Tuesday, November 27, 2018

Baedecker Blitz


The Baedeker Blitz or Baedeker Raids were a series of attacks by the Luftwaffe on English cities during the Second World War. The name derives from Baedeker, a series of German tourist guidebooks, including detailed maps, which were used to generate targets for bombing.

The raids were planned in response to a devastating increase in the effectiveness of the Royal Air Force's (RAF) bombing offensive, starting with the bombing of Lübeck in March 1942. The aim was to begin a tit-for-tat exchange with the hope of forcing the RAF to reduce their actions. To increase the effect on civilian life, targets were chosen for their cultural and historical significance, rather than for any military value.

The main set of raids began in late April 1942, and ended by the end of May, though towns and cities continued to be targeted for their cultural value over the next two years.

By any measure, the attempt was an abject failure. In the time following the original Blitz, a little over a year earlier, the RAF had dramatically improved its night fighter capability and introduced the AMES Type 7 radar specifically for the night fighting role. Losses to the Luftwaffe's bomber force were unsustainable, and for a variety of reasons the damage to the targeted cities was minimal compared to the German bombing campaign of 1940–41, or to the contemporaneous Allied campaign against Germany. Nevertheless, the raids resulted in over 1,600 civilian deaths and tens of thousands of damaged homes.

By the winter of 1941/1942 both the British and German strategic bombing campaigns had reached a low ebb. The German offensive, a nine-month period of night bombing known as the Blitz, which had left London and many other British cities heavily damaged, had come to an end in May 1941, when the Luftwaffe had switched its resources to the invasion of the Soviet Union. Thereafter it had confined itself to hit-and-run raids on British coastal towns. Meanwhile, the RAF's night bombing offensive had been shown to be largely ineffective, as revealed by the Butt report in August 1941, and by Christmas the offensive had largely petered out.

When it resumed in March 1942 with the bombing of Lübeck, there was a marked change in effectiveness. New heavy bombers (the Stirling and Halifax, followed by the poor Manchester from which was developed the excellent Lancaster), improved navigation (with aids such as Gee and Oboe), new leadership (with the appointment of AVM Harris) and new tactics (the bomber stream, use of incendiaries, and focusing on a single target) all contributed. Not least of these was the switch to area bombing. Prior to this the RAF had attempted to make precision attacks, aiming at individual factories, power stations, even post offices, in multiple strikes across the country; this had been costly and ineffective. In March 1942, and following the Luftwaffe's example the RAF began concentrating a single blow against an area where several worthwhile targets existed, not least the homes and morale of the civilian population living there. These changes resulted in the destruction of Lübeck, and came as a profound shock to the German leadership and population.

The first raid of the Baedeker Blitz was directed against Exeter, on the night of 23/24 April 1942. Whilst this raid caused little damage, a second raid the following night was more severe, with over 80 fatalities. On 25/26 and 26/27 April, the bomber force attacked Bath, causing widespread damage and some 400 casualties. These raids came a month after the Lübeck raid, and coincided with the RAF's four night offensive against Rostock. On 27/28 April, the Luftwaffe attacked Norwich, dropping more than 90 tons of bombs and causing 67 deaths. On 28/29 April, they attacked York, causing limited damage but 79 deaths.

A week later, on 3/4 May the Luftwaffe returned to Exeter, causing heavy damage to the city centre and 164 deaths. The 4/5 May they also attacked Cowes, a target of both cultural and military value, being the home of the J. Samuel White shipyard. On 8/9 May Norwich was attacked again, though the raid was ineffective despite more than 70 aircraft taking part. During May the Luftwaffe also bombed Hull (a major port, and thus a military target), Poole, Grimsby and, at the end of May, Canterbury. This raid, which coincided with the RAF's 1,000 bomber raid on Cologne, involved 77 bombers, dropping 40 tons of bombs, which resulted in 43 deaths.

Across all the raids in this period a total of 1,637 civilians were killed and 1,760 injured, and over 50,000 houses were destroyed. Some noted buildings were destroyed or damaged, including York's Guildhall and the Bath Assembly Rooms, but on the whole most escaped – the cathedrals of Norwich, Exeter and Canterbury and the minster at York included. The German bombers suffered heavy losses for minimal damage inflicted, and the Axis' need for reinforcements in North Africa and Russian Front meant further operations continued on a reduced scale. Hit-and-run raids on coastal towns by a few Focke-Wulf Fw 190 fighter-bombers continued also.

On 27 April, Winston Churchill told the War Cabinet that the government should do all it could to "ensure that disproportionate publicity was not given to these raids" and "avoid giving the impression that the Germans were making full reprisal" for British raids.

Whilst the term "Baedeker Blitz" is sometimes limited to the raids on five cities (Bath, Canterbury, Exeter, Norwich, York) in April and May 1942, in fact the Luftwaffe continued to target cities for their cultural value for the next two years. In June 1942 they attacked Ipswich, Poole and Canterbury again, Southampton (a port target), Norwich again and Weston-super-Mare. In July there were three raids on Birmingham, another three on Middlesbrough and one on Hull, all industrial cities of military and strategic value: But in August the Germans returned to "Baedeker" targets; Norwich, Swansea, Colchester and Ipswich.

In September they attacked Sunderland (a port and industrial centre) and Kings Lynn (a market town of no military value). All these raids were less intense than those of April and May, involving some 20 aircraft apiece; this reflected the steady and increasing losses suffered by the Germans as Britain's night-fighter defences improved and German casualties mounted. By the autumn KG2 had lost 65 of its 88 crews and the offensive had slowed to a halt.

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