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The Nile river is subject to political interactions. It is the world's longest river flowing 6,700 kilometers through ten countries in northeastern Africa – Rwanda, Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Sudan and Egypt with varying climates.
Considering the basin area of the Nile, Sudan has the largest size (1.9 million km²) whereas, of the four major tributaries to the Nile, three originate from Ethiopia – the Blue Nile, Sobat and Atbara. The modern history of hydropolitics in the Nile basin is very complex and has had wide ramifications both for regional and global developments.
Agreements that favour Egypt’s rights to Nile waters are an anachronism.
Egypt has historically adopted an aggressive approach to the flow of the River Nile. Cairo considers the Nile a national security matter and statements continue to include threats of military action against Ethiopia should it interfere with the flow as set out in agreements signed in 1929 and another in 1959.
The first agreement was made between Great Britain, as the colonial power in eastern African, and Egypt. Cairo was favoured over other riparian countries as an important agricultural asset. In addition, the Egyptian-run Suez Canal was vital for British imperial ambitions.
The British riparian colonies – Sudan, Uganda, Kenya and Tanganyika (now Tanzania) – as well as Ethiopia had no say.
Under the terms, Egypt would receive 48 billion cubic metres water annually and Sudan 4 billion cubic metres. Egypt would not need the consent of upstream states to undertake water projects in its own territories but could veto projects on any tributaries of the Nile in the upstream countries, including the 43,130 square kilometre Lake Victoria. The world’s second largest fresh water lake is fed by direct precipitation and by thousands of streams from Tanzania, Burundi, Uganda and Kenya, all located in the central east of Africa.
The limits of the new “Nile Agreement”:
Considering the basin area of the Nile, Sudan has the largest size (1.9 million km²) whereas, of the four major tributaries to the Nile, three originate from Ethiopia – the Blue Nile, Sobat and Atbara. The modern history of hydropolitics in the Nile basin is very complex and has had wide ramifications both for regional and global developments.
The first agreement was made between Great Britain, as the colonial power in eastern African, and Egypt. Cairo was favoured over other riparian countries as an important agricultural asset. In addition, the Egyptian-run Suez Canal was vital for British imperial ambitions.
The British riparian colonies – Sudan, Uganda, Kenya and Tanganyika (now Tanzania) – as well as Ethiopia had no say.
Under the terms, Egypt would receive 48 billion cubic metres water annually and Sudan 4 billion cubic metres. Egypt would not need the consent of upstream states to undertake water projects in its own territories but could veto projects on any tributaries of the Nile in the upstream countries, including the 43,130 square kilometre Lake Victoria. The world’s second largest fresh water lake is fed by direct precipitation and by thousands of streams from Tanzania, Burundi, Uganda and Kenya, all located in the central east of Africa.
To this day Egypt argues that the 1929 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and its modified version, the 1959 Agreement, are still valid. The 1959 agreement, signed by Egypt and an independent Sudan, increased Egypt’s share to 55.5 billion cubic metres and Sudan’s to 18.5 billion.
These bilateral agreements totally ignored the needs of other riparian countries including Ethiopia which supplies 70% to 80% of the Nile waters. Consequently, none of the other Nile basin countries has ever approved the agreements.
On the other hand, the Cooperative Framework Agreement signed by four Nile basin countries in 2010 was strongly rejected by both Egypt and Sudan.
These bilateral agreements totally ignored the needs of other riparian countries including Ethiopia which supplies 70% to 80% of the Nile waters. Consequently, none of the other Nile basin countries has ever approved the agreements.
On the other hand, the Cooperative Framework Agreement signed by four Nile basin countries in 2010 was strongly rejected by both Egypt and Sudan.
Ethiopia’s Grand Renaissance Dam constitutes a recent but probably the biggest challenge to Egypt’s militaristic approach to the Nile flow. The dam is a huge project on the headwaters of the Blue Nile in Ethiopia in Benishangul-Gumuz region, 500 km North West of the capital Addis Ababa and about 32 km east of the border of Sudan.
The dam is considered to be the largest hydropower project in Africa and 8th-largest in the world. It’s designed to generate 6,000 megawatts of electricity. The reservoir can hold more than 70 billion cu metres of water which is nearly equal to the flow of the Nile in one year.
The Ethiopian government intends to fill the dam’s immense reservoir in five years. This will have considerable impact on the downstream countries. Even after the reservoir is filled there will not be too much hope for the normalisation of the flow of the Nile because Ethiopia will hold the key to the dam. Normalisation is also not expected because of evaporation in the reservoir.
Another challenge to the Nile is the fact that the river is shrinking due to less and more intermittent precipitation in Ethiopia and in other upstream countries. In addition, Lake Victoria, the source of 20%-30% of the Nile waters, is shrinking at an alarming rate.
What these developments mean is that Egypt’s insistence that the old agreements should remain untouched is no longer practical.
The dam is considered to be the largest hydropower project in Africa and 8th-largest in the world. It’s designed to generate 6,000 megawatts of electricity. The reservoir can hold more than 70 billion cu metres of water which is nearly equal to the flow of the Nile in one year.
The Ethiopian government intends to fill the dam’s immense reservoir in five years. This will have considerable impact on the downstream countries. Even after the reservoir is filled there will not be too much hope for the normalisation of the flow of the Nile because Ethiopia will hold the key to the dam. Normalisation is also not expected because of evaporation in the reservoir.
Another challenge to the Nile is the fact that the river is shrinking due to less and more intermittent precipitation in Ethiopia and in other upstream countries. In addition, Lake Victoria, the source of 20%-30% of the Nile waters, is shrinking at an alarming rate.
What these developments mean is that Egypt’s insistence that the old agreements should remain untouched is no longer practical.
The limits of the new “Nile Agreement”:
On Monday, March 23, 2015, leaders of Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan met in the Sudanese capital Khartoum to sign an agreement that is expected to resolve various issues arising out of the decision by Ethiopia to construct a dam on the Blue Nile. The Khartoum declaration, which was signed by the heads of state of the three countries—Abdel Fattah al-Sisi (Egypt), Omar al-Bashir (Sudan), and Halemariam Desalegn (Ethiopia), has been referred to as a “Nile Agreement,” and one that helps resolve conflicts over the sharing of the waters of the Nile River. However, this view is misleading because the agreement, as far we know, only deals with the Blue Nile’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam project (GERDP) and does not tackle the broader, still contentious issues of sharing of the Nile River waters among all riparian states. Thus, the new agreement does leave the conflict over the equitable, fair, and reasonable allocation and utilization of the waters of the Nile River unresolved.
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