23-9-15 Ordered Mobilized | P00ti's Ruscian Subclasses (subs) - Katz > .
23-8-30 Fear is the new normal in Russian politics - Anders > .
23-8-29 Dictatorships: From Spin to Fear | Ruscist Regression (subs) - Katz > .
23-8-2 Single-Industry Towns' Armies | [Factory to Fodder] (subs) - Katz > .
23-7-2 Is Vladimir P00tin’s power coming to an end? | 60 Min Aus > .
23-5-13 [Ztupidity: P00, Babitchkas, Prickozhin, Fodder, nukes, Xi] - CBC > .
23-3-15 Timothy Snyder on reasons for ICC "WAR CRIMES" decision > .
23-3-5 Wagner Group, Russian PMCs & Ukraine - Hx, R-U - Perun > .
23-3-1 [Seven Losses of P00tin: How to Fail Ztupidly as Dicktator - Matters > .
23-2-22 How Ukraine Saved Kyiv: Ruscian Missteps, Ukrainian Ingenuity - Spaniel > .
23-2-5 Scary Stalinism vs Pathetic Pootinism [electioneering] (subs) - Katz > .
23-1-30 Offensive Pooti's Doomed Orcine Escalation (subs) - Katz > .
23-1-19 Kremlin's Bizarre Ideological Mission for 2023 - Vlad > .
22-12-16 3 reasons why Pootin started the ztupid war (subs) - Katz > .
22-12-10 2nd wave of mobilization | cannon meat for 2023 (subs) - Katz > .
22-11-23 Kherson Retreat & Winter Prospects [War Mapped] - gtbt > .
22-11-22 Where Will Ukraine Strike Next? 3 Main Options for Kyiv - Spaniel > .
22-11-22 Can Ruscia's [Press Gang] Mobilization Make a Difference? - T&P > .
22-11-11 Economics of Kamikaze Drones - nwyt > . skip > .
22-10-31 The KGB is not dead, it simply has a new name...(FSB) - Enforcer Matt > .
22-10-27 Pooti's [Desperate] Iranian Drones | Peter Zeihan, Ben Hodges > .
22-10-24 How a Russian Nuclear Strike Could Play Out | WSJ > .
22-10-22 War With Ukraine is Coming Home to Ruscian Mobiki - VICE > .
22-10-21 Response if Russia uses a nuclear weapon in Ukraine? - J K-L > .
22-10-20 The Russian war narrative after mobilization - Anders > .
22-10-20 Ukraine Continues Attacking - Russian Invasion DOC - K&G > .
22-10-16 Nuclear threats from Ruscia (subs) - hromadske > .
22-10-15 [Press Gang] Mobilization | Pooti & cannon meat (subs) - Katz > .
22-10-7 What If Pootin Nukes Ukraine? - OBF > .
22-10-6 Here's How Pootin [Tries to Strike] Back - My Take > .
22-10-4 Pootin’s war: short, medium & long term? – Alex Stubb > .
22-10-4 Melt down | Prigozhin & Kadyrov curse Russian army (subs) - Katz > .
Comment on Ruscian madness:
As a former nuclear operations commander, I have a lot to say about this.
0:00 Introduction and Titles to "RUSSIA | A Very Real Nuclear Threat?"
00:39 Russia, Ukraine and the Nuclear Threat
01:48 The Origins of Nuclear Weapons
02:43 The Development and Spread of Nuclear Weapons
03:35 Efforts to Limit Nuclear Weapons
04:55 Why Russia May Really Consider A Nuclear Strike
06:57 A Nuclear Strike as a De-Escalation Strategy?
08:27 Western Responses to a Russian Nuclear Strike
10:20 International Reactions to a Strike
22-10-3 MADness: RUSCIA | A Very Real Nuclear Threat? - J K-L > .
As a former nuclear operations commander, I have a lot to say about this.
Firstly, we (USA) have a treaty in place within which we inspect each other's nuclear weapons. That not only provides a technical understanding of each other's nuclear capabilities, but also the competency of their procedures and crew force. Like ourselves, there are safeguards in place to restrict the usage of a nuclear weapon without the full agreement of the civilian leadership. I word it that way deliberately. Nuclear operations is specifically unautomated throughout the entire command structure. There are human beings at every level (including the top) to ensure the order is both lawful and correct. The system will not allow any singular individual to give the command to launch a nuclear weapon.
This doesn't mean a launch is impossible, but the situation needs to fit parameters lined out in doctrine and agreed upon by individuals at all levels. How this applies for a "tactical" nuclear weapon is difficult to say as Russia is essentially unique with that type of platform, but the standards for officers in this career path are well beyond the regular force. I'm also of the mind that any nuclear weapon, no matter how small the yield, is strategic in nature. I'm certain my Russian counterparts would have similar views.
As you've partly discussed, there are myriad ways to dissuade a country from a nuclear strike. There are also a plethora of options for responding, most without escalation. I'm not privy to, nor would I be able to discuss if I were, the pathways developed by the wargamers for such a scenario. But US intel and responses so far have been competent and thorough and I personally trust their judgement to make smart decisions.
There are going to be moments during the course of this war that will give the general public pause and there will be rhetoric utilized to inspire panic. These are intentional. Public opinion is a powerful force, both in a democracy and otherwise. I would suggest viewing these statements through this prism.
00:39 Russia, Ukraine and the Nuclear Threat
01:48 The Origins of Nuclear Weapons
02:43 The Development and Spread of Nuclear Weapons
03:35 Efforts to Limit Nuclear Weapons
04:55 Why Russia May Really Consider A Nuclear Strike
06:57 A Nuclear Strike as a De-Escalation Strategy?
08:27 Western Responses to a Russian Nuclear Strike
10:20 International Reactions to a Strike
“Mobik” [мобик] is a Ukrainian portmanteaux term for a Ruscian conscript invader. It combines “mobilized” + “vatnik”. A vatnik [ватник] is a poor, uneducated person who has been zombified by stupefying Ruscist propaganda.
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