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● Securing Democracy 21st ..
The selectorate theory of government studies the interactive relationships between political survival strategies and economic realities. It is detailed in The Logic of Political Survival (2003). The theory is also applicable to all types of organizations with leadership, including (among others) private corporations and non-state actors.
The theory is known for its use of continuous variables to classify regimes by describing the ratios of coalitions within the total population. Regimes are classified on a spectrum of coalition size, as opposed to conventional, categorical labels (for example, the authors define conventional democracy as a large coalition regime and autocracy as a small coalition regime). The theory has been applied to a large range of topics including foreign aid, the choice of tax rates by incumbent political leaders, as well as medieval European history.
00:00 Intro Risk of Coups / Mass Uprising
2:55 Selectorate Governance: Is Democracy Fragile?
5:25 The Selectorate Theory
12:00 What Do Leaders Do?
37:30 What helps leaders survive?
39:22 Q&A
Comment: 5 Rules of Power Politics
The theory is known for its use of continuous variables to classify regimes by describing the ratios of coalitions within the total population. Regimes are classified on a spectrum of coalition size, as opposed to conventional, categorical labels (for example, the authors define conventional democracy as a large coalition regime and autocracy as a small coalition regime). The theory has been applied to a large range of topics including foreign aid, the choice of tax rates by incumbent political leaders, as well as medieval European history.
In selectorate theory, three groups of people constrain leaders. These groups are the nominal selectorate, the real selectorate, and the winning coalition. The nominal selectorate, also referred to as the interchangeables, includes every person who has some say in choosing the leader (for example, in an American presidential election, this is all registered voters). The real selectorate, also referred to as the influentials, are those who really choose the leaders (for example, in an American presidential election, the people who cast a vote for one of the candidates). The winning coalition, also referred to as the essentials, are those whose support translates into victory (for example, in an American presidential election, those voters that get a candidate to 270 Electoral College votes). In other countries, leaders may stay in power with the support of much smaller numbers of people, such as senior figures in the security forces, and business oligarchs, in contemporary Russia.
The fundamental premise in selectorate theory is that the primary goal of a leader - regardless of secondary policy concerns - is to remain in power. To remain in power, leaders must retain support from every member of their winning coalition. When the winning coalition is small, as in autocracies, the leader will tend to use private goods to satisfy the coalition. When the winning coalition is large, as in democracies, the leader will tend to use public goods to satisfy the coalition.
In The Dictator's Handbook, Bueno de Mesquita and Smith state five rules that leaders should use to stay in power:
The fundamental premise in selectorate theory is that the primary goal of a leader - regardless of secondary policy concerns - is to remain in power. To remain in power, leaders must retain support from every member of their winning coalition. When the winning coalition is small, as in autocracies, the leader will tend to use private goods to satisfy the coalition. When the winning coalition is large, as in democracies, the leader will tend to use public goods to satisfy the coalition.
In The Dictator's Handbook, Bueno de Mesquita and Smith state five rules that leaders should use to stay in power:
- The smaller the winning coalition, the fewer people to satisfy to remain in control.
- Having a large nominal selectorate gives a pool of potential people to replace dissenters in coalition.
- Maintain control of revenue flows to redistribute to your friends.
- But only pay friends enough that they will not consider overthrowing you and at the same time little enough so that they depend on you.
- Don't take your friends' money and redistribute it to the masses.
- The winning coalition need not be the majority of the selectorate.
For example, Duh J tRUMP was elected [UN]president of the United States in 2016 without a majority of all votes cast. In this case, the winning coalition was less than 50% of the real selectorate, all the voters that actually cast a ballot in that election. Additionally, Duh J T's winning coalition represented only 24.5% of the nominal selectorate.
2:55 Selectorate Governance: Is Democracy Fragile?
5:25 The Selectorate Theory
12:00 What Do Leaders Do?
37:30 What helps leaders survive?
39:22 Q&A
1. Depend on as few people as possible.
2. Make the group of people that you can trust as large as possible (make officers expendable).
3. Tax people as highly as you can (not too high that they quit working or revolt)
4. Use minimal amount of that revenue to keep administration loyal.
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