In 1919 Fraser had joined the chemical company Brunner Mond & Co as a manager, remaining when it merged with three other British chemical manufacturers to become Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) in 1926. With 33,000 employees, ICI was one of the largest manufacturers in Britain, able to compete with the rest of the world's chemical producers. Fraser was first appointed director-general of equipment production, before moving to the aircraft production post which he held throughout the rest of the war.
On the outbreak of WW2 a significant number of businessmen were seconded to the civil service, particularly in field of army supply. Fraser was part of this group, joining the War Office in 1939 as Assistant Director General of Progress and Statistics, then Director of Investigation and Statistics in 1940. Moving to the Ministry of Aircraft Production (MAP) in 1942, he became Director General of Equipment Production and, in April 1943, Director General of Aircraft Production, a post he held until the end of the war.
In MAP Fraser worked closely with the Minister of Aircraft Production who, from November 1942, was Sir Stafford Cripps, who worked well with Ministry staff. By 1942 aircraft production had rapidly expanded from a number of small innovative companies to be the largest industry in the country. MAP's role was to monitor and co-ordinate the activity of the industry to maximise output, particularly of bombers, and intervene to remove inefficiency and bad practice where necessary. MAP officials with previous experience in large industries, and who knew more about factories and production lines than ministers and permanent civil servants, played a key role in this work. While Fraser was Director General, Cripps developed Joint Production Consultation Committees, set up in each aircraft factory to allow an exchange of views between managers and workers. These mirrored ICI labour relations policies, which had already recognised works councils for a number of years.
In MAP Fraser worked closely with the Minister of Aircraft Production who, from November 1942, was Sir Stafford Cripps, who worked well with Ministry staff. By 1942 aircraft production had rapidly expanded from a number of small innovative companies to be the largest industry in the country. MAP's role was to monitor and co-ordinate the activity of the industry to maximise output, particularly of bombers, and intervene to remove inefficiency and bad practice where necessary. MAP officials with previous experience in large industries, and who knew more about factories and production lines than ministers and permanent civil servants, played a key role in this work. While Fraser was Director General, Cripps developed Joint Production Consultation Committees, set up in each aircraft factory to allow an exchange of views between managers and workers. These mirrored ICI labour relations policies, which had already recognised works councils for a number of years.
In 1945, Ben, later Sir Ben, Lockspeiser was appointed director-general.
Stories of the Battle of Britain 1940 – Lord Beaverbrook, a Week at the Office .
The first minister, Lord Beaverbrook, pushed for aircraft production to have priority over virtually all other types of munitions production for raw materials. This was needed in the summer and autumn of 1940, but it distorted the supply system of the war economy. It eventually came to be replaced by a quota system, with each supply ministry being allocated a certain amount of raw materials imports to be distributed amongst various projects within the ministries' purviews. Beaverbrook still continued to push hard for increases in aircraft production until he left the ministry to become Minister of Supply.
The result of this effort and management style was that while the number of German fighters available for operations over England fell from 725 to 275, the RAF's complement rose from 644 at the beginning of July 1940 to 732 at the beginning of October 1940.
- Max Aitken, 1st Baron Beaverbrook (14 May 1940 – 1 May 1941)
- John Moore-Brabazon (1 May 1941 – 22 February 1942)
- John Llewellin (22 February 1942 – 22 November 1942)
- Sir Stafford Cripps (22 November 1942 – 25 May 1945)
- Ernest Brown (25 May 1945 – 26 July 1945)
Controversially, under Beaverbrook's tenure the aircraft programs set bore little relation to actually expected aircraft production. Beaverbrook deliberately inserted an extra margin of 15% over and above the very best that British industry could be expected to produce. The extra margin was added to provide an out-of-reach target to British industry so that it would push as hard as possible to increase production. Only with the 'realistic' programme of 1943 was planned aircraft production brought back into line with volumes that could realistically be expected from British factories.
The Ministry was characterised by, for its time, highly unorthodox methods of management, including its initial location at Beaverbrook's home, Stornoway House. The personnel was personally recruited from outside the Air Ministry, interaction was informal, characterised by personal intervention, crisis management and application of willpower to improve output. "Few records were kept, the functions of most individuals were left undefined and business was conducted mainly over the telephone."
One important change made within days of the creation of the ministry was it taking over the RAF's storage units and Maintenance Units which were found to have accepted 1,000 aircraft from the industry, but issued only 650 to squadrons. These management and organisational changes bore results almost immediately: in the first four months of 1940, 2,729 aircraft were produced of which 638 were fighters, while in the following four months crucial to the Battle of Britain combat during May to August 1940, production rose to 4,578 aircraft, of which 1,875 were fighters. This production rate was two and a half times Germany's fighter production at the time. The ministry was additionally able to repair and return to service nearly 1,900 aircraft.
The Ministry was characterised by, for its time, highly unorthodox methods of management, including its initial location at Beaverbrook's home, Stornoway House. The personnel was personally recruited from outside the Air Ministry, interaction was informal, characterised by personal intervention, crisis management and application of willpower to improve output. "Few records were kept, the functions of most individuals were left undefined and business was conducted mainly over the telephone."
One important change made within days of the creation of the ministry was it taking over the RAF's storage units and Maintenance Units which were found to have accepted 1,000 aircraft from the industry, but issued only 650 to squadrons. These management and organisational changes bore results almost immediately: in the first four months of 1940, 2,729 aircraft were produced of which 638 were fighters, while in the following four months crucial to the Battle of Britain combat during May to August 1940, production rose to 4,578 aircraft, of which 1,875 were fighters. This production rate was two and a half times Germany's fighter production at the time. The ministry was additionally able to repair and return to service nearly 1,900 aircraft.
The result of this effort and management style was that while the number of German fighters available for operations over England fell from 725 to 275, the RAF's complement rose from 644 at the beginning of July 1940 to 732 at the beginning of October 1940.
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