime against peace, and in turn became the basis for many of the key prosecution arguments in the Nuremberg Trials and the Tokyo Trials that followed the WW2.

A common criticism is that the Kellogg–Briand Pact did not live up to all of its aims, but has arguably had some success. It neither ended war, nor stopped the rise of militarism, and was unable to prevent WW2. The pact has been ridiculed for its moralism and legalism and lack of influence on foreign policy. Moreover, it effectively erased the legal distinction between war and peace because the signatories began to wage wars without declaring them.

The pact's central provisions renouncing the use of war, and promoting peaceful settlement of disputes and the use of collective force to prevent aggression, were incorporated into the United Nations Charter and other treaties. Although civil wars continued, wars between established states have been rare since 1945, with a few exceptions in the Middle East. One legal consequence is to discourage annexation of territory by force, although other forms of annexation have not been prevented. More broadly, some authors claim there is now a strong presumption against the legality of using, or threatening, military force against another country. The pact also served as the legal basis for the concept of a crime against peace, for which the Nuremberg Tribunal and Tokyo Tribunal tried and executed the top leaders responsible for starting World War II.

Many historians and political scientists see the pact as mostly irrelevant and ineffective.

With the signing of the Litvinov Protocol in Moscow on February 9, 1929, the Soviet Union and its western neighbors, including Romania, agreed to put the Kellogg–Briand Pact in effect without waiting for other western signatories to ratify. The Bessarabian Question had made agreement between Romania and the Soviet Union challenging and dispute between the nations over Bessarabia continued.

1929-2-11 Lateran Treaty

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The Lateran Treaty (Patti Lateranensi; Pacta Lateranensia) was one component of the Lateran Pacts of 1929, agreements between the Kingdom of Italy under King Victor Emanuel III and the Holy See under Pope Pius XI to settle the long-standing Roman Question. During the unification of Italy in the mid-19th century, the Papal States resisted incorporation into the new nation, even as all the other Italian countries, except for San Marino, joined it; Camillo Cavour's dream of proclaiming the Kingdom of Italy from the steps of St. Peter's Basilica did not come to pass. The nascent Kingdom of Italy invaded and occupied Romagna (the eastern portion of the Papal States) in 1860, leaving only Latium in the pope's domains. Latium, including Rome itself, was occupied and annexed in 1870. For the following sixty years, relations between the Papacy and the Italian government were hostile, and the status of the pope became known as the "Roman Question".

The Popes knew that Rome was irrevocably the capital of Italy. There was nothing they wanted less than to govern it or be burdened with a papal kingdom. What they wished was independence, a foothold on the earth that belonged to no other sovereign.

Negotiations for the settlement of the Roman Question began in 1926 between the government of Italy and the Holy See, and culminated in the agreements of the Lateran Pacts, signed—the Treaty says—for King Victor Emmanuel III of Italy by Prime Minister Benito Mussolini and for Pope Pius XI by Cardinal Secretary of State Pietro Gasparri, on 11 February 1929. It was ratified on 7 June 1929.

The treaty and associated pacts were named after the Lateran Palace where they were signed on 11 February 1929, and the Italian parliament ratified them on 7 June 1929. The treaty recognized Vatican City as an independent state under the sovereignty of the Holy See. The Italian government also agreed to give the Roman Catholic Church financial compensation for the loss of the Papal States. In 1948, the Lateran Treaty was recognized in the Constitution of Italy as regulating the relations between the state and the Catholic Church.

Concordat .
Law of Guarantees .
List of Sovereigns of the Vatican City State .
Index of Vatican City-related articles .
Properties of the Holy See .
Roman Question .
Reichskonkordat, treaty between the Holy See and Nazi Germany .
Religion in Italy .

1930-4-22 London Naval Treaty Signed


NHT - Naval Hx - Treaties ..  

On April 22, 1930, the United States, Britain and Japan signed the London Naval Treaty, which regulated submarine warfare and limited shipbuilding.
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The Treaty for the Limitation and Reduction of Naval Armament, commonly known as the London Naval Treaty, was an agreement between the United Kingdom, the Empire of Japan, France, Italy and the United States, signed on 22 April 1930, which regulated submarine warfare and limited naval shipbuilding. Ratifications were exchanged in London on October 27, 1930, and the treaty went into effect on the same day. It was registered in League of Nations Treaty Series on February 6, 1931.

The terms of the treaty were seen as an extension of the conditions agreed in the Washington Naval Treaty. That treaty had been an effort to prevent a naval arms race after World War I.

The Conference was a revival of the efforts which had gone into the Geneva Naval Conference of 1927. At Geneva, the various negotiators had been unable to reach agreement because of bad feeling between the British Government and that of the United States. This problem may have initially arisen from discussions held between President Herbert Hoover and Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald at Rapidan Camp in 1929; but a range of factors affected tensions which were exacerbated between the other nations represented at the conference.

Under the Treaty, the standard displacements of submarines was restricted to 2,000 tons with each of the major powers being allowed to keep three submarines up to 2,800 tons, and France being allowed to keep one. Submarine gun caliber was also restricted for the first time to 6.1 inches (155 mm) with one exception, an already constructed French submarine was allowed to retain 8 inch (203 mm) guns. This put an end to the 'big-gun' submarine concept pioneered by the British M class and the French Surcouf.

The Treaty also established a distinction between cruisers armed with guns no greater than 6.1 inches (155mm) ("light cruisers" in unofficial parlance) from those with guns up to 8 inches (203 mm) ("heavy cruisers"). The number of heavy cruisers was limited – *Britain was permitted 15 with a total tonnage of 147,000, the U.S. 18 totalling 180,000, and the Japanese 12 totalling 108,000 tons. For light cruisers, no numbers were specified but tonnage limits were 143,500 tons for the U.S., 192,200 tons for the British, and 100,450 tons for the Japanese.

Destroyer tonnage was also limited, with destroyers being defined as ships of less than 1,850 tons and guns not exceeding 5.1 inches (130 mm). The Americans and British were permitted up to 150,000 tons and Japan 105,500 tons.

Article 22 relating to submarine warfare declared international law applied to them as to surface vessels. Also merchant vessels which demonstrated "persistent refusal to stop" or "active resistance" could be sunk without the ship's crew and passengers being first delivered to a "place of safety".

The next phase of attempted naval arms control was the Second Geneva Naval Conference in 1932; and in that year, Italy "retired" two battleships, twelve cruisers, 25 destroyers, and 12 submarines—in all, 130,000 tons of naval vessels (either scrapped or put in reserve). Active negotiations amongst the other treaty signatories continued during the following years.

This was followed by the Second London Naval Treaty of 1936.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/London_Naval_Treaty
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Prime Minister delivers final message to the press. Treaty document exhibited. Mr Stimson and Mr MacDonald in garden of No 10 Downing Street.

41-1-29 ABC-1, Europe First 41-3-27

Europe First meetings - ABC1, 41-1-29 to 41-3-27 >

42-1-1 Arcadia Conference & Declaration of the United Nations

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45-2-4 Big Three at Yalta (Crimea) Conference - FDR, Churchill, Stalin - HiPo > .

At the ongoing Arcadia Conference, 26 nations sign the Declaration of the United Nations.

Friendship Between Britain & USA | Warlords: Churchill vs Roosevelt - Time > .


Following the German declaration of war on America on the 11th of December 1941, Britain gained an invaluable ally. Securing a joint military command between the new partnership was central to its success.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) was the supreme military staff for the United States and Britain during World War II. It set all the major policy decisions for the two nations, subject to the approvals of British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt.

The CCS emerged from the meetings of the Arcadia Conference in Washington, from December 22, 1941 to January 14, 1942. Shortly after Pearl Harbor, Prime Minister Churchill and his senior military staff used Arcadia as an opportunity to lay out the general strategy for the war. The American Army Chief of Staff George Marshall came up with the idea of a combined board, and sold it to Roosevelt and together the two sold the idea to Churchill. Churchill's military aides were much less favorable, and General Alan Brooke, the chief of the British Army, was strongly opposed. However, Brooke was left behind in London to handle the daily details of running the British war effort, and was not consulted. As part of Marshall's plan, Roosevelt also set up a Joint Chiefs of Staff on the American side. The combined board was permanently stationed in Washington, where Field Marshal John Dill represented the British half.

The responsibilities of the Combined Chiefs of Staff were set out as follows: Under the direction of the heads of the United Nations, the Combined Chiefs of Staff will collaborate in the formulation and execution of policies and plans concerning: 
(a) the strategic conduct of the war; 
(b) the broad programme of war requirements based on approved strategic policy; 
(c) the direction of munition resources based on strategic needs and the availability of means of transportation; and 
(d) the requirements for overseas transportation for the fighting services of the United Nations, based on approved strategic priority. 

In the report of the Arcadia Conference, it is noted, to avoid confusion, that the word 'Combined' applied to the Combined Staffs of, or combined action by two or more of the united nations, whilst the word 'Joint' signified inter- service planning by one of the 'united nations.'

The CCS was constituted from the British Chiefs of Staff Committee and the American Joint Chiefs of Staff, The American unit was created in part to present a common front to the British Chiefs of Staff. It held its first formal meeting on 9 February 1942 to coordinate U.S. military operations between War and Navy Departments.

The CCS charter was approved by President Roosevelt 21 April 1942. The American members of the CCS were General George C. Marshall, the United States Army chief of staff, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Harold R. Stark (replaced early in 1942 by Admiral Ernest J. King); and the Chief (later Commanding General) of the Army Air Forces, Lt. Gen. Henry H. Arnold. In July 1942 a fourth member was added, the President's personal Chief of Staff, Admiral William D. Leahy.

On the British side the Chiefs of Staff only normally attended during the heads of states' conferences. Instead the British Joint Staff Mission was permanently situated in Washington, D.C. to represent British interests. The British members were a representative of the Prime Minister, in his capacity as Minister of Defence, and the Chiefs of Staff Committee, which consisted of the First Sea Lord, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and the Chief of the Air Staff, or the Washington representative of each. The representative of the Prime Minister was Field Marshal Sir John Dill and after his death Field Marshal Sir Henry Maitland Wilson. The Washington representatives of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, who normally met with the United States members in place of their principals, were the senior officers from their respective services on the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington. In the course of the war, the First Sea Lord was represented by Admiral Sir Charles Little, Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham, Admiral Sir Percy Noble, and Admiral Sir James Somerville; the Chief of the Imperial General Staff was represented by Lt. Gen. Sir Colville Wemyss and Lt. Gen. G. N. Macready; and the Chief of the Air Staff was represented by Air Marshal D. C. S. Evill, Air Marshal Sir William L. Welsh, and Air Marshal Douglas Colyer. Dill, a close friend of Marshall, often took the American position and prevented a polarizations that would undermine effectiveness.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff organization included the Combined Secretariat and a supporting organisation of combined committees and sub-committees to deal with specific subjects. Of these, the Combined Planning Staff were the body of officers appointed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to make studies, draft plans, and perform such other work as placed on the Combined Chiefs of Staff agenda and delegated to them by the Combined Planning Staff. Officers attached to the British Joint Staff Mission provided the British element in the secretariat for these combined committees. Their authority did not extend to operations controlled directly by the Admiralty and the US Navy Department.


In the Northern hemisphere spring of 1942, Britain and the United States agreed on a worldwide division of strategic responsibility. On 24 March 1942, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff were designated as primarily responsible for the war in the Pacific, and the British Chiefs for the Middle East-Indian Ocean region, while the European-Mediterranean-Atlantic area would be a combined responsibility of both staffs. China was designated a separate theater commanded by its chief of state, Chiang Kai-shek, though within the United States' sphere of responsibility. Six days later the Joint Chiefs of Staff divided the Pacific theater into three areas: the Pacific Ocean Areas (POA), the South West Pacific Area (SWPA), and the Southeast Pacific Area. The Pacific Ocean Area command formally became operational on 8 May.

The CCS usually held its meetings in Washington. The full CCS usually met only during the great wartime conferences on grand strategy, such as at Casablanca (see List of WW2 conferences). The British Chiefs of Staff took their place on the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee at the international conferences (at which Roosevelt and Churchill settled the main lines of allied strategy). For the conferences at Tehran (December 1943)Yalta (February 1945) and Potsdam (July-August 1945), the British and Americans were joined by the Russian Chiefs of Staff. The meetings of heads of government at those conferences were designed to reach formal agreement on issues thoroughly staffed by the CCS. At the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, General Frank Maxwell Andrews was appointed commander of all United States forces in the European Theater of Operations.

Although it was responsible to both the British and American governments, the CCS controlled forces from many different countries in all theaters, including the Pacific, India and North Africa. The existence of the Combined Chiefs of Staff enabled forces to be effectively placed under a commander of a different nationality without breaking the chain of responsibility to their home government, as commanders were responsible to the Combined Chiefs who respectively continued to remain responsible to their own governments. This responsibility was both advisory (in terms of the settlement between governments of the overall strategy) and executive (in terms of formulating and issuing directives to implement that strategy). Representatives of allied nations were not members of the CCS but accepted procedure included consultation with "Military Representatives of Associated Powers" on strategic issues. Much cooperation continued between the British and American militaries after the war including the Combined Chiefs of Staff structure, and it was used again during the Berlin Blockade of 1948 even as negotiations began that resulted in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

sī vīs pācem, parā bellum

igitur quī dēsīderat pācem praeparet bellum    therefore, he who desires peace, let him prepare for war sī vīs pācem, parā bellum if you wan...