Showing posts sorted by relevance for query Financing War. Sort by date Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by relevance for query Financing War. Sort by date Show all posts

Tuesday, April 23, 2019

Financing War - Economics of Defense

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2024 
2022, 2023 
Wartime Production - Mech >> .

In 1942, the government of Mackenzie King launch a propaganda effort that simulates Canada falling under Hitler's yoke. Why? For the war economy of course!

Financing War - Bonds, Loans .. 
Lend-Lease Act 41-3-11 .. 

Geostrategic Projection, 21st
European Geostrategic Projection ..


War finance is a branch of defense economics. The power of a military depends on its economic base and without this financial support, soldiers will not be paid, weapons and equipment cannot be manufactured and food cannot be bought. Hence, victory in war involves not only success on the battlefield but also the economic power and economic stability of a state. War finance covers a wide variety of financial measures including fiscal and monetary initiatives used in order to fund the costly expenditure of a war. Such measures can be broadly classified into three main categories:
The economics of defense or defense economics is a subfield of economics, an application of the economic theory to the issues of military defense. The formal study of economics of defense is a relatively new field. An early specialized work in the field is the RAND Corporation report The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age by Charles J. Hitch and Roland McKean (1960, also published as a book). It is an economic field that studies the management of government budget and its expenditure during mainly war times, but also during peace times, and its consequences on economic growth. It thus uses macroeconomic and microeconomic tools such as game theorycomparative statisticsgrowth theory and econometrics. It has strong ties to other subfields of economics such as public financeeconomics of industrial organizationinternational economicslabour economics and growth economics.

The field revolves around finding the optimal resource allocation among defense and other functions of the government. While the primal goal is to find the optimal size of the defense budget with respect to sizes of other budgets managed by the public body, the field also studies the optimization of allocation among specific missions and outputs such as arms control, disarmament, civil defense, sealift, arms conversion, mobilization bases, or weaponry composition. At the same time, different ways these goals can be achieved are analyzed on lower levels. These consist of finding the optimal choice between alternative logistic arrangements, rifles, specialized equipment, contract provisions, base locations and so on. Since the defense management of a country consists of choosing between many substitutes, an analysis of costs and benefits of various options is vital.

Economizing in the economics of defense represents the principle of reallocating available scarce resources such that an output of the greatest possible value is produced. This can be achieved in two closely-intertwined ways:
  • Improvement of the economic calculus
  • Improvement of the institutional arrangements that shape defense choices
These two are closely intertwined since finding an optimal choice is worthless if institutions lead decision-makers to different choices, just as functioning institutions do not provide much help if an optimal choice is not found. An absence of a widely accepted tool to calculate the change in value when choosing among various options represents a major difficulty in the economics of defense because it makes the identification of the optimal allocation practically impossible. Differences of opinions on security and threat protection topics are common between people, which causes improbability of such tool being ever developed.

Although the economics of defense mainly studies microeconomic topics, which involve allocation optimization and optimal choice identification, it also looks into several macroeconomic topics, which focus on the impact of defense expenditures on various macroeconomic variables such as economic growth, gross domestic product and employment.

In terms of economics, a distinctive feature of the defense is that it is public goods, and as such it is both non-excludable and non-rivalrous. As such, it may suffer the so-called "free rider problem". In the social sciences, the free-rider problem is a type of market failure that occurs when those who benefit from resources, public goods (such as public roads or hospitals), or services of a communal nature do not pay for them or under-pay. Free riders are a problem because while not paying for the good (either directly through fees or tolls or indirectly through taxes), they may continue to access or use it. Thus, the good may be under-produced, overused or degraded. Additionally, it has been shown that despite evidence that people tend to be cooperative by nature, the presence of free-riders cause this prosocial behaviour to deteriorate, perpetuating the free-rider problem.

In economics, a good, service or resource are broadly assigned two fundamental characteristics; a degree of excludability and a degree of rivalry. Excludability is defined as the degree to which a good, service or resource can be limited to only paying customers, or conversely, the degree to which a supplier, producer or other managing body (e.g. a government) can prevent "free" consumption of a good.

In economics, a good is said to be rivalrous or a rival if its consumption by one consumer prevents simultaneous consumption by other consumers, or if consumption by one party reduces the ability of another party to consume it. A good is considered non-rivalrous or non-rival if, for any level of production, the cost of providing it to a marginal (additional) individual is zero. A good is "anti-rivalrous" and "inclusive" if each person benefits more when other people consume it.

A good can be placed along a continuum from rivalrous through non-rivalrous to anti-rivalrous. The distinction between rivalrous and non-rivalrous is sometimes referred to as jointness of supply or subtractable or non-subtractable.

The roots of the science of defense economics can be tracked back to the 1920s when The Political Economy of War by Arthur Cecil Pigou was originally published. While the science as such started developing in the 20th century, many of its topics can be found long before then. 

A major step forward can be then accredited to Charles J. Hitch and Roland McKean and their work The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age from 1960. A great contribution to the subject came in 1975 when the British economist G. Kennedy published his book The Economics of Defence. However, importance of the field grew especially in the late 1980s and early 1990s due to political instability caused by the breakup of the Soviet Union and liberation of Eastern Europe. This resulted in the publication of a complex overview of the current state of the field in 1995 from Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley called The Handbook of Defense Economics.

Generally, developments in defense economics reflect current affairs. During the Cold War, the main topics included superpower arms races, establishment of strong and lasting alliances and nuclear weapon research. After the Cold War, the focus shifted to conversion opportunities, disarmament and the peace dividend availability

At the beginning of the new millennium, the research shifted its attention to an increasing number of regional and ethnic conflicts (Africa, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq), international terrorist threats (terrorist attacks on the USA) and weapons of mass destruction. Besides that, much work was dedicated to NATO, the European Union and other alliances that accepted new members and continued with developing new missions, rules and international organizations, an example being the European Security and Defence Policy, which involved the introduction of the European Defence Equipment Market and the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base.

War-finance measures may include levy of specific taxation, increase and enlarging the scope of existing taxation, raising of compulsory and voluntary loans from the public, arranging loans from foreign sovereign states or financial institutions, and also the creation of money by the government or the central banking authority.

Loot and plunder - or at least the prospect of such - may play a role in war economies. This involves the taking of goods by force as part of a military or political victory and was used as a significant source of a revenue for the victorious state. During the first World War when the Germans occupied the Belgians, the Belgian factories were forced to produce goods for the German effort or dismantled their machinery and took it back to Germany – along with thousands and thousands of Belgian slave factory workers.


If Day ("Si un jour", "If one day") was a simulated Nazi German invasion and occupation of the Canadian city of Winnipeg, Manitoba, and surrounding areas on 19 February 1942, during the Second World War. It was organized by the Greater Winnipeg Victory Loan organization, which was led by prominent Winnipeg businessman J. D. Perrin. The event was the largest military exercise in Winnipeg to that point.

If Day included a staged firefight between Canadian troops and volunteers dressed as German soldiers, the internment of prominent politicians, the imposition of Nazi rule, and a parade. The event was a fundraiser for the war effort: over $3 million was collected in Winnipeg on that day. Organizers believed that the fear induced by the event would help increase fundraising objectives. It was the subject of a 2006 documentary, and was included in Guy Maddin's film My Winnipeg.

War bonds are debt securities issued by a government to finance military operations and other expenditure in times of war. War bonds are either retail bonds marketed directly to the public or wholesale bonds traded on a stock market. Exhortations to buy war bonds are often accompanied by appeals to patriotism and conscience. Retail war bonds, like other retail bonds, tend to have a yield which is below that offered by the market and are often made available in a wide range of denominations to make them affordable for all citizens.

In the United Kingdom, the National Savings Movement was instrumental in raising funds for the war effort during both world wars. During World War II a War Savings Campaign was set up by the War Office to support the war effort. Local savings weeks were held which were promoted with posters with titles such as "Lend to Defend the Right to Be Free", "Save Your Way to Victory" and "War Savings Are Warships".

Canada's involvement in the Second World War began when Canada declared war on Nazi Germany on September 10, 1939, one week after the United Kingdom. Approximately half of the Canadian war cost was covered by War Savings Certificates and war bonds known as "Victory Bonds" as in World War I. War Savings Certificates began selling in May 1940 and were sold door-to-door by volunteers as well as at banks, post offices, trust companies and other authorised dealers. They matured after seven years and paid $5 for every $4 invested but individuals could not own more than $600 each in certificates. Although the effort raised $318 million in funds and was successful in financially involving millions of Canadians in the war effort, it only provided the Government of Canada with a fraction of what was needed.

The sale of Victory Bonds proved far more successful financially. There were ten wartime and one postwar Victory Bond drives. Unlike the War Savings Certificates, there was no purchase limit to Victory Bonds. The bonds were issued with maturities of between six and fourteen years with interest rates ranging from 1.5% for short-term bonds and 3% for long-term bonds and were issued in denominations of between $50 and $100,000. Canadians bought $12.5 billion worth of Victory Bonds or some $550 per capita with businesses accounting for half of all Victory Bond sales.

The first Victory Bond issue in February 1940 met its goal of $20 million in less than 48 hours, the second issue in September 1940 reaching its goal of $30 million almost as quickly.

When it became apparent that the war would last a number of years the war bond and certificate programs were organised more formally under the National War Finance Committee in December 1941, directed initially by the president of the Bank of Montreal and subsequently by the Governor of the Bank of Canada. Under the more honed direction the committee developed strategies, propaganda and the wide recruitment of volunteers for bonds drives. Bond drives took place every six months during which no other organization was permitted to solicit the public for money. The government spent over $3 million on marketing which employed posters, direct mailing, movie trailers (including some by Walt Disney), radio commercials and full page advertisement in most major daily newspaper and weekly magazine. Realistic staged military invasions, such as the If Day scenario in WinnipegManitoba, were even employed to raise awareness and shock citizens into purchasing bonds.

Tuesday, September 19, 2023

War Economies

23-9-15 R-U War: Ukraine's Greatest Economic Catastrophe AND Opportunity - gtbt > .
24-9-8 Ruscian War Economy 2024: sanctions, inflation, mounting risks - Perun > .
24-8-13 Economics of War - CNBC I > .
24-7-28 [Brain Drain & Employment Statistics in Wartime Ruscia] | Researcher > .
24-6-3 [Unsurprising] US microchips in Ruscian weapons | WSJ > . 
24-6-1 Exposing Military Industrial Complex - Ryan McBeth > .
24-4-28 (Realistic) [Ruscian Demographics & Economy Imploding] - Inside R > .
24-4-14 US Arms Production - Strategy to Restore Arsenal of Democracy? - Perun > .
24-3-21 Ukraine attacks Ruscian oil and gas sites to slash P00ti's war chest - Forces > .
24-3-3 R-U War 2024 - Military & Economic Balance of Long War - Perun > .
24-1-20 Can Ruscia win the military production race? - Anders > .
23-12-19 Could Ruscia Rebuild And Threaten NATO by 2027? - gtbt > .
23-12-6 Shadow Fleet Fueling Ruscia’s War | Bloomberg > .
23-12-5 Most Dangerous [XIR] Moment: America’s Role in the Pacific | Hoover > . 
23-12-3 [Fatigue, Politics, Resources & R-U War - Public, Governments] - Perun > .
23-12-2 Huawei: [Subsidized Weapon in Chip War versus USA] - Update > . 
23-11-7 Scientific Progress & War - [Counterproductive for Ruscia] (subs) - Katz > .
23-10-8 West's Commitment to the Defeat of Ruscia? - K&G > .
23-10-6 Konstantin - MiC Kwap & Ruscia's Economy Rubbling - Silicon > .
23-10-2 [Ztupidity: Mobiks' Forever Fight, Convicts' Unleashed Terror] (subs) - Katz > .
23-9-18 South Korean Factory Churning Out Armaments for NATO | WSJ > .
23-9-17 Ruscian Defence Production 2023 vs R-U equipment attrition - Perun > .
> Brain Drain >> & Human Resources 
23-7-30 Skills Wars Are The New Trade Wars | EcEx > .
> Future Combat >>  >> Future >>>
> Krumblin >>  >> Krumblin >>> & Sanctions
23-8-1 Sanctioning Russia | Effects: Dodging Sanctions, Brain Drain (subs) - Katz > .23-2-21 Sanctions, 1 Year Later - M&M > . skip > .
Dodging Sanctions - Weighs 'n Means >> .
> EcWarfare >>

Tuesday, April 30, 2019

●● Home Front


Њ Home Front timeline ..
Home Front timeline & links ..

Agricultural Productivity 

Addison Act of 1919 to Wartime Homes ..
Aussies, Brits vs "Yanks" ..
BBC ..
Blackout .. 
Conditions ~ WW2 ..Economics of Defense ..
Life - WW1 Home Front ..National Loaf ..
Refugee Children Movement - 38-12-2 ..

Wednesday, January 9, 2019

Territorial Army, Reserved Occupations, 44th (Home Counties) Infantry Division, BEF

Territorial Army | Reserved Occupations | 44th (Home Counties) Infantry Division | BEF

Up The Terriers Aka Territorial Army Recruiting (1939)

The Class Z Reserve was a Reserve contingent of the British Army consisting of previously enlisted soldiers, now discharged.

The first Z Reserve was authorised by an Army Order of 3 December 1918. When expected problems with violations of the Armistice with Germany did not eventuate, the Z Reserve was abolished on 31 March 1920

Following the Second World War, a new Z Reserve of soldiers and officers who had served between 3 September 1939 and 31 December 1948 were available for recall if under 45 years of age.
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The Army Reserve (previously known as the Territorial Force, Territorial Army (TA) and the Territorial and Army Volunteer Reserve (TAVR) from 1920 to 2014) was created as the Territorial Force in 1908 by the Secretary of State for War, Richard Haldane, when the Territorial and Reserve Forces Act 1907 combined the previously civilian-administered Volunteer Force, with the mounted Yeomanry (at the same time the Militia was renamed the Special Reserve). Most Volunteer infantry units had unique identities, but lost these in the reorganisation, becoming Territorial battalions of Regular Army infantry regiments. Only one infantry unit, the London Regiment, has maintained a separate identity.

During periods of total war, the Army Reserve is incorporated by the Royal Prerogative into Regular Service under one code of Military Law for the duration of hostilities or until de-activation is decided upon. After the Second World War, for example, the Army Reserve - or Territorial Army as it was known then - was not demobilised until 1947.

New recruiting started in early 1920, and the Territorial Force was reconstituted on 7 February 1920. ... As part of the post-war "Geddes Axe" financial cuts, the TA was further reduced in size in 1922: artillery batteries lost two of their six guns, the established size of infantry battalions was cut and ancillary medical, veterinary, signals and Royal Army Service Corps units were either reduced in size or abolished. The bounty was also reduced to £3 for trained men and £2.10s 0d for recruits, which resulted in finding £1,175,000 of the total savings required from the army as a whole. An innovation in 1922 was the creation of two Air Defence Brigades to provide anti-aircraft defence for London.

On 29 March 1939, it was announced that the size of the TA was to be doubled by the reforming of the 2nd line units. The total strength of the TA was to be 440,000: the field force of the Territorial Army was to rise from 130,000 to 340,000, organised in 26 divisions, while an additional 100,000 all ranks would form the anti-aircraft section. When the 2nd Line was reformed, they were a little different from their First World War predecessors. They had slightly different names and the regiments assigned were different. After VJ Day in August 1945, the Territorial Army was significantly reduced, with all 2nd Line and several 1st Line Divisions once again disbanded.
In 1938, a Schedule of Reserved Occupations was created with the goal of exempting skilled workers from being conscripted into service. This idea was drawn up because of lessons learned during World War I when many skilled labourers were drawn into service, which created problems where positions needed filling. Examples of reserved occupations in the Second World War included coal mining, ship building, and many engineering-related trades. The idea was constantly reviewed throughout the war, as women, again, began to work more in industries such as munitions. This meant that men were free to join other organisations such as the Special Constabulary, the Home Guard or the ARP.

It also allowed for men to join up and give them responsibilities towards the war effort, as well as allowing for them to be less stressed about not being able to directly be involved in the action. Also, many pacifists and conscientious objectors worked in reserved occupations as a compromise or to avoid call-up. Harper Adams Agricultural College saw a huge demand for places during the Second World War, as both agricultural students and farmers were exempt from conscription.
In the UK, coal mining was not a reserved occupation at the start of the war, and there was a great shortage of coal miners. Consequently, starting in December 1943, one in ten men conscripted was chosen at random to work in the mines. These men became known as "Bevin Boys" after the creator of the scheme, Ernest Bevin, the Minister of Labour and National Service.

The territorial division, by now designated as the 44th (Home Counties) Infantry Division, was mobilized on 3 September 1939 on the outbreak of the Second World War. Initially in Southern and then Eastern Commands, the division, under the command of Major-General Edmund Osborne, was sent overseas where it joined the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) in France and Belgium on 1 April 1940, and was assigned to III Corps, commanded by Lieutenant-General Ronald Forbes Adam. It took part in the Battle of St Omer-La Bassée (23–29 May) during the retreat to Dunkirk. At the end of May 1940 they were evacuated at Dunkirk after the German Army threatened to cut off and destroy the entire BEF from the French Army during the battles of France and Belgium.

After returning to England the division, much reduced in manpower and woefully short of equipment, and now under the command of Major-General Arthur Percival (who had taken command in late June 1940, until late March the following year), spent the next nearly two years on home defence, anticipating a German invasion which never arrived, travelling variously through the counties of Kent and Sussex and serving under I and XII Corps.

On 29 May 1942, the division, now under the control of the War Office and commanded by Major-General Ivor Hughes, departed the United Kingdom to take part in the North African Campaign. It arrived in Cairo, Egypt on 24 July – the long sea journey being due to transiting via the Cape of Good Hope.

Less than three weeks after its arrival, however, the division was soon ordered by General Sir Harold Alexander (replacing General Sir Claude Auchinleck on 13 August), the Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C), Middle East, to be sent forward to join the British Eighth Army, commanded by Lieutenant General Bernard Montgomery, at El Alamein. The 44th Division, serving under XIII Corps under Lieutenant-General Brian Horrocks (a former commander of the division between June 1941 and March 1942), fought at the Battle of Alam el Halfa (30 August–7 September) where the 132nd Brigade was temporarily detached to the 2nd New Zealand Division and suffered heavily, with just under 700 casualties being sustained.

On 8 September, the 133rd Brigade was detached from the division. It was briefly assigned to the 8th Armoured Division before being assigned to the 10th Armoured Division on 29 September as a lorried infantry unit. Therefore, as a result of this change, the division started the Battle of El Alamein (23 October–4 November) with just two brigades. It was still assigned to XIII Corps,[59] alongside the 7th Armoured and 50th (Northumbrian) Infantry Divisions. The Corps was on the southern flank with the task of tying down enemy reserves while the main thrust was made in the north with XXX and X Corps. The division was further reduced when the 131st Brigade was also detached. It joined the 7th Armoured Division on 1 November, likewise as a lorried infantry brigade, as its original brigade (the 7th Motor) had been transferred to the 1st Armoured Division.

The Battle of El Alamein was the 44th Division's last action; it was disbanded on 31 January 1943. The 132nd and 133rd Brigade were dispersed, with the battalions ending up as British battalions in British Indian Army brigades. The 131st Brigade continued to serve with the 7th Armoured Division for the rest of the war, taking part in the rest of the North African Campaign, culminating in May 1943 with the surrender of almost 250,000 Axis soldiers as prisoners of war, the Allied invasion of Italy from September–November 1943, and in the campaign in North-West Europe from June 1944 until Victory in Europe Day in May 1945.


Men were expected to do basic training at their local Drill Hall, usually one or two nights a week, for which they received small expenses, and to attend an annual camp, when they were paid as full time soldiers. They also received a Bounty for regular attendance.

The TF was created for home defence but were asked to volunteer to serve abroad. Battalions garrisoned Malta and Gibraltar in September 1914 and the East Lancashire Division went to Egypt.

The first TF infantry sent to France were 14th battalion, London Regiment (London Scottish), who fought at Messines on 31st October 1914. The TF had their own port and base camp at Rouen and other units were gradually transferred to bolster the Expeditionary Force. TF Divisions fought on many fronts during the war.
After WW1 the TF was disbanded as the army reorganised on a peacetime basis, but in 1920 was reconstituted as The Territorial Army. In a long period of defence cuts the TA was an easy target and suffered from lack of money.

They continued to recruit and maintain a basic strength, holding their annual camps (which continued to be a draw for many men, promising a fortnight’s full army pay, good army food and the adventure of military training in the open). To aid recruiting some units added bars, billiard and reading rooms to their Drill Halls.

As WW2 loomed the Bounty and travelling expenses were increased and more allowances paid. By the summer of 1938, buoyed by new recruits, the TA was bigger than at any time after 1920. They were even beginning to see new equipment though, as ever, the Regulars took priority.

Most Yeomanry units replaced their horses with armoured cars. Other units retrained as searchlight and anti-aircraft units. The Munich Crisis of September 1938 saw 58,000 Territorials called up to man anti-aircraft guns around London and thousands more men were recruited. TA units trained alongside Regular Army units at their summer camps in 1938 and 1939.
On the outbreak of WW2 the Government formally incorporated the TA into the British Army. By early 1940 three former Territorial Divisions were in France, the 48th (South Midland), 50th (Northumbrian) and 51st (Highland). At Dunkirk 50th Division fought until their ammunition ran out to allow the maximum number of men to evacuate.

In the 1941 Syrian campaign the Cheshire Yeomanry became the last British unit to go into battle on horseback, crossing the frontier with swords, cap badges and stirrup irons blackened. Other TA units retrained as tank battalions and former TA units fought in the desert, in Italy, at D-Day and on into Germany.
A soldier emerges from the 'mud bath' during training at the 44th Division's battle school near Tonbridge in Kent, 22 April 1942.

Phoney war and Blitzkrieg: the territorial army in 1939–1940
At the ‘outbreak of war in 1939, the Regular army was augmented by Territorials and militia to make up the British Expeditionary Force. By May 1940, they had suffered serious defeats which, given that the Territorials had theoretically been training for years, raised worrying questions. Here Peter Caddick‐Adams explores why the TA was in fact so unprepared for war, tracing back from its initial deployment the roots the problems encountered in. out of date equipment, training, recruitment and leadership, highlighting the dichotomy’ between peacetime and wartime ‘needs. These shortcomings were exacerbated by a lack of understanding of German strength and tactics, which contributed to the defeats encountered in Belgium. After considering the credible performance of the TA against the odds, Captain Caddick‐Adams discusses the poor financing and lack of commitment on the part of the authorities during, the 1930s. Despite these difficulties, TA units performed credibly, and with increasing importance and ability throughout the war. While the TA may be much better integrated into toddy's military capabilities the author concludes that current feelings of under‐ funding and undervalue still prevail and need to be countered if today's TA is not to be taken for granted.

In the late 1930s neither the regular army nor the TA were getting enough recruits. In 1937-8 the regular army, with an establishment of about 200,000 was some 20,000 under strength, and took only 50,000 recruits compared to 70,000 in 1932. However, in April 1939 the Secretary of State for War announced the regular army's total strength as 224,000. The increasing threat of war was gaining recruits, particularly those who wanted to be sure of serving in the regiment or corps of their choice. Most TA units were well under strength, and in the 1930s their reduced establishment was only about 60% of war strength, but totaled some 436,000 including officers. TA artillery regiments had a regular army adjutant, regimental sergeant major and a small number of senior NCOs as 'permanent staff'.

According to the League of Nations Yearbook, there were about 140,000 reservists, although this figure excluded some 40,000 Supplementary Reservists mostly tradesmen whose civilian jobs were directly relevant to the army. However, most reservists were those completing their 12 years of service or had volunteered for reserve service after 12 years. There were three sections of these regular other-rank reservists, excluding the Supplementary:
A - Volunteers enrolled for 1 year at a time who agreed to be called out without Proclamation when 'warlike operations were in preparation or progress' (the Supplementary Reserve was also on this basis).
B - Men completing their 12 years of service.
C - Men who had completed 12 years service and volunteered for a further 4 years reserve service.
B and C were liable to call-out by Proclamation when there was 'imminent national danger', this also extended the service of regular soldiers due to complete their service with the colours. All three sections were liable for annual training but in practice this seldom if ever happened. All this left a substantial number of ex-regular soldiers who had not completed 21 years service and were not part of the Reserve.

There were also only 14,000 regular and 19,000 TA serving officers for the entire army. Regular officers who retired before the compulsory retiring age were liable for service in the Regular Army Reserve of Officers until they reached retiring age. There were also a few thousand reserve TA officers. Of course there were also many thousands of men in their 40s who had been officers in WW1 but were not officially reservists. To put all this in perspective nearly a quarter of a million army Emergency Commissions were granted in WW2.

Artillery strengths were:
31 Dec 1939 - 14,202 Officers, 312,309 Other ranks
31 Dec 1940 - 22,882 Officers, 443,457 Other ranks
31 Dec 1941 - 36,548 Officers, 642,188 Other ranks
Peak strength was reached in about June 1943 when all-rank totals for the British Army's arms were:
Royal Armoured Corps - 120,433
Royal Artillery - 699,993
Royal Engineers - 231,985
Royal Signals - 133,920
Infantry - 551,742
Of the RA totals about 40% was field artillery with about 7% officers, however, AA had only some 5% and Coast 3% officers.

sī vīs pācem, parā bellum

igitur quī dēsīderat pācem praeparet bellum    therefore, he who desires peace, let him prepare for war sī vīs pācem, parā bellum if you wan...