Sunday, December 29, 2019

1928-8-7 Kellogg–Briand (Paris) Pact


On the 27th of August 1928 Germany France and the United States signed the general
treaty for renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy otherwise known as the Kellogg-Briand pact. A total of 62 nations eventually went on to join them in signing the agreement, which promised to never use war as a way to settle conflicts.

Jointly created by the United States Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg and French foreign minister Aristide Briand, the Pact stemmed from France’s desire to protect itself against possible future German aggression. Unwilling to join what could be interpreted as a military alliance, Kellogg suggested that they invite all countries to sign a condemnation of war unless in self-defence. The United States’ involvement meant that the Pact was signed outside the League of Nations, of which America was not a member, and therefore means that it is still in force today.

At the time it was hoped that the signing of the Pact would stop any future wars, but the impact of the worldwide depression in the 1930s led nations such as Japan and Italy to launch invasions of Manchuria and Abyssinia respectively. Such invasions began without the aggressor ever declaring war but, despite this, the Pact was ineffective since it provided no way to enforce its terms anyway. However, it did act as the legal basis for the notion of a crime against peace, and in turn became the basis for many of the key prosecution arguments in the Nuremberg Trials and the Tokyo Trials that followed the Second World War.

The Kellogg–Briand Pact (or Pact of Paris, officially General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy) is a 1928 international agreement in which signatory states promised not to use war to resolve "disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them". There were no mechanisms for enforcement. Parties failing to abide by this promise "should be denied of the benefits furnished by [the] treaty". It was signed by Germany, France, and the United States on 27 August 1928, and by most other states soon after. Sponsored by France and the U.S., the Pact renounced the use of war and calls for the peaceful settlement of disputes. Similar provisions were incorporated into the Charter of the United Nations and other treaties, and it became a stepping-stone to a more activist American policy. It is named after its authors, United States Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg and French foreign minister Aristide Briand. The pact was concluded outside the League of Nations and remains in effect.

A total of 62 nations eventually went on to join them in signing the agreement, which promised to never use war as a way to settle conflicts.

Jointly created by the United States Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg and French foreign minister Aristide Briand, the Pact stemmed from France’s desire to protect itself against possible future German aggression. Unwilling to join what could be interpreted as a military alliance, Kellogg suggested that they invite all countries to sign a condemnation of war unless in self-defence. The United States’ involvement meant that the Pact was signed outside the League of Nations, of which America was not a member, and therefore means that it is still in force today.

At the time it was hoped that the signing of the Pact would stop any future wars, but the impact of the worldwide depression in the 1930s led nations such as Japan and Italy to launch invasions of Manchuria and Abyssinia respectively. Such invasions began without the aggressor ever declaring war but, despite this, the Pact was ineffective since it provided no way to enforce its terms anyway. However, it did act as the legal basis for the notion of a crime against peace, and in turn became the basis for many of the key prosecution arguments in the Nuremberg Trials and the Tokyo Trials that followed the WW2.

A common criticism is that the Kellogg–Briand Pact did not live up to all of its aims, but has arguably had some success. It neither ended war, nor stopped the rise of militarism, and was unable to prevent WW2. The pact has been ridiculed for its moralism and legalism and lack of influence on foreign policy. Moreover, it effectively erased the legal distinction between war and peace because the signatories began to wage wars without declaring them.

The pact's central provisions renouncing the use of war, and promoting peaceful settlement of disputes and the use of collective force to prevent aggression, were incorporated into the United Nations Charter and other treaties. Although civil wars continued, wars between established states have been rare since 1945, with a few exceptions in the Middle East. One legal consequence is to discourage annexation of territory by force, although other forms of annexation have not been prevented. More broadly, some authors claim there is now a strong presumption against the legality of using, or threatening, military force against another country. The pact also served as the legal basis for the concept of a crime against peace, for which the Nuremberg Tribunal and Tokyo Tribunal tried and executed the top leaders responsible for starting World War II.

Many historians and political scientists see the pact as mostly irrelevant and ineffective.

With the signing of the Litvinov Protocol in Moscow on February 9, 1929, the Soviet Union and its western neighbors, including Romania, agreed to put the Kellogg–Briand Pact in effect without waiting for other western signatories to ratify. The Bessarabian Question had made agreement between Romania and the Soviet Union challenging and dispute between the nations over Bessarabia continued.

1929-2-11 Lateran Treaty

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The Lateran Treaty (Patti Lateranensi; Pacta Lateranensia) was one component of the Lateran Pacts of 1929, agreements between the Kingdom of Italy under King Victor Emanuel III and the Holy See under Pope Pius XI to settle the long-standing Roman Question. During the unification of Italy in the mid-19th century, the Papal States resisted incorporation into the new nation, even as all the other Italian countries, except for San Marino, joined it; Camillo Cavour's dream of proclaiming the Kingdom of Italy from the steps of St. Peter's Basilica did not come to pass. The nascent Kingdom of Italy invaded and occupied Romagna (the eastern portion of the Papal States) in 1860, leaving only Latium in the pope's domains. Latium, including Rome itself, was occupied and annexed in 1870. For the following sixty years, relations between the Papacy and the Italian government were hostile, and the status of the pope became known as the "Roman Question".

The Popes knew that Rome was irrevocably the capital of Italy. There was nothing they wanted less than to govern it or be burdened with a papal kingdom. What they wished was independence, a foothold on the earth that belonged to no other sovereign.

Negotiations for the settlement of the Roman Question began in 1926 between the government of Italy and the Holy See, and culminated in the agreements of the Lateran Pacts, signed—the Treaty says—for King Victor Emmanuel III of Italy by Prime Minister Benito Mussolini and for Pope Pius XI by Cardinal Secretary of State Pietro Gasparri, on 11 February 1929. It was ratified on 7 June 1929.

The treaty and associated pacts were named after the Lateran Palace where they were signed on 11 February 1929, and the Italian parliament ratified them on 7 June 1929. The treaty recognized Vatican City as an independent state under the sovereignty of the Holy See. The Italian government also agreed to give the Roman Catholic Church financial compensation for the loss of the Papal States. In 1948, the Lateran Treaty was recognized in the Constitution of Italy as regulating the relations between the state and the Catholic Church.

Concordat .
Law of Guarantees .
List of Sovereigns of the Vatican City State .
Index of Vatican City-related articles .
Properties of the Holy See .
Roman Question .
Reichskonkordat, treaty between the Holy See and Nazi Germany .
Religion in Italy .

1930-4-22 London Naval Treaty Signed


NHT - Naval Hx - Treaties ..  

On April 22, 1930, the United States, Britain and Japan signed the London Naval Treaty, which regulated submarine warfare and limited shipbuilding.
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The Treaty for the Limitation and Reduction of Naval Armament, commonly known as the London Naval Treaty, was an agreement between the United Kingdom, the Empire of Japan, France, Italy and the United States, signed on 22 April 1930, which regulated submarine warfare and limited naval shipbuilding. Ratifications were exchanged in London on October 27, 1930, and the treaty went into effect on the same day. It was registered in League of Nations Treaty Series on February 6, 1931.

The terms of the treaty were seen as an extension of the conditions agreed in the Washington Naval Treaty. That treaty had been an effort to prevent a naval arms race after World War I.

The Conference was a revival of the efforts which had gone into the Geneva Naval Conference of 1927. At Geneva, the various negotiators had been unable to reach agreement because of bad feeling between the British Government and that of the United States. This problem may have initially arisen from discussions held between President Herbert Hoover and Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald at Rapidan Camp in 1929; but a range of factors affected tensions which were exacerbated between the other nations represented at the conference.

Under the Treaty, the standard displacements of submarines was restricted to 2,000 tons with each of the major powers being allowed to keep three submarines up to 2,800 tons, and France being allowed to keep one. Submarine gun caliber was also restricted for the first time to 6.1 inches (155 mm) with one exception, an already constructed French submarine was allowed to retain 8 inch (203 mm) guns. This put an end to the 'big-gun' submarine concept pioneered by the British M class and the French Surcouf.

The Treaty also established a distinction between cruisers armed with guns no greater than 6.1 inches (155mm) ("light cruisers" in unofficial parlance) from those with guns up to 8 inches (203 mm) ("heavy cruisers"). The number of heavy cruisers was limited – *Britain was permitted 15 with a total tonnage of 147,000, the U.S. 18 totalling 180,000, and the Japanese 12 totalling 108,000 tons. For light cruisers, no numbers were specified but tonnage limits were 143,500 tons for the U.S., 192,200 tons for the British, and 100,450 tons for the Japanese.

Destroyer tonnage was also limited, with destroyers being defined as ships of less than 1,850 tons and guns not exceeding 5.1 inches (130 mm). The Americans and British were permitted up to 150,000 tons and Japan 105,500 tons.

Article 22 relating to submarine warfare declared international law applied to them as to surface vessels. Also merchant vessels which demonstrated "persistent refusal to stop" or "active resistance" could be sunk without the ship's crew and passengers being first delivered to a "place of safety".

The next phase of attempted naval arms control was the Second Geneva Naval Conference in 1932; and in that year, Italy "retired" two battleships, twelve cruisers, 25 destroyers, and 12 submarines—in all, 130,000 tons of naval vessels (either scrapped or put in reserve). Active negotiations amongst the other treaty signatories continued during the following years.

This was followed by the Second London Naval Treaty of 1936.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/London_Naval_Treaty
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Prime Minister delivers final message to the press. Treaty document exhibited. Mr Stimson and Mr MacDonald in garden of No 10 Downing Street.

41-1-29 ABC-1, Europe First 41-3-27

Europe First meetings - ABC1, 41-1-29 to 41-3-27 >

Saturday, December 28, 2019

47-3-12 Truman Doctrine

History of the Cold War: Every Month - Dec '45 to Dec '91 > .Berlin Wall: Escaping for Freedom and Love - Geographics > .

The aftermath of WW2 War saw Greece rocked by civil war between the royal government and the leftist National Liberation Front, who were supported by neighboring Communist Yugoslavia. Meanwhile, in Turkey, the government had been under pressure from the U.S.S.R. over access to the strategic waterways that linked the Black Sea to the Mediterranean.

In an attempt to limit communist expansion into Europe the British government provided economic and military assistance to both the Greek and Turkish governments. However, in February 1947 Britain informed the U.S. government that it couldn’t afford to continue this support while they faced their own economic crisis at home, and that they would stop providing aid on 31 March.

In what later developed into the ‘domino theory’, Truman’s advisors explained that if either Greece or Turkey fell to communism then it could spread to the rest of Europe and Asia. To avoid this they urged policymakers to take Britain’s place and provide support to the two governments.

On 12 March, President Truman appeared before a joint session of Congress where he laid out the threat. Among other things, he stated, ‘It must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.’ In a program that won broad support, America committed to providing $400 million in assistance to Greece and Turkey. This established the Truman Doctrine that would guide U.S. policy, and relations with the U.S.S.R., for the next forty years.

The Truman Doctrine was an American foreign policy with the primary goal of containing Soviet geopolitical expansion during the Cold War. It was announced to Congress by President Harry S. Truman on March 12, 1947, and further developed on July 4, 1948, when he pledged to contain the communist uprisings in Greece and Turkey. Direct American military force was usually not involved, but Congress appropriated financial aid to support the economies and militaries of Greece and Turkey. More generally, the Truman Doctrine implied American support for other nations thought to be threatened by Soviet communism. The Truman Doctrine became the foundation of American foreign policy, and led, in 1949, to the formation of NATO, a military alliance that still exists. Historians often use Truman's speech to date the start of the Cold War.

Truman told Congress that "it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." Truman contended that because totalitarian regimes coerced free peoples, they automatically represented a threat to international peace and the national security of the United States. Truman made the plea in the midst of the Greek Civil War (1946–1949). He argued that if Greece and Turkey did not receive the aid, they would inevitably fall to communism with grave consequences throughout the region. Because Turkey and Greece were historic rivals, it was considered necessary to help both equally even though the crisis in Greece was far more intense.

Critics of the policy have observed that the governments of Greece and Turkey were themselves far from democratic at this time, and neither were facing Soviet subversion in the spring of 1949. Historian Eric Foner writes that the Doctrine "set a precedent for American assistance to anticommunist regimes throughout the world, no matter how undemocratic, and for the creation of a set of global military alliances directed against the Soviet Union."

For years, the United Kingdom had supported Greece, but was now near bankruptcy and was forced to radically reduce its involvement. In February 1947, Britain formally requested for the United States to take over its role in supporting the royalist Greek government. The policy won the support of Republicans who controlled Congress and involved sending $400 million in American money but no military forces to the region. The effect was to end the Greek revolt, and in 1952, both Greece and Turkey joined NATO, a military alliance, to guarantee their stability.

The Truman Doctrine was informally extended to become the basis of American Cold War policy throughout Europe and around the world. It shifted American foreign policy toward the Soviet Union from an anti-fascist alliance to a policy of containment of Soviet expansion as advocated by diplomat George Kennan. It was distinguished from rollback by implicitly tolerating the previous Soviet takeovers in Eastern Europe.

sī vīs pācem, parā bellum

igitur quī dēsīderat pācem praeparet bellum    therefore, he who desires peace, let him prepare for war sī vīs pācem, parā bellum if you wan...