Indo-Pacific Militaries
23-10-20 Xina's PLAN Expansion vs USN's Hegemony - gtbt > . skip > .
23-7-12 Xina prepares for war - Hudson > .
22-11-27 Dragon's Claw: Xina's Next 10 Years - Kamome > . skip > .
22-10-11 Condeleeza Rice - Xina and Taiwan - Hoover > .
22-8-4 Situation Zoom: Pelosi Visits Taiwan | Goodfellows - Hoover > .
22-7-31 How PGII & IPEF could checkmate BRI - CaspianReport > .
22-7-31 How PGII & IPEF could checkmate BRI - CaspianReport > .
22-4-28 Almost 60% of Australians want Australia to be tougher on China > .
22-4-4 Peter Jennings | China & National Security - John Anderson > .
22-3-30 China’s Secret Plan for a Pacific Military Base - Uncensored > .
22-3-28 Conversation with Senator the Hon Penny Wong - CSIS > .
22-3-27 Avoidable War - Kevin Rudd: US future conflict with China | 9 Aus > .
22-3-16 China: "No. 1 Threat" to the West | Heinrichs - JoAnd > . full > .
22-3-1 Tim Harcourt | Russia's Commodity-Heavy Sanctions & Australia - rh > .
2021 Economic & Military Implications of China's BRI (Kevin Rudd) - Asia Society > .
2021 Australia has rebelled against China (South Korea not followed) - VisPol > .
ASEAN, AUKUS, CPTPP, QUAD - Compass Rose >> .Australia's CCP Problem - Rap >> .
Indo-Pacific Security & Threats - Γαῖα >> .
Resources
Coming Resource Conflicts ..
2019: China has released a new white paper on national defense, laying out the country's military preparedness and security strategy. It singled out the United States, Japan and Australia as actors allegedly causing security uncertainties in the Pacific region. The paper discusses those nations' moves to beef up their military presence and alliances. China claimed its own military does not pose a threat. Chinese officials say one of their top concerns remains independence movements in Tibet and in the northwestern Chinese province of Xinjiang. The paper also goes on to warn against independence for Taiwan, a self-governed island that China claims as part of its territory.
Just when we thought Australia's relationship with China couldn’t get any worse, Beijing has delivered Australia another punch. It’s in the form of a list of 14 grievances it has with us and is polished off with an almighty threat: if you make an enemy of China, China will be the enemy! [More like: China will drop the smiley mask.] When that belligerence is combined with the upheaval of a new administration in Washington, it’s clear we are facing a dangerous new world order, and the Pacific is likely to be an especially vulnerable region. For the best analysis of what the immediate future might hold, 60 Minutes Australia speaks with H. R. McMaster, a highly respected military man and former U.S. national security adviser. But his expert assessment includes a grim warning. Australia, he reckons, has a battle on its hands.
Paul Dibb AM (born 3 October 1939) is an English-born Australian strategist, academic and former defence intelligence official. He is currently emeritus professor of strategic studies at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre which is part of the Australian National University.
He was the head of the National Assessments Staff (the predecessor to the Office of National Assessments) from 1974 to 1978, the director of the Joint Intelligence Organisation (the predecessor to the Defence Intelligence Organisation) from 1986 to 1988, and the head of the Defence Strategy and Intelligence Group with the rank of Deputy Secretary in the Department of Defence from 1988 to 1991. Dibb is also known for his contribution to Australian defence strategy through writing the 1986 Review of Australia’s defence capabilities, known as the Dibb Report, and being the primary author of the 1987 Defence White Paper. From 1965 to 1984, Dibb worked for the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, tasked with gaining intelligence and recruiting KGB and GRU agents in Canberra. In 1991, Dibb retired from the Australian Public Service and became the director of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, part of the Australian National University until 2003–where he is currently the emeritus professor. During the Government of Prime Minister John Howard, Dibb was a member of the Foreign Minister's Foreign Policy Advisory Council.
Dibb's report was published in March 1986 and recommended for Australia to abandon the remaining elements of the forward defence policy but concentrate its military resources on the geographic areas relevant to defending the country and its economic interests from direct attack.
Dibb's recommendations were based around an assessment that "Australia is one of the most secure countries on earth" and that while there was the potential for regional conflict, the longer-term intentions and capabilities of countries in Australia's region could not be predicted and so did not form a suitable basis for planning.
Dibb recommended for Australia's military posture to be based on a strategy of denying aggressors the ability to attack the country. That was to be achieved through using a layered defence of Jindalee Operational Radar Network (over-the-horizon radar), patrol aircraft and maritime strike aircraft to protect Australia's approaches with the Army's Operational Deployment Force being responsible for defeating any landings on the Australian mainland. That would require changes to the Australian Defence Force's structure and equipment acquisition programs. The policy of self-reliance proposed by Dibb also placed less emphasis on ANZUS, its alliance with the United States, than previous policies.
The Dibb Report received a mixed response. Some experts regarded it as being an important contribution to developing an independent Australian defence posture. Other experts criticised the report for calling for an essentially defensive military strategy, implying that existing Australian military capabilities be abandoned and making optimistic assumptions about the period of time available to detect and respond to new threats to Australia. Many of the Dibb Report's assumptions were used in developing the 1987 Defence White Paper, but the Government did not adopt some of Dibb's key recommendations, such as those concerning Australia's relationship with the United States and the Australian military's role in the Pacific.
He was the head of the National Assessments Staff (the predecessor to the Office of National Assessments) from 1974 to 1978, the director of the Joint Intelligence Organisation (the predecessor to the Defence Intelligence Organisation) from 1986 to 1988, and the head of the Defence Strategy and Intelligence Group with the rank of Deputy Secretary in the Department of Defence from 1988 to 1991. Dibb is also known for his contribution to Australian defence strategy through writing the 1986 Review of Australia’s defence capabilities, known as the Dibb Report, and being the primary author of the 1987 Defence White Paper. From 1965 to 1984, Dibb worked for the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, tasked with gaining intelligence and recruiting KGB and GRU agents in Canberra. In 1991, Dibb retired from the Australian Public Service and became the director of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, part of the Australian National University until 2003–where he is currently the emeritus professor. During the Government of Prime Minister John Howard, Dibb was a member of the Foreign Minister's Foreign Policy Advisory Council.
Dibb's recommendations were based around an assessment that "Australia is one of the most secure countries on earth" and that while there was the potential for regional conflict, the longer-term intentions and capabilities of countries in Australia's region could not be predicted and so did not form a suitable basis for planning.
Dibb recommended for Australia's military posture to be based on a strategy of denying aggressors the ability to attack the country. That was to be achieved through using a layered defence of Jindalee Operational Radar Network (over-the-horizon radar), patrol aircraft and maritime strike aircraft to protect Australia's approaches with the Army's Operational Deployment Force being responsible for defeating any landings on the Australian mainland. That would require changes to the Australian Defence Force's structure and equipment acquisition programs. The policy of self-reliance proposed by Dibb also placed less emphasis on ANZUS, its alliance with the United States, than previous policies.
